Minnesota Lawyer//May 21, 2026//
Civil Nonprecedential
Civil Commitment
SDP; Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant challenged his indeterminate commitment to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) as a sexually dangerous person (SDP), arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish the statutory criteria for commitment and that a less-restrictive treatment alternative was available. The Court of Appeals held that the district court did not clearly err by determining that appellant engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct, manifested qualifying disorders, and was highly likely to engage in future harmful sexual conduct. The court concluded that appellant’s criminal-sexual-conduct convictions presumptively satisfied the harmful-sexual-conduct requirement and that the district court properly relied on expert testimony, actuarial assessments, treatment history, and appellant’s own testimony in assessing future dangerousness. Affirmed.
A25-1980 In re Civ. Commitment of Lafountaine (Dakota County)
Default Judgment
Success on the Merits
Appellant family acquaintance challenged the denial of his motion to vacate a default judgment requiring him to return personal property belonging to respondents’ deceased father. The Court of Appeals held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that appellant failed to satisfy the first Finden factor necessary for relief under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(a)—a reasonable defense on the merits or debatably meritorious claim. The court concluded that respondents’ ownership rights to the disputed property were established by a probate court decree of descent, which appellant could not collaterally attack in the separate civil action. Because appellant admitted possessing the property and refusing to return it, and because his asserted defenses depended on challenging the validity of the probate decree, appellant failed to establish a cognizable defense or claim in the litigation. Affirmed.
A25-1712 Witthaus v. Barnes (Stearns County)
Domestic Relations
Dissolution; Martial Assets
Appellant wife challenged a dissolution judgment, arguing that the district court inequitably divided marital assets and debts, improperly denied spousal maintenance and need-based attorney fees, and erroneously denied her motion to compel discovery. The Court of Appeals held that the district court did not abuse its broad discretion in dividing the parties’ property and debts because its findings regarding wife’s dissipation of marital assets, possession of personal property, and receipt of marital funds after separation were supported by the record and credibility determinations entitled to deference. The court further held that the district court properly denied spousal maintenance because wife failed to provide sufficient evidence establishing need. The court also concluded that denial of need-based attorney fees was proper because the district court reasonably determined that husband lacked the means to contribute to wife’s fees and that wife had sufficient resources or earning capacity to pay her own fees. Finally, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying wife’s untimely motion to compel discovery where she failed to demonstrate that husband’s discovery responses were insufficient. Affirmed.
A25-1240 Baer v. Baer (Blue Earth County)
Domestic Relations
Parenting Time; Reduction
Appellant father challenged parenting-time, child-support, and attorney-fee determinations in a dissolution proceeding. The Court of Appeals held that the district court inadequately explained why reducing father’s parenting time from equal parenting time to a less-than-equal schedule was in the children’s best interests, requiring reversal and remand for additional findings. The court further held that the district court did not clearly err in calculating mother’s self-employment income for child-support purposes and properly awarded mother need-based attorney fees based on the parties’ financial circumstances. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
A25-0812 Rivera v. Rivera (Washington County)
Harassment Restraining Orders
Harassment
Appellant mother challenged the issuance of a harassment restraining order (HRO) obtained by her adult son, arguing that the evidence did not establish repeated contact, objectively unreasonable conduct, or a substantial adverse effect on his safety, security, or privacy. The Court of Appeals held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding repeated unwanted contact based on testimony and documentary evidence showing that appellant continued emailing and contacting respondent and his wife after repeated requests for no contact. The court further held that the district court properly determined that appellant’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of the parties’ strained relationship, respondent’s efforts to keep his contact information private, and appellant’s continued attempts to contact him and appear at family-related events. Affirmed.
A25-1558 Rasmusson v. Gielen (Itasca County)
Insurance
Underinsured Motorists
Appellant widow challenged dismissal of claims seeking to recover stacked underinsured-motorist (UIM) benefits under multiple vehicle policies following her husband’s fatal automobile accident. The Court of Appeals held that the district court properly dismissed appellant’s breach-of-contract-related claims under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) because the complaint failed to state legally sufficient claims under the doctrines of reasonable expectations, fraudulent coverage, illusory coverage, and the made-whole doctrine. The court concluded that the insurance policy unambiguously limited UIM recovery to the $1,000,000 policy limit applicable to the accident vehicle regardless of the number of insured vehicles, that the challenged anti-stacking language was plainly disclosed in the policy’s liability-limits section, and that appellant failed to allege facts showing ambiguity, fraud, misleading conduct, or functionally nonexistent coverage. The court further held that the district court properly declined to address appellant’s constitutional challenge to Minnesota’s anti-stacking statute because the outcome of the dispute was controlled by the plain language of the insurance contract rather than the statute itself. Affirmed.
A25-1452 Schroeder v. N. Star Mut. Ins. Co. (Lyon County)
Municipalities
Cannabis Licensing
Relators cannabis-business applicants challenged a city council’s denial of their application for a cannabis retail business registration after the city had adopted an ordinance requiring registrations to be issued on a first-come, first-served basis. The Court of Appeals held that the city council’s denial of the application was a quasi-judicial decision because it involved applying established ordinance criteria to a specific applicant and affected only the applicant’s rights rather than the public generally. The court further held that the denial was contrary to law because the undisputed record showed that relators satisfied all requirements of the city’s ordinance, yet the council denied the application despite the ordinance mandating registration on a first-come, first-served basis for qualifying applicants. The court also concluded that the denial was arbitrary because the council’s discussion focused primarily on disagreement with state cannabis policy and frustration over limited municipal control rather than any deficiency in relators’ application. The court declined to order issuance of the registration in light of subsequent amendments to the city’s cannabis ordinance but reversed the denial of the application. Reversed.
A25-1356 Schlichter v. City of Albert Lea (City of Albert Lea)
Public Records
Disciplinary Actions
Appellant government-transparency organization challenged summary judgment dismissing its claims under the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (MGDPA) after a city refused to disclose police-department coaching records relating to officer misconduct investigations. The Court of Appeals held that the district court erred by construing “disciplinary action” under Minn. Stat. § 13.43 too narrowly as limited to punitive or penalizing measures. The court concluded that “disciplinary action” also includes corrective actions imposed in response to employee misconduct complaints or charges. Applying that interpretation, the court determined that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the police department treated “coaching” as discipline because record evidence included notices and communications expressly referring to coaching as “discipline,” while other evidence suggested department leadership viewed coaching as non-disciplinary. The court further held that the district court should reconsider on remand whether the city violated the MGDPA by failing to conduct an adequate search for responsive records. Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the city was not required to create redacted summary data absent a specific request for such data and rejected appellant’s argument that the district court improperly reversed the MGDPA’s presumption favoring public access. Reversed and remanded.
A25-0919 Minn. Coalition on Gov’t Info. v. City of Minneapolis (Hennepin County)
Civil Order Opinions
Civil Commitment
SDP; Right to Self-Representation
Appellant challenged the denial of his Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion seeking relief from a 2012 judgment indeterminately committing him as a sexually dangerous person, arguing that he was deprived of a right to self-representation during the commitment proceedings and that the district court improperly adopted the county’s proposed findings nearly verbatim. The Court of Appeals concluded that appellant failed to establish any due-process violation because the record showed that he never objected to appointed counsel, never sought to waive counsel or represent himself, and affirmatively stipulated that he was satisfied with counsel’s representation during the commitment proceedings. Affirmed.
A25-1650 In re Civ. Commitment of Birkholtz (Morrison County)
Civil Commitment
SDP; Right to Self-Representation
Appellant challenged the denial of his Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion seeking relief from his indeterminate civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person, arguing that he was deprived of a right to self-representation during the original commitment proceedings in light of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s later decision recognizing a waivable right to counsel in Commitment Appeal Panel proceedings. The Court of Appeals concluded that the supreme court’s decision recognizing a waivable right to counsel in Commitment Appeal Panel proceedings did not establish a right to self-representation during initial commitment proceedings and, in any event, appellant never requested to waive counsel or represent himself during those proceedings. Affirmed.
25-1703 In re Civ. Commitment of Metzger (St. Louis County)
Criminal Nonprecedential
Criminal Sexual Conduct
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant challenged his conviction for first-degree criminal sexual conduct and his aggravated sentence. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to prove force because defendant physically assaulted the victim shortly before the sexual penetration during a continuous course of conduct. The court further held that defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial on aggravating sentencing factors was invalid because the district court failed to properly advise him of that right, but concluded the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because overwhelming evidence supported the aggravating factors of threats, taunts, and degradation. Affirmed.
A25-0659 State v. Ibrahim (Stearns County)
Felony Murder
Aiding & Abetting
Petitioner challenged the denial of his preliminary application seeking permission to petition for vacatur of his aiding-and-abetting second-degree felony-murder conviction under an uncodified law enacted on May 19, 2023, which provides a means of obtaining relief from aiding-and-abetting felony-murder convictions under certain circumstances. The Court of Appeals held that the reviewing judge abused discretion by denying the preliminary application solely on the ground that defendant was a major participant in the underlying felony without considering whether defendant acted with extreme indifference to human life. Reversed and remanded.
A25-1481 Omuya v. State (Hennepin County)
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Vouching Testimony
Defendant challenged his convictions for third-degree assault and felony domestic assault, arguing that the prosecutor committed misconduct by improperly vouching for the victim’s credibility, eliciting vouching testimony from a police sergeant, and misstating the evidence during closing argument. The Court of Appeals held that most of the challenged statements constituted permissible argument regarding the victim’s credibility and consistency rather than improper personal endorsement. Although the court concluded that the prosecutor’s statement that the victim “told you the truth” constituted improper vouching, the error was harmless because the evidence of guilt was strong, the misconduct was limited, and defendant had an opportunity to rebut the argument. The court further held that the sergeant’s testimony describing the complainant as a domestic-violence victim did not constitute improper vouching because it merely referenced information contained in police reports and did not explicitly comment on credibility. Finally, the court concluded that the prosecutor did not misstate the evidence by arguing that the victim’s testimony was consistent because the record supported that inference. Affirmed.
A25-1106 State v. Ward (Ramsey County)
Protective Order Violations
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant challenged his conviction for violating an order for protection (OFP), arguing that messages sent through the approved Our Family Wizard platform regarding delivery of gifts to his son did not violate the OFP’s exception permitting communication about “parenting-time issues only.” The Court of Appeals held that the evidence was insufficient to prove a violation of the OFP because defendant’s messages concerned logistical arrangements for delivering birthday and Christmas gifts to his child and therefore related closely to parenting-time issues. The court further concluded that defendant’s use of his sister-in-law to assist with the messaging did not establish a prohibited third-party contact because she functioned merely as a conduit to help defendant communicate through the authorized platform due to his technological and literacy limitations. Reversed.
A25-1001 State v. Tuinder (Ramsey County)
Sentencing
Stays of Adjudication
Defendant challenged the revocation of her stay of adjudication for gross-misdemeanor domestic assault following termination from mental-health court, arguing that a stay of adjudication constitutes an intermediate sanction and creates a protected liberty interest requiring additional procedural safeguards before revocation. The Court of Appeals held that revocation of a stay of adjudication is not an intermediate sanction because the statutory language distinguishes continuation or revocation of a stay from the imposition of intermediate sanctions such as jail, treatment, or electronic monitoring. The court further held that a defendant does not possess a protected liberty interest in a stay of adjudication because such dispositions are extraordinary, discretionary remedies available only in limited circumstances by statute or agreement of the parties. Affirmed.