Split appellate panel reverses conviction in sex assault case

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The Minnesota Court of Appeals has reversed a conviction for attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct. In a split decision, the court concluded that the state’s independent evidence did not corroborate elements of the crime constituting the corpus delicti of the crime.

Nicholas Hill went to a subsidized senior-living apartment building in Minneapolis in May 2020. He had been there a few times in the past, each time asking for a housing application. C.L. gave Hill an application to fill out, and agreed to Hill’s request to tour an apartment.

While they were looking at the apartment, Hill shoved C.L. into a closet and began to choke her. C.L. began punching the walls and screaming, which alerted the building’s service coordinator, who called 911. Then, C.L. scratched Hill’s face and told him to stop. Hill suddenly stopped, got up, apologized multiple times, and left the building.

Police arrested Hill the next day. At his interrogation, Hill confessed that he got an erection and thought about sexually assaulting C.L. but ultimately did not. “I thought I was supposed to do it, but the way she was acting didn’t seem correct, so I stopped and walked out,” Hill told police.

Hill was charged with attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct while armed with a dangerous weapon and attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct while using force or coercion to cause personal injury.

During his trial, Assistant Public Defender Lindsay Siolka argued in a memorandum supporting a motion to dismiss, “Mr. Hill never spoke or verbalized any demands to the victim. He did not rip or pull at her clothes. He did not pull down his pants or make any sexual gestures.”

“Victim testified that the door to the apartment was locked, and she did not lock the door,” then-Hennepin County Attorney Michael Freeman maintained. “He further sought to isolate Victim by getting her into a smaller room…where he could accomplish the rape.”

Ultimately, Hill was found guilty in a written order of attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct while using force or coercion to cause personal injury. Relying on Hill’s post-arrest confession, the court concluded that Hill intended to sexually penetrate C.L. and took a substantial step towards committing the crime. Hill was sentenced to 180 months of imprisonment.

On appeal, Hill argued that the state failed to provide evidence outside of his confession that reasonably tended to prove that attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct actually occurred. He maintained that attempting first-degree sexual conduct did not actually occur.

The appellate court agreed with Hill that the state did not corroborate his confession by presenting evidence outside of the confession that reasonably tended to prove that attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct occurred. Asked by the prosecutor what she was thinking when Hill was choking her, C.L. simply stated that she realized she needed to “get out of the situation.” She did not mention fearing sexual assault. Nor did C.L. mention that Hill touched any intimate parts of her body, tried to undress either party, or made sexually charged comments.

“We acknowledge that, in a case like this case, a person in C.L.’s position might fear a sexual assault or might perceive that a sexual assault was imminent. But that apparently was not so in this case,” wrote Judge Matthew Johnson.

It was not a unanimous decision, however. Judge Peter Reyes dissented, arguing that three of the four elements of attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct were supported by evidence outside of the confession that reasonably tends to prove that the crime occurred. Reyes maintained that the Minnesota Supreme Court specifically stated that not every element of the charged offense needs to be corroborated.

“It is undisputed that appellant’s conduct met three of the four elements of the crime because he did not have C.L.’s consent, used force, and caused personal injury to C.L.,” Reyes asserted. Reyes maintained that, even if the state was required to corroborate Hill’s intent, circumstantial evidence demonstrated that he intended to engage in criminal sexual conduct.

“Appellant did not have to overtly express his intentions during the assault because his conduct demonstrated that he was executing his plan to sexually assault C.L. He cased C.L.’s workplace by visiting it several times before the incident occurred. He asked C.L. to show him an apartment under false pretenses. Then, when he had her alone in the apartment, he forced her into a closet, locked the door behind him, pushed her flat on the ground, and began choking her,” wrote Reyes. “Not only do these circumstances ‘reasonably tend[] to prove’ appellant’s guilt, but they point unerringly to the only conclusion that a woman in C.L.’s situation would reach: that appellant intended on engaging in criminal sexual conduct of C.L.”