Defamation damages can be presumed

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A former Moose Lake police officer is entitled to recover in a defamation action against an individual who called him “Pat the Pedophile” in a phone conversation with one of the officer’s acquaintances, the Court of Appeals has ruled.

Even absent direct evidence of general damages resulting from the statement, those damages could be presumed because the statement was defamatory per se, the appellate court found.

The plaintiff, who was 34, was involved in a romantic relationship with an 18-year-old woman. After the plaintiff was not retained as a police officer following a probationary period, he sued the defendant for defamation, alleging that the nickname had spread through the community, damaged his reputation and cost him the job. A jury found for the plaintiff, awarding him a total of $573,000, including:

• $90,000 in special damages for past and future wage loss;

• $230,000 in general damages for past and future harm to reputation, mental distress, humiliation and embarrassment;

• $3,000 in future medical expenses; and

• $250,000 in punitive damages.

A Carlton County District Court judge granted the defendant judgment notwithstanding the verdict, concluding there was no evidence of a causal link between the statement and any of the plaintiff’s damages and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s punitive damage award.

The Court of Appeals concluded the statement was defamatory per se and therefore general damages could be presumed.

“[W]e hold that in almost every circumstance a reasonable listener would believe that calling a person a pedophile imputes serious sexual misconduct or criminal activity to that person,” Judge Natalie E. Hudson wrote. “It is, therefore, defamatory per se.”

Thus, the appellate court reversed the JNOV for the defendant with regard to the general-damage award.

However, the actual amount of general damages ultimately awardable still remains at issue. The appellate court upheld the trial judge’s finding that the $230,000 awarded by the jury was unreasonable. The court therefore remanded the case for further findings on the amount of general damages that should be awarded.

The court also affirmed the trial judge’s decision to set aside the special- and punitive-damage awards. Those damages must be proved, and the trial court judge in this case did not err in finding that the plaintiff had failed to do so, the appellate court concluded.

Minneapolis attorney Marshall Tanick, who frequently handles First Amendment cases, said that the court’s ruling that damages can be presumed is significant, particularly given the difficulties of demonstrating reputation damages.

With a presumption of damages, “you don’t have to bring in people whose view of the plaintiff has actually changed” in order to recover for defamation, he stated, adding that it’s typically “hard to find” such witnesses.

Tanick also said that by allowing a presumption of damages, the case appears to suggest a dichotomy between defamation cases involving media defendants and those not involving media defendants. In a 1996 case, Richie v. Paramount Pictures Corp., the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized limitations on presumed damages in defamation suits against media defendants where speech on a matter of public concern is implicated.

Although the Court of Appeals demonstrated a willingness to presume damages, it provided little guidance as to how the amount of those damages are to be calculated.

“It provides no criteria for awarding damages when defamation per se applies,” Tanick said.