All in the Family: Disability benefits, immigrant status steal spotlight

Just when you thought we’d be cornered into summarizing another month of unpublished appellate decisions about parenting time disputes, the Court of Appeals surprises — and gives us (and you) some really thought-provoking stuff to chew on.

Two published reversals stand out.

Military disability benefits exempt from division

In re the Marriage of Mattson is a published decision of the Minnesota Court of Appeals issued on Oct. 2, 2017. An issue arose surrounding the stipulated division of military disability benefits.

Husband enlisted in the U.S. Navy in 1984. He married Wife in 1992. Husband retired from the military in 2004 and was granted a 70 percent disability rating for injuries suffered during active duty.

Husband and Wife separated in 2014 and finalized their divorce, by stipulation, in early 2015. At the time of dissolution, the parties had two adult children. Wife had served as a homemaker and care provider for the parties’ children during the majority of the marriage.

At the time of divorce, Wife was employed full-time. Husband was receiving military “retired” pay as well as military “disability” compensation.

The parties agreed that Wife was in need of spousal maintenance, but reserved the issue based upon an agreement that called for Wife to receive a 40 percent share of Husband’s disability compensation.

After entry of the divorce decree, Husband made only sporadic payments to Wife. Consequently, Wife filed a motion for post-decree relief, seeking that which she was owed under the decree. Husband opposed Wife’s requests.

The District Court filed an order directing Husband to immediately pay Wife the pay and disability compensation due and owing. Husband appealed, arguing that federal law pre-empted enforcement of the portion of the parties’ divorce decree that divided his disability compensation.

In reversing, Judge Lucinda Jesson noted that the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act “carves out a portion of a veteran’s retired pay that may be treated as marital property” and, therefore, subject to division as part of a divorce. However, he also suggested that “the Act does not specifically allow for the treatment of disability compensation as marital property.”

Jesson provided a lengthy summary of how appellate courts across the country have interpreted the act’s impact on disability compensation in dissolution actions — including the Howell decision of the United States Supreme Court, issued earlier this year.

In Howell, Justice Stephen Breyer opined that a “state court may not order a veteran to indemnify a divorced spouse for the loss in the divorced spouse’s portion of the veteran’s retirement pay caused by the veteran’s waiver of retirement pay to receive service-related disability benefits.”

This issue was previously addressed by the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Gatfield, and the court held that “federal law does not pre-empt state district courts from enforcing the stipulated terms” of a divorce decree.

Naturally, the Howell decision has functionally overruled Gatfield.

In short, Jesson noted that state courts cannot “vest that which … they lack authority to give.” Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded that the portion of the judgment and decree (despite being stipulated to) was unenforceable.

Special immigrant juvenile clarification

On Sept. 11, 2017, the Minnesota Court of Appeals issued a decision involving issues that couldn’t be further from the Mattson decision.

In re the Marriage of Calles De Guardado v. Guardado Menjivar involves the interplay between a federal path to permanent residency and the findings of a family court judge.

In Calles De Guardado, the parties were the parents of two minor children born in El Salvador. Soon after the birth of their youngest child, Father and Mother came to Minnesota.

Mother filed for divorce in 2016, citing abuse inflicted upon herself, and the minor children, by Father. She sought sole physical and legal custody of the children. She also requested that the district court make specific findings to enable the children to seek SIJ status — a federally created path to permanent residency in the United States.

At the default hearing, Mother requested that the District Court specifically find that the children were “dependent upon the juvenile court or have been legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a [s]tate, or an individual or entity appointed by a [s]tate or juvenile court.”

The District Court refused to make the SIJ finding, suggesting that the custody award to Mother did not substantiate the finding, and a dissolution proceeding was not the appropriate forum for such a finding. Instead, the District Court wrote that the children were dependent on “their mother who has been awarded sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ minor children.”

Mother appealed, following a denial of her motion for reconsideration.

The first issue addressed by the Court of Appeals involved whether the District Court had the authority to make SIJ findings. More specifically, the question involved whether they were a “juvenile” court within the meaning of the relevant federal statute.

Judge Florey indicated that the district court qualifies as a “juvenile” court because it is authorized under state law to make “judicial determinations about the custody and care of juveniles.” Moreover, the USCIS Policy Manual specifically references state family courts as an example of those that constitute a juvenile court.

The second issue (one of first impression in Minnesota) involved whether the children in the dissolution were “placed under the custody of … an individual … appointed by a [s]tate or juvenile court.” Terms such as “placed,” “custody,” “individual” and “appointed” are not defined within the SIJ statute — raising an issue of statutory interpretation and plain meaning.

Without hesitation, the court of appeals relied upon various ground-level resources — including The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. It became abundantly clear that a plain reading of the SIJ statutes indicates that an award of sole legal and physical custody is, indeed, a “placement” under the “custody” of an “individual” who has been “appointed” by a state court.

Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court was obligated to address three SIJ issues: (1) dependency/custody; (2) reunification; and (3) best interests. The district court adopted Mother’s findings concerning reunification and best interests, but erred in failing to make a dependency/custody finding — which, according to Judge Florey, was merited under the facts of this particular case.

The SIJ statutes are not something most of us encounter in our day-to-day work. Just know that District Courts have the authority (and, seemingly, an obligation) to make findings that cater to what the federal statutes care about.