Laura Brown//July 31, 2025//
In Brief
Nicholas Hill was convicted of attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct after attacking a woman during an apartment tour, but the conviction was overturned by the Minnesota Court of Appeals after it found the conviction violated the corpus delicti statute, which bars a conviction based solely on a confession. Reversing the appellate court, the Minnesota Supreme Court clarified its corpus delicti standard for attempted crimes and found that evidence independent of the confession reasonably tended to prove that Hill attempted to sexually assault the victim.
Hill repeatedly visited a subsidized senior-living apartment building in Minneapolis, asking for a housing application. During one visit, on May 11, 2020, Hill again asked for an application from C.L., who also agreed to show Hill an apartment.
As C.L. and Hill were touring the apartment, however, Hill shoved C.L. into a closet. As he began to choke her, C.L. punched the walls and screamed. Hearing this, the building’s service coordinator called 911.
However, Hill stopped when C.L. scratched his face and told him to stop. He got up, apologized, and left. Hill was arrested the next day. He confessed that although he was physically aroused during this encounter and considered sexually assaulting C.L., he ultimately did not. Hill apparently told police, “I thought I was supposed to do it, but the way she was acting didn’t seem correct, so I stopped and walked out.”
Hill, who possessed a knife during the attack, was charged with attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct while armed with a dangerous weapon and attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct while using force or coercion to cause personal injury.
In a written order, the district court found Hill guilty. It concluded that, given Hill’s post-arrest confession, he intended to sexually penetrate C.L. and took a substantial step toward committing the crime. Hill, who has been incarcerated at Minnesota Correctional Facility – Moose Lake since January 2023, was sentenced to 180 months in prison.
Hill appealed, pointing to the corpus delicti statute, which bars convictions based solely on confessions. Hill argued that the state failed to provide evidence outside of his confession that reasonably tended to prove that attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct actually occurred. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. It held that, “if the specific crime charged in the complaint is an attempt crime, the state must present evidence independent of the confession that reasonably tends to prove, first, an intent to commit an underlying crime and, second, a substantial step toward the commission of the underlying crime.”
However, the Court of Appeals decision was not unanimous. Dissenting Judge Peter Reyes noted that evidence outside of the confession supported three of the four elements of attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct. “Appellant did not have to overtly express his intentions during the assault because his conduct demonstrated that he was executing his plan to sexually assault C.L.,” wrote Reyes.
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether the corpus delicti statute, § 634.03 (2024), is satisfied for completed and attempt offenses if there is independent evidence that reasonably tends to prove that the defendant committed the charged offense. It also evaluated whether Hill’s conviction violated the corpus delicti statute.
“The majority opinion below answered a question that no one was asking,” Assistant Hennepin County Attorney Robert Yount asserted. “It is how do you take a common law doctrine, developed in 17th century England, to corroborate the confession by a defendant to a completed crime and apply it to corroborate a defendant’s confession to an attempted crime in 21st century America?”
Yount argued that common law principles were distilled into statute in Minnesota and that the court should interpret the criminal statute as written.
Conversely, Hill’s defense argued that there needed to be independent evidence of defendant’s attempt to establish corpus delicti for attempt crimes. He argued that there was none.
Assistant State Public Defender Adam Lozeau maintained, “It is undisputed that Hill committed a physical assault. There is affirmative evidence from the victim herself that, during this very short incident, Hill did not touch any of her intimate parts. There is affirmative testimony that he did not attempt to undress her or undress himself. There is affirmative testimony that during the incident, he did not lay on top of her.”
Ultimately, the court agreed with the state that the standard that the court articulated in its 2021 decision, State v. Holl — that requires evidence that reasonably tends to prove that the defendant committed the charged offense — applies both to completed and attempt crimes.
“We are persuaded that this rule should apply to both completed offenses and attempt offenses for two reasons,” Justice Theodora Gaïtas wrote for the court. “First, it best reflects the limited purpose of the corpus delicti statute: to avoid prosecutions for nonexistent crimes when the only evidence of the crime is a defendant’s confession.”
“Second, we have held that the plain language of the corpus delicti statute ‘does not require that each element of the offense charged be individually corroborated,’” Gaïtas continued.
“Although the corpus delicti statute does not require independent evidence of every element of an offense, we emphasize that confessing defendants are entitled to the additional protection of due process under the federal and state constitutions,” Gaïtas wrote. “This constitutional requirement ensures that convictions are based on sufficient evidence of each element of a crime.”
Additionally, the court found that evidence independent of the confession reasonably tended to prove that Hill committed the charged offense.
“It is reasonable to infer from the evidence — which shows that Hill went to the apartment building armed with a knife, persuaded C.L. to take him to a vacant apartment, locked the door, knocked C.L. to the ground, loomed over C.L. while she was on her back, and choked C.L. — that Hill intended to sexually penetrate C.L. without consent and took a substantial step toward committing that offense,” Gaïtas wrote. “Thus, the State satisfied its burden of establishing the corpus delicti for attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct, as required by section 634.03, and the court of appeals erred in concluding otherwise.”