Court of Appeals Digest: Aug. 4, 2025

Listen to this article

Civil Precedential

Eminent Domain

Attorney Fees

Appellant Commissioner of Transportation challenged the District Court’s judgment awarding respondent-landowner attorney fees and expenses in an eminent-domain proceeding. MnDOT sought a temporary easement and fee acquisition so it could improve a highway in Grand Marais. MnDOT contended that the District Court’s award must be reversed and remanded for two reasons: first, the District Court erred as a matter of law by awarding attorney fees not authorized by Minn. Stat. § 117.031(a) and, second, the District Court abused its discretion by misapplying the lodestar method. § 117.031(a) unambiguously provides that a District Court must award a property owner reasonable attorney fees and expenses if the final judgment or damages award exceeds $25,000 and is more than 40% greater than the condemning authority’s last written offer before petitioning for condemnation. MnDOT posited that the District Court erred by awarding attorney fees and expenses not authorized by § 117.031(a) because the award included fees and expenses incurred for respondent’s failed objection to the condemnation petition.

The Court of Appeals held that reasonable attorney fees and expenses awarded in an eminent-domain proceeding under § 117.031(a) must relate to the work performed to obtain the final judgment or award for damages and may include fees incurred in defending an objection to the eminent-domain proceeding. Furthermore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in applying the lodestar method and determining the amount of reasonable fees and expenses that respondent was entitled. Affirmed.

A24-1713 State by Comm’r of Transp. v. Williams (Cook County)

Service of Process

Substitute Service

The issue on appeal in this insurance-coverage dispute was whether the plaintiffs properly commenced the action under the substituted-service statute, Minn. Stat. § 45.028. Plaintiff-respondents did not file an affidavit on or before the return day of the process, but the District Court allowed them further time to file one beyond that date. Defendant-appellant maintained that the statute did not authorize a District Court to extend the filing deadline beyond the return date of the process and, alternatively, that the District Court abused its discretion in granting an extension here.

The Court of Appeals held that (1) under Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd. 2, which requires a plaintiff commencing an action under the substituted-service statute to file an affidavit of compliance “on or before the return day of the process, if any, or within further time as the court allows,” a District Court may extend the time to file the affidavit beyond the return day of the process; and (2) the Court of Appeals reviews a challenge to the District Court’s decision to allow further time to file an affidavit of compliance for an abuse of discretion. Affirmed.

A25-0089 Drewicke v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. (Traverse County)

Civil Nonprecedential

Breach of Contract

Mediation Requirement

Following a court trial in this construction dispute, the District Court entered judgment in favor of respondent-homeowners on their claims and awarded damages. On appeal, appellant-contractor sought reversal of the judgment, raising several arguments. Appellant argued that the District Court erred in granting relief to respondents because respondents’ claims were barred by their failure to comply with the contractual requirement that the parties participate in mediation prior to bringing a lawsuit. Appellants also argued that respondents’ claims were released by the terms of the contract when respondents took occupancy of the home, that that respondents failed to mitigate their damages, that the District Court erred by rescinding a valid change order, and the District Court erred by dismissing appellant’s fraud claim against respondents. The Court of Appeals concluded that appellant forfeited the mediation argument by failing to raise the issue until the end of trial, more than two years after respondents commenced this litigation. The remainder of appellant’s claims also did not warrant relief. Affirmed.

A24-1621 Lukens v. Snowman Constr., LLC (Blue Earth County)

Breach of Fiduciary Duties

Damages

Following a jury verdict for respondents on a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim in this action arising out of a family business, and the District Court’s denial of appellant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and for a new trial, appellant argued the District Court (1) erred by denying the JMOL motion because damages were speculative and based on a theory that had not been pled and (2) abused its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial because the court should have granted his motion in limine and because the evidence did not show that appellant owed respondents a fiduciary duty when the alleged breach occurred. The Court of Appeals concluded that there was a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury’s award of $500,000 that was separate and apart from the challenged failure-to-repurchase theory. Affirmed.

A24-1802 Evanson v. Bealka (Winona County)

Civil Commitment

Mental Illness; Likelihood of Harm

Appellant challenged the District Court’s order civilly committing her as a person who posed a risk of harm due to mental illness, contending that the record did not establish (1) that she posed a substantial likelihood of physical harm based on a failure to provide herself with necessary food or shelter and (2) that she posed a substantial likelihood of physical harm based on a future risk of significant psychiatric deterioration. Noting the finding that appellant had lost over 40 pounds in the previous few months because she was not eating, the Court of Appeals found no error. Affirmed.

A25-0233 In re Civ. Commitment of Dmitrieva (Hennepin County)

Civil Commitment

SDP; Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellant challenged his indeterminate civil commitment to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP), arguing that the record lacked clear and convincing evidence that (1) he met the definition of a sexually dangerous person (SDP) or (2) he had a sexual psychopathic personality (SPP). Appellant argued in the alternative that (3) he proved by clear and convincing evidence that a less-restrictive alternative to commitment was available and appropriate. Noting the multiple criminal charges over a 16-year period, the Court of Appeals found no error in the District Court’s determinations. Affirmed.

A25-0338 In re Civ. Commitment of Frank (Chippewa County)

Construction

Warranties

This appeal concerned the scope of liability following a pipe burst that occurred at a mixed-use building while it was undergoing significant repairs. Appellant-building owner challenged the District Court’s dismissal of all of its claims against respondents, who were contractors and other parties who made or designed the repairs. Appellant argued, inter alia, that the District Court (1) erred by dismissing its breach-of-warranty claims, and (2) erred by dismissing its negligence claims. The Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court did not err by determining that any transferrable warranties expired and that appellant otherwise did not raise viable breach-of-warranty claims. And the District Court properly determined that the respondents lacked a duty of care to appellant. Affirmed.

A24-1225 JHP 2309 Lyndale, LLC v. Icon Homes LLC (Hennepin County)

Domestic Relations

Child Protection; Termination of Parental Rights

Appellant-father challenged the District Court’s order terminating his parental rights, arguing that the District Court made an erroneous factual finding and its order was insufficient for appellate review. Appellant also contended that the District Court abused its discretion when it determined that respondent-county made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. The Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court’s finding that the facts alleged in the petition were proven was not clearly erroneous, the order was sufficient to effectuate meaningful appellate review, and there was no abuse of discretion. Affirmed.

A25-0211 In re Welfare of Children of A.R. (Ramsey County)

Election Law

Fair Campaign Practices

In this certiorari appeal, pro se relator-candidate challenged the dismissal by an administrative-law judge (ALJ) of his administrative complaint against respondent, a state representative, for unfair campaign practices, asserting that (1) the hearing process violated his due-process rights and (2) the ALJ erred by applying a more stringent standard than probable cause. The Court of Appeals concluded that the ALJ did not commit an error of law by allowing respondent’s counsel to question respondent during the probable-cause hearing, that the ALJ’s exclusion of relator’s proffered evidence and quashing the subpoena was permitted by law, that the ALJ did not deny relator’s complaint based on the posthearing submissions, and that the ALJ did not apply a more stringent standard than probable cause when it dismissed the complaint. Affirmed.

A24-1719 Scheffler v. Heintzeman (Office of Admin. Hearings)

Employment

Discrimination

Appellant challenged the summary-judgment dismissal of his claim against respondent city, his former employer, for an alleged violation of the Minnesota whistleblower act (MWA). In its summary-judgment order, the District Court applied the McDonnell Douglas framework and determined that dismissal was appropriate because appellant had not produced evidence showing that the city’s proffered reason for terminating him was a pretext for retaliation. Appellant argued that the District Court erred by applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to an MWA claim. Appellant also argued, in the alternative, that summary judgment was inappropriate under McDonnell Douglas because the evidence was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact that the city’s proffered reason for his termination was pretextual and the discharge was actually motivated by retaliatory animus. The Court of Appeals concluded that McDonnell Douglas applies to appellant’s MWA claim and that, under that framework, the record did not present a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Affirmed.

A24-2001 Olds v. City of Moorhead (Clay County)

Financial Exploitation of Vulnerable Adults

Elements

Appellant challenged the summary-judgment dismissal of her claim against respondents-banks, arguing that the District Court erred when it determined that there existed no genuine issues of material fact that respondents aided and abetted the financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult. The Court of Appeals held that Minn. Stat. § 626.557, subd. 20, does not provide a cause of action for aiding and abetting the financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult, that Minnesota has not recognized the common-law tort of undue influence, and that, even if undue influence was a tort, the District Court did not err by granting summary judgment because the estate failed to present evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the elements of the claim. Affirmed.

A25-0168 Shega v. Am. Bank of N. (St. Louis County)

Harassment Restraining Orders

Harassment

Pro se appellant argued that the record did not support the District Court’s denial of his petition for a harassment restraining order (HRO) against respondent, a resident of a neighboring property who allegedly “stared ominously” at appellant. Noting that appellant failed to show that respondent’s conduct caused him a substantial adverse effect on his safety, security, or privacy, the Court of Appeals found no error in the District Court’s conclusions. Affirmed.

A24-1846 Williams v. Moran (Crow Wing County)

Harassment Restraining Orders

Hearings

Parents of appellant successfully separately petitioned for harassment restraining orders against her after she allegedly began harassing them and her younger siblings by repeatedly falsely reporting to law enforcement and child protection that they were committing child abuse. Appellant argued on appeal that she was denied a proper hearing and that the record did not support the orders. The Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court’s procedure was proper and its decision was within its discretion, but the evidence did not support the orders as applied to appellant’s siblings and the orders must be clarified so as not to prohibit appellant from making good-faith child-abuse reports. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

A24-1885, A24-1886 Yusuf v. Yusuf (In re Abas) (Washington County)

Judges

Bias

Pro se appellant argued that the District Court engaged in judicial misconduct because, during the initial hearing in this probate dispute, it unfairly limited his time to present opening and closing arguments, violated his right to be heard, and showed bias and lacked impartiality. Noting that there was nothing in the record suggesting that the District Court committed judicial misconduct by displaying bias or a lack of impartiality by limiting the time for argument or not considering appellant’s argument, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court did not engage in judicial misconduct. Affirmed.

A25-0463 In re Estate of Wennes (Ramsey County)

Municipalities

Code Enforcement

Pro se relator homeowner challenged a citation and fine for storing firewood in a manner that did not comply with city code, arguing that respondent city violated his constitutional rights by encroaching upon the curtilage of his home and that the hearing officer’s upholding of the citation and fine was not based on substantial evidence in the record. Noting that appellant agreed that one of his firewood stacks could be seen from the street, the Court of Appeals concluded that, because none of the factors weighed in favor of concluding that the apprentice intruded upon appellant’s curtilage, the apprentice did not intrude upon appellant’s curtilage when he viewed the firewood stack. Furthermore, substantial evidence supported the hearing officer’s decision to uphold the city’s citation and fine for appellant’s improper storage of firewood in violation of the city code.

A24-1550 City of Brooklyn Park v. Doleman (City of Brooklyn Park Admin. Enf’t Program)

Public Utilities

Rate Changes

Relators challenged a decision by respondent Minnesota Public Utilities Commission (that transitioned the method used by respondent Northern States Power Company to calculate bill credits for subscribers of certain Community Solar Gardens. Relators raised eight arguments, contending that the commission: (1) exceeded its statutory authority, (2) impermissibly engaged in retroactive-ratemaking, (3) issued an order that was arbitrary and capricious, (4) should have ordered a contested-case hearing, (5) violated the Contract Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions, (6) violated the federal and state constitutional Takings Clauses, (7) violated the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, and (8) issued an order that violated the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The Court of Appeals found no error, concluding, inter alia, that the commission’s action did not violate Minn. Stat. § 216B.1641 or 216B.164, or Minn. R. 7835.4023. Affirmed.

A24-1450, A24-1454, A24-1455, A24-1700, A24-1741, A24-1750 In re N. State Power Co. (Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n)

Real Property

Mobile Homes

The issue in this appeal was whether the terms “mobile home” and “manufactured home” are legally synonymous such that referring to a mobile home as a manufactured home in a contract for deed cannot constitute a false statement. The District Court granted summary judgment for respondent-sellers after concluding that the terms were interchangeable under Minnesota law. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the terms manufactured home and mobile home are interchangeable under Minnesota law. Affirmed.

A24-1966 Hatlevig v. Schott (Winona County)

Trusts

Beneficiaries

This appeal arose from litigation over a family trust. Under the trust’s terms, settlors’ three children, appellant and respondents, were the co-trustees and sole beneficiaries. The trust’s sole asset was all the shares of an S-corporation that operated a resort property on Lake Vermillion. Respondent and his spouse managed and operated the property. Appellant filed this action in his capacity as a beneficiary, alleging that respondents breached their fiduciary duties to appellant in their administration of the trust and operation of the property. Following a bench trial, the District Court denied appellant’s claims and filed an order to show cause why appellant should not be sanctioned for engaging in frivolous litigation. Appellant moved for a new trial, arguing the District Court made legal errors and findings unsupported by the record. Appellant also filed a motion to remove the District Court judge. The District Court then sanctioned appellant in the amount of $25,000 and denied both motions. On appeal, appellant challenged the District Court’s posttrial decisions to: (1) deny his motion for a new trial; (2) impose sanctions; and (3) deny the motion to remove the judge. The Court of Appeals concluded that it was a legal error when the District Court failed to evaluate appellant’s claims based on his role as a beneficiary, and that, because this legal error pervaded the District Court’s analysis, the District Court abused its discretion when it denied the motion for a new trial. Furthermore, some of the District Court’s findings were unsupported by the record, and the District Court abused its discretion when it imposed sanctions because appellant’s claims were not frivolous. But there was no error in the denial of the motion to remove. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

A24-1421 In re Tr. of Karakash Fam. Tr. (St. Louis County)

Civil Order Opinions

Evidence
Review

Appellant challenged the District Court’s decision to enter judgment in favor of respondent following a jury trial on appellant’s defamation counterclaim. Appellant argued that the District Court abused its discretion when it failed to exclude a police chief’s testimony under Minn. R. Evid. 403. The Court of Appeals concluded that appellant forfeited appellate review of this issue by failing to raise an objection at trial and failed to file a motion in limine before trial or a motion for a new trial after trial. Affirmed.

A24-1967 Dotson v. Smith (Hennepin County)

Criminal Precedential

Illegal Firearm Possession

Constitutionality

In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction, defendant argued that Minn. Stat. § 609.667(3), as applied to his possession of a firearm without a serial number, violates the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution because defendant’s firearm never had a serial number The Court of Appeals held that § 609.667(3) does not violate the Second Amendment to as applied to defendant’s possession of a privately made firearm without a serial number. Affirmed.

A24-1249 State v. Jones (Ramsey County)

Criminal Nonprecedential

Disorderly Conduct

Constiutionality

A jury found defendant guilty of disorderly conduct based on evidence that he made crude, offensive, and disrespectful statements to the police chief. Based on the nature of defendant’s words and the surrounding circumstances, as reflected in the videorecording of the incident, the Court of Appeals concluded that the statements for which defendant was convicted, including “I hope they exterminate you. . . . Take that badge off and come out in the woods,” were not “fighting words” and, thus, were protected by the First Amendment. Reversed.

A24-1585 State v. Miller (Crow Wing County)

Driving Infractions

Jury Instructions

A jury found defendant guilty of failing during a traffic stop to provide proof of vehicle insurance. She sought a new trial, arguing that the District Court’s unobjected-to jury instructions were plainly erroneous because they did not expressly say that she could have provided proof electronically and could have provided proof after the traffic stop. The Court of Appeals concluded that the jury instructions were not erroneous. Affirmed.

A24-1406 State v. Myers (Itasca County)

Evidence

Relevance

In this pretrial appeal, the state challenged the District Court’s order excluding evidence found during the searches of defendant’s dorm room and car. The state argued that exclusion of the evidence would have a critical impact on its ability to successfully prosecute defendant for terroristic threats-reckless disregard, and that the District Court abused its discretion when it determined that the evidence was not relevant and that any probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. By way of a cross-appeal, defendant challenged the District Court’s denial of his motion to exclude evidence related to a prior incident. The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court’s determination that the evidence found in defendant’s dorm room and car as part of the investigation into the disposal of boxes of ammunition was not relevant to the terroristic threats-reckless disregard charge, and, as the evidence was not relevant, its exclusion could not have a critical impact on the state’s case. Appeal dismissed.

A24-1980 State v. Kurts (Rice County)

Hearsay

Residual Exception

In this direct appeal from convictions for felony threats of violence and misdemeanor domestic assault, defendant argued: (1) that the District Court prejudicially abused its discretion in admitting certain hearsay evidence; (2) that defendant’s substantial rights were affected by prosecutorial misconduct in cross-examination and closing argument; and (3) that the District Court erred by imposing sentences for both offenses. The Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court acted within its discretion by admitting the victim’s statements to the police officer, the social worker, and the child-protection investigator under the residual-hearsay exception, and that, even if the District Court abused its discretion by admitting the victim’s hearsay statements through the nurse’s testimony under the medical-diagnosis exception, defendant was not prejudiced by the admission of that evidence. But the District Court erred by sentencing defendant for both offenses. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

A24-1302 State v. Hashi (Hennepin County)

Murder

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant sold pills to a man who died of an overdose. After a stipulated-evidence court trial, the District Court found defendant guilty of third-degree murder and second-degree manslaughter. Defendant argued that, because he believed that the pills contained oxycodone and did not know that the pills contained fentanyl, the evidence was insufficient to prove that he proximately caused the victim’s death. Noting that defendant’s knowledge or understanding of the ingredients of the pills that he sold to the victim was immaterial, the Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction of third-degree controlled-substance murder. Affirmed.

A24-1418 State v. Harlan (Hennepin County)

Probation Revocation

Need for Confinement

Defendant challenged an order by the District Court that revoked his probation and executed his prison sentences in two District Court files for second- and third-degree burglary. In particular, defendant argued that the District Court abused its discretion in revoking his probation because the record did not establish that the need for confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation. Noting defendant’s continued lack of cooperation with probation, his need for treatment, and the manner in which his conduct precluded probationary supervision, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court made sufficient findings that were adequately supported by the record. Affirmed.

A24-1811 State v. Lee (Freeborn County)

Right to Public Trial

Plain Error

Following his conviction of two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, defendant challenged the District Court’s (1) decision to close the courtroom for a portion of voir dire and (2) imposition of conditional-release terms on his stayed prison sentences. Defendant did not object to the courtroom closure at trial. The Court of Appeals concluded that, even if it assumed that the District Court committed error that was plain when it closed the courtroom for a portion of voir dire, the closure did not affect defendant’s substantial rights. However, the District Court erred when it imposed conditional-release terms on defendant’s stayed prison sentences. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

A24-1415 State v. Perez Solis (Mower County)

Right to Speedy Trial

Reason for Delay

In this appeal from the final judgment of conviction of third-degree assault, defendant argued that his conviction must be reversed because his right to a speedy trial was denied when the state dismissed and refiled the complaint.  Noting that the delay was caused entirely by the state’s inability to secure the victim’s presence for trial, and that the state’s reason to dismiss the original complaint, and later refile, was to secure its case for trial, the Court of Appeals concluded that defendant’s speedy-trial right was violated. Reversed.

A24-1248 State v. Voeller (Dakota County)

Sentencing

Downward Departures

On direct appeal from his conviction of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, defendant argued that the District Court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a downward dispositional departure. Noting that it was clear that the District Court weighed the reasons for and against a downward dispositional departure, the Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion. Affirmed.

A24-1564 State v. Bounhom (Ramsey County)

Sentencing

Downward Departures

Defendant challenged the District Court’s decision not to impose a downward dispositional departure for his conviction for second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon. Defendant argued the District Court abused its discretion when it denied his departure motion because: (1) the District Court improperly relied on offense-related factors and (2) defendant was particularly amenable to probation. Noting that the record reflected that the District Court considered the reasons for a departure, the Court of Appeals concluded the District Court did not abuse its discretion. Affirmed.

A24-1762 State v. Carlson (Isanti County)

Sentencing

Downward Departures

Defendant challenged the District Court’s denial of his motion for a downward dispositional departure or a downward durational departure from the presumptive guidelines sentence following his conviction of fleeing police in a motor vehicle. The Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court did not err in its application of the law or abuse its discretion by imposing a sentence within the presumptive range. Affirmed.

A24-1637 State v. Hoberg (Hennepin County)

Sentencing

Downward Departures

Defendant challenged the District Court’s decision to deny her motion for a downward dispositional departure for her conviction for second-degree criminal sexual conduct. Noting that the District Court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented, the Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion. Affirmed.

A24-1592 State v. Mayry (Hennepin County)

Sentencing

Predatory Offender

In this direct appeal from a conviction of stalking, and following a stay for postconviction proceedings, defendant argued that the District Court improperly required that he register as a predatory offender because a dismissed kidnapping charge, which triggered the registration requirement, was not supported by probable cause. The Court of Appeals concluded that defendant’s valid guilty plea waived his probable-cause challenge, and probable cause supported the kidnapping charge. Affirmed.

A24-0531 State v. Schoeviller (Crow Wing County)

Spreigl Evidence

Prejudice

Defendant argued that his two convictions of possession of child pornography should be reversed because the District Court erroneously admitted Spreigl evidence of a prior conviction for the same offense and there was a reasonable possibility that the evidence significantly affected the verdict. The Court of Appeals concluded that, even if it were to assume that the District Court erred in admitting the Spreigl evidence, there was not a reasonable possibility that its admission significantly affected the jury’s verdict. Affirmed.

A24-1425 State v. Wininngham (Hennepin County)

Witness Tampering

Single Behavioral Incident

In this pretrial prosecution appeal, the state challenged the District Court’s order dismissing a complaint charging defendant with two misdemeanors—third-degree witness tampering and violating an order for protection (OFP). The state argued that the District Court erred in dismissing the complaint under Minn. Stat. § 609.035 after defendant pleaded guilty to felony witness tampering in a separate case because the misdemeanor case and the felony case involved separate behavioral incidents. The Court of Appeals agreed that the two cases involved separate behavioral incidents because the offenses did not arise from the same course of conduct and prosecution was not barred under § 609.035. Reversed and remanded.

A25-0239 State v. Rorman (Hennepin County)

Criminal Order Opinions

Postconviction Relief

Time Bar

Petitioner appealed the denial as untimely and Knaffla-barred of his third postconviction petition challenging his conviction for, among other charges, second-degree intentional murder. Noting that petitioner’s implication was that COVID-19 was the injustice that caused him to miss the two-year limit, but that his earlier petitions had been filed in 2020 and 2021, the Court of Appeals concluded that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in summarily denying the petition. Affirmed.

A24-1831 Harris v. State (Ramsey County)

Postconviction Relief

Time Bar

Petitioner appealed the denial as untimely and Knaffla-barred of his fourth postconviction petition challenging his conviction for second-degree intentional murder. Noting that petitioner could not satisfy the interests-of-justice exception, the Court of Appeals concluded that the postconviction court did not err by concluding that the petition was both time-barred and procedurally barred. Affirmed.

A24-1834 Turner v. State (Hennepin County)