Court of Appeals Digest: Aug. 3, 2026

Civil Nonprecedential

Arbitration

Appeals

Homebuyers appealed an order staying arbitration as to certain respondents and sought review of an earlier order compelling arbitration, arguing that the District Court improperly excluded two respondents from arbitration and that the earlier arbitration order was reviewable under several appellate doctrines. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court properly stayed arbitration as to the respondents that never moved to compel arbitration, explaining that the earlier order compelling arbitration applied only to the parties that affirmatively requested arbitration and did not bind parties who had not sought that relief. The court further held that the earlier order compelling arbitration was outside the scope of appellate review because such orders are not independently appealable and none of the asserted exceptions applied. Specifically, the court concluded that the order did not affect the appealable stay order under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04, was not inextricably intertwined with the later order, and failed the collateral-order doctrine because arbitrability may be reviewed after final judgment. Affirmed in part, appeal dismissed in part.

A25-1667 Lee v. Estate of Pasvogel (Dakota County)

Civil Commitment

Mental Illness; Sufficiency of the Evidence

Patient appealed his commitment as a person who poses a risk of harm due to mental illness, arguing that the evidence did not clearly and convincingly establish that he was mentally ill, that he posed a substantial likelihood of physical harm to himself, or that no less-restrictive alternative to commitment existed. The Court of Appeals held that clear and convincing evidence supported the District Court’s finding that patient suffered from a qualifying mental illness, explaining that differing or “unspecified” psychiatric diagnoses did not undermine the experts’ unanimous opinions that patient met the statutory commitment criteria. The court further held that the record established a substantial likelihood of physical harm because, as a result of his mental illness, patient failed to obtain necessary food and shelter by living without heat or cooking capability, relying on family members to provide food and water, and exhibiting significant weight loss, without requiring proof that actual physical injury had already occurred. Finally, the court concluded that the District Court adequately considered and rejected less-restrictive alternatives by relying on the testimony of both court-appointed examiners, who explained that outpatient and other proposed alternatives would not adequately address patient’s treatment needs in light of his lack of insight into his mental illness. Affirmed.

A26-0551 In re Civ. Commitment of Swenson (Blue Earth County)

Defamation

Pleading

Pro se plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his defamation action and the denial of his motion to amend the complaint, arguing that his allegations satisfied Minnesota’s notice-pleading requirements and that he should have been permitted to amend. The Court of Appeals held that the complaint failed to state a claim because Minnesota requires defamation claims to be pleaded with greater specificity than ordinary civil claims, and plaintiff failed to identify with sufficient particularity the alleged defamatory statements, their audience, or the time, place, and context in which they were made. The court concluded that each alleged statement lacked the factual detail necessary to place defendant on notice of the specific claims, including the identity of the recipients or other contextual information. The court further held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend because the proposed amendments did not cure the pleading deficiencies and therefore would have been futile. Affirmed.

A25-1942 Domeier v. Lynn (Brown County)

Domestic Relations

Contempt; Counsel

Father appealed civil contempt orders entered for failing to comply with child-support obligations, arguing that his court-appointed attorney provided ineffective assistance during contempt proceedings and that the resulting contempt order was unenforceable. The Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding, that father had a right to effective assistance of counsel in civil contempt proceedings where incarceration was a possible outcome, but held that he failed to satisfy either prong of the Strickland standard. The court concluded that counsel’s alleged failures to communicate, seek dismissal, object, cross-examine witnesses, or present evidence involved matters of trial strategy that are generally not subject to appellate review and that father failed to overcome the strong presumption of reasonable representation. The court further held that father failed to demonstrate prejudice because the contempt finding rested on his continuing voluntary underemployment and resulting ability to pay child support, and he did not show a reasonable probability that different representation would have changed the outcome. Finally, the court concluded that father’s challenge to the enforceability of the contempt order was forfeited because it was not presented to the District Court, was inadequately briefed on appeal, and, to the extent it attacked earlier child-support orders, fell outside the scope of the appeal. Affirmed.

A25-1400 Larson v. Marohn (Isanti County)

Domestic Relations

Dissolution; Spousal Maintenance

Husband appealed the dissolution judgment, challenging the spousal-maintenance award and the order requiring the parties to jointly file their 2024 tax return and equally divide any resulting refund. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court abused its discretion by calculating spousal maintenance based in part on expenses attributable to the parties’ adult child without determining what portion of the claimed expenses related to the adult child or identifying any legal basis for including those expenses in the maintenance calculation. The court further held that the District Court failed to make the necessary findings regarding husband’s reasonable monthly expenses, preventing meaningful appellate review of his ability to pay maintenance. The court otherwise concluded that the District Court acted within its discretion by crediting wife’s budget, finding she was not voluntarily underemployed, considering the effect of her marital-property award, and resolving disputed evidence concerning retroactive maintenance. Finally, the court held that the District Court erred by treating a potential 2024 income-tax refund as marital property because any refund attributable to post-valuation-date income constituted nonmarital property. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

A25-1727 Engman v. Engman (Olmsted County)

Domestic Relations

Dissolution; Spousal Maintenance

Husband appealed the judgment dissolving a long-term marriage, arguing that the District Court awarded excessive spousal maintenance, improperly awarded wife post-valuation-date business cash and receivables, accepted unsupported valuations of certain business interests, and ordered an equalizer payment with an unaffordable down payment. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court acted within its broad discretion in awarding indefinite spousal maintenance, concluding that its findings regarding husband’s income, including expected business distributions, and wife’s reasonable monthly expenses were supported by the record and reflected the parties’ affluent marital standard of living. The court further held that the District Court equitably awarded wife a share of business cash and receivables generated after the valuation date because husband had, in bad faith, withheld distributions that historically would have been made and thereby improperly restricted marital funds during the dissolution proceedings. The court also upheld the District Court’s valuation of disputed business entities, concluding that it permissibly credited the neutral expert and wife’s evidence over the testimony of husband’s expert, whom it found unreliable. Finally, the court held that husband failed to demonstrate that the required equalizer down payment constituted an abuse of discretion given the substantial business and other assets awarded to him in the property division. Affirmed.

A25-1672 Shea v. Shea (Hennepin County)

Drivers’ License Revocation

Warrantless Entry

Driver appealed the order sustaining the revocation of her driver’s license, arguing that officers unlawfully entered her home during a “knock and talk,” unlawfully seized her, lacked probable cause to arrest her for DWI, and that she established the affirmative defense of post-driving alcohol consumption. The Court of Appeals held that the officers did not unlawfully enter the home because they remained outside the residence, did not intrude into a constitutionally protected area, and lawfully approached the residence to investigate a reported disturbance and serve a trespass notice. The court further held that the officers’ seizure of driver was justified by officer-safety concerns after she reached toward an officer’s duty belt and physically struggled with the officers. The court also concluded that probable cause existed to arrest driver based on reports that she had appeared intoxicated before driving away from the service station, the officers’ observations of her bloodshot eyes, odor of alcohol, aggressive behavior, and other circumstances indicating impairment. Finally, the court held that driver failed to prove her affirmative defense of post-driving consumption because the District Court permissibly rejected her inconsistent testimony, credited the expert toxicology evidence, and reasonably concluded that her claimed alcohol consumption was inconsistent with the recorded breath-test result. Affirmed.

A25-1784 Wirkus v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety (Washington County)

Employment

Breach of Contract

Former headmaster and a private high school cross-appealed following a jury verdict rejecting the headmaster’s breach-of-contract claim, finding the school’s executive director liable for defamation, and awarding contractual attorney fees to the school. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court properly denied the headmaster’s motion for judgment as a matter of law because the jury reasonably could find that the headmaster materially breached his contractual duties by staging a disciplinary photograph involving a student and thereby failing to maintain a positive school environment and relationships with parents, excusing any subsequent nonperformance by the school. The court further held that the District Court properly denied the executive director’s posttrial motions because sufficient evidence supported the jury’s findings that her statements accusing the headmaster of dishonesty were false and made with actual malice, and the special verdict properly distinguished between the factual issues relating to qualified privilege and actual malice. Finally, the court held that the District Court erred by awarding the school contractual attorney fees because the employment agreement authorized attorney-fee recovery only “[i]n the event of a breach” of the agreement, and the jury found that neither party breached the contract. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

A25-1459, A25-1487 LaFond v. Mater Dei Apostolate (St. Louis County)

Environmental Law

Environmental Assessment Worksheets

Adjacent landowners sought certiorari review of a township resolution denying a citizens’ petition for an environmental assessment worksheet (EAW) for a proposed gravel-pit expansion, arguing that the project required a mandatory EAW and that the township improperly denied a discretionary EAW. The Court of Appeals held that the township correctly determined that the proposal constituted an expansion of an existing mine rather than a connected action, and that the project therefore did not meet the acreage threshold requiring a mandatory EAW. The court concluded that the connected-action argument was forfeited because it was raised for the first time on appeal and that substantial evidence supported the township’s classification of the project as an expansion. The court further held, however, that the township committed an error of law when it denied the citizens’ petition by requiring proof that the project will have the potential for significant environmental effects rather than applying the statutory standard requiring only that there may be potential for significant environmental effects. Reversed and remanded.

A26-0043 In re Env’t Assessment Worksheet for Fischer Pit Expansion Project (Vermillion Twp.)

Insurance

Public Adjusters

Homeowners appealed summary judgment in favor of a public-adjusting company on its breach-of-contract claim arising from a public-adjusting agreement executed after a residential fire, arguing that portions of the agreement lacked consideration, the contract was fraudulently induced, and the agreement did not authorize fees on certain insurance payments. The Court of Appeals held that the agreement was supported by valid consideration because the adjuster agreed to provide claim-preparation, presentation, and adjustment services in exchange for a percentage of insurance payments, and the homeowners’ reliance on extrinsic evidence to limit that obligation was barred by the unambiguous terms of the integrated contract. The court further held that the homeowners’ fraudulent-inducement defense failed as a matter of law because any alleged oral representations that the adjuster would charge a fee only on additional insurance proceeds directly contradicted the written agreement, making reliance on those representations unjustifiable. Finally, the court concluded that the contract’s plain language entitled the adjuster to a percentage of all insurance payments within the agreement’s scope, including reimbursements for recoverable depreciation on personal property and payments made on the homeowners’ behalf for living expenses. Affirmed.

A26-0131 Claims, Inc. v. Njitor (Washington County)

Judgment

Fraud on the Court

Parents appealed the dismissal of an action under Minn. Stat. § 548.14 seeking to set aside a prior wrongful-death judgment based on alleged fraud by a school and its basketball coach, arguing that newly discovered evidence established a conspiracy to conceal the true cause of a fatal vehicle crash. The Court of Appeals held that the complaint failed to state a claim because the alleged newly discovered evidence had largely been known and litigated more than three years before the action was commenced, rendering the claim untimely under § 548.14. The court further held that the statute permits relief only for fraud committed by a prevailing party in the underlying action, while the complaint primarily alleged misconduct by nonparties, including a law-enforcement investigator and other individuals whose conduct could not support relief under the statute. The court also concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by designating the parents as frivolous litigants because they repeatedly relitigated the same issues that had been rejected in prior state and federal proceedings. Finally, the court upheld Rule 11 sanctions against both the parents and their attorney, determining that the claims lacked legal and factual support, were pursued for an improper purpose despite safe-harbor notices, and justified the District Court’s reduced attorney-fee award. Affirmed.

A25-0793, A25-1790, A25-1809 Kvalvog v. Lee (Clay County)

Landlord & Tenant

Eviction

Tenant appealed an eviction judgment, arguing that the District Court failed to apply statutory protections for tenants who terminate a lease because of domestic abuse, miscalculated the security required to stay the eviction pending appeal, and violated her procedural-due-process rights. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court properly applied Minn. Stat. § 504B.206 because, although tenant invoked the statute to terminate her lease based on fear of imminent violence, the landlord did not commence the eviction action until after tenant failed to vacate by the termination date reflected in her notice. The court further held that tenant’s challenge to the amount of security required for a stay pending appeal was not properly before the court because that issue had already been reviewed through the applicable appellate procedure. Finally, the court concluded that tenant received constitutionally adequate process because she was properly served, received notice of the eviction hearing, appeared and presented defenses, and failed to demonstrate that the summary eviction procedures deprived her of a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Affirmed.

A25-2197 Crocket Props. LP v. DuRoss (Hennepin County)

Legal Malpractice

Res Judicata

Pro se client appealed the dismissal of her third legal-malpractice action against her former attorneys, as well as the District Court’s order declaring her a frivolous litigant and awarding attorney-fee sanctions. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court properly dismissed the complaint because it was barred by res judicata. The court concluded that all four elements of the doctrine were satisfied where the current action arose from the same underlying legal representation and factual circumstances as two prior malpractice actions, involved the same parties, resulted in prior final judgments on the merits, and followed multiple full and fair opportunities to litigate the claims. The court further held that the complaint was independently barred by the statute of limitations because client failed to support her claim that fraudulent concealment tolled the limitations period, identifying neither record evidence nor legal authority showing that the alleged concealment could not have been discovered through reasonable diligence. Finally, the court upheld the frivolous-litigant designation and attorney-fee sanctions, concluding that the record supported the District Court’s findings that client repeatedly relitigated the same previously rejected malpractice claims and that the resulting fee award fell within the District Court’s broad discretion. Affirmed.

A26-0015 Olson v. Christensen Law Office PLLC (Isanti County)

Probate

Personal Representatives

Sister appealed the denial of her motion to reopen probate proceedings after the parties settled a petition seeking removal of their brother as personal representative of their father’s estate, arguing that the personal representative materially breached the mediated settlement agreement because the agreed-upon independent financial review was not truly independent. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen because the record supported its finding that the financial review complied with the settlement agreement. The court concluded that the agreement unambiguously gave the neutral discretion to determine how to conduct the review and did not require the neutral to communicate with any party, receive the settlement agreement, or provide the parties with the neutral’s contact information or engagement letter. The court further held that the District Court did not clearly err in finding that the review was conducted on behalf of the agreed financial firm and that, even assuming any deviation from the agreement occurred, sister failed to establish a material breach warranting rescission because the review remained independent and fulfilled the agreement’s essential purpose. Affirmed.

A26-0009 In re Estate of Penttila (Dakota County)

Real Property

Eviction

Property owner appealed the entry of default judgment in an eviction action following a mortgage foreclosure, arguing that the District Court erred by granting eviction, denying his fee-waiver application, and rejecting challenges to the underlying foreclosure. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court properly entered default judgment because the redemption period had expired, the bank was entitled to possession of the property, and appellant failed to identify any error in the District Court’s basis for awarding possession. The court further held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s fee-waiver application because the District Court determined that his request for immediate relief was frivolous, an independent statutory basis for denying a fee waiver that appellant did not challenge on appeal. Finally, the court declined to consider appellant’s challenges to the foreclosure because an eviction action ordinarily determines only the right to present possession, not the validity of the foreclosure, and appellant failed to show that the eviction proceeding was his sole available forum for those claims. The court also declined to consider additional arguments that appellant failed to present to the District Court and denied the bank’s motion to strike appellant’s appellate addendum as moot. Affirmed.

A25-1884 Pioneer Bank v. Jackson (Blue Earth County)

Real Property

Tax-Forfeited Land

Purchaser appealed summary judgment requiring it to demolish a residence and septic system on tax-forfeited property, arguing that the demolition requirement was an unenforceable condition precedent that merged into the deed upon conveyance and that a factual dispute existed regarding its knowledge of the condition. The Court of Appeals held that the demolition requirement was a condition subsequent, not a condition precedent, because the sale documents did not contain the clear and unequivocal language necessary to require demolition before conveyance, and the applicable statutes authorize counties to impose post-sale conditions on tax-forfeited land. The court concluded that, as a condition subsequent, the demolition requirement was incorporated into the conveyance and remained enforceable after delivery of the deed. The court further held that any dispute over purchaser’s actual knowledge of the demolition condition was immaterial because the county complied with the statutory publication requirements, and the governing statutes do not require proof that the purchaser had actual notice of the published sale conditions. Affirmed.

A26-0350 Ashcel Cos., Inc. v. County of Dodge (Dodge County)

Summary Judgment

Review

Pro se borrower appealed summary judgment in favor of a bank on a consumer-credit account, arguing that the District Court improperly adjudicated matters not before it, ruled before resolving issues concerning rejected filings, and created an inadequate record for appellate review. The Court of Appeals held that borrower forfeited his challenge to the adequacy of the appellate record because he failed to identify specific deficiencies in the transcript or record or explain how any alleged omissions affected appellate review, instead relying on conclusory assertions. The court further held that borrower failed to preserve or adequately brief his argument that the District Court prematurely ruled before resolving other filings, identifying neither the submissions allegedly left unresolved nor any supporting legal authority. Finally, the court concluded that it lacked authority to review the District Court’s postjudgment order addressing an exemption claim because that collateral enforcement order was not timely appealed and fell outside the scope of the appeal from the summary-judgment decision. Affirmed.

A25-1359 Bank of America, N.A. v. Gilbertson (Scott County)

Torts

Anti-SLAPP

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of claims against his former spouse, a mental-health provider, and the provider’s employees arising from communications made during child-custody, parental-rights, and related proceedings, arguing that the District Court misapplied the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), improperly denied discovery, erroneously required expert support for his negligence claims, awarded excessive attorney fees, and wrongly denied leave to amend. The Court of Appeals held that UPEPA applied because the challenged communications were prepared for and communicated in connection with judicial proceedings, and that the statute’s goods-and-services exception did not apply because the claims arose from the substance of the communications rather than the sale of therapeutic services. The court further held that plaintiff forfeited his discovery argument by never requesting limited discovery in the District Court, failed to demonstrate any abuse of discretion in the attorney-fee award, and failed to preserve his constitutional challenge to UPEPA’s fee provision. The court also concluded that plaintiff’s negligence allegations were, in substance, medical-malpractice claims requiring expert-review affidavits because they challenged professional psychological diagnosis and treatment, and that dismissal was therefore proper. Affirmed.

A25-1960 Quinlan v. Fraser (Washington County)

Unemployment Benefits

Quit

Employee appealed an unemployment-law judge’s determination that he voluntarily quit his employment and was therefore ineligible for unemployment benefits, arguing that he was discharged rather than resigned because his text messages were not an unequivocal resignation and his employer later sent a termination email. The Court of Appeals held that substantial evidence supported the ULJ’s finding that employee quit. The court concluded that employee’s text message stating he did not think he would be returning to work because he intended to focus on assets left by his late father, coupled with his failure to report for work after repeatedly promising to return and his failure to respond to the employer’s subsequent separation email, reasonably supported the ULJ’s determination that the decision to end the employment relationship was the employee’s. The court further held that the employer’s “termination” email did not transform the separation into a discharge because the ULJ permissibly credited testimony that the email merely confirmed an employee’s previously communicated decision to leave employment and was routinely sent whenever employment ended. Affirmed.

A25-2006 Green v. Zerorez, Inc. (Dep’t of Emp’t & Econ. Dev.)

Civil Order Opinions

Contracts

Guaranties

Individual appealed summary judgment holding him personally liable under a guaranty for his company’s default on a financing agreement, arguing that he did not execute the guaranty in his personal capacity and that the company should not have been held liable under the underlying agreement. The Court of Appeals held that appellant was personally liable because he signed the guaranty in the signature block designated for individual guarantors while leaving blank the signature block for corporate guarantors, making him individually liable under the unambiguous terms of the guaranty. The court further held that appellant could not challenge the underlying liability of the company because the company did not appeal the judgment, a corporation cannot appear through a nonattorney representative, and the guaranty expressly made appellant’s obligations unconditional regardless of any defenses the company might assert. Affirmed.

A25-1833 Channel Partners Cap., LLC v. Jon Smith Group, LLC (Brown County)

Injunctions

Pleading

Recipient of Section 8 rental assistance appealed the denial of her motion for a temporary injunction seeking to preserve housing benefits pending related appellate and administrative proceedings, arguing that the District Court had authority to issue injunctive relief despite the absence of a complaint and that due-process concerns required relief. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court properly denied the motion because a temporary injunction is a remedy rather than an independent cause of action and therefore cannot be granted absent an underlying actionable pleading. The court concluded that appellant’s pending appeals in separate actions did not supply the necessary underlying cause of action because they involved different District Court files, different legal claims, and a different opposing party. Affirmed.

A25-2073 Celander v. Worthington Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. (Nobles County)

Criminal Nonprecedential

Assault

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant appealed his conviction for first-degree assault against a peace officer, arguing that the circumstantial evidence failed to prove he intentionally drove his vehicle into a squad car and did not eliminate the rational hypothesis that the collision was accidental. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to establish intent under the heightened circumstantial-evidence standard. The court concluded that the circumstances proved—including defendant’s prolonged high-speed flight from law enforcement, his continued driving after tire-deflation devices were deployed, his decision to steer head-on toward a clearly marked squad car positioned on the opposite side of the highway, his abrupt turn to follow the squad car into the ditch, his failure to brake, and his hostile conduct toward officers after the collision—supported only the inference that he intentionally struck the squad car. The court further held that defendant’s theory that he lost control because of impaired steering or bright lights was not a rational inference from the circumstances proved, but instead depended on testimony the jury was free to reject and would require the appellate court to reweigh the evidence. Affirmed.

A25-1374 State v. Moe (Beltrami County)

Domestic Assault

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant appealed his convictions for domestic assault and disorderly conduct, arguing that the circumstantial evidence failed to establish the required intent for either offense. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to prove defendant intended to cause fear of immediate bodily harm. The court concluded that the circumstances proved—including defendant’s admission that he followed the victim into a bathroom during an escalating argument, grabbed her arms, pinned her to the ground to “get his point across,” acknowledged that he “took it too far” and had “probably” scared her, the victim’s attempt to prepare to call 911, her retrieval of a knife after being released, and her visibly shaken condition when officers arrived—were inconsistent with the rational hypothesis that defendant was merely attempting to calm the victim. The court further held that the same circumstantial evidence sufficiently established that defendant knew or had reason to know his conduct would arouse alarm, supporting the disorderly-conduct conviction. Affirmed.

A25-1744 State v. Flora (Kanabec County)

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Deficient Performance

Defendant appealed the summary denial of postconviction relief following a conviction for second-degree murder, arguing that postconviction counsel was ineffective by encouraging withdrawal of her guilty plea, inadequately presenting her request for a downward durational departure at sentencing, and cumulatively providing ineffective assistance. The Court of Appeals held that the postconviction court properly denied relief without an evidentiary hearing because defendant failed to allege facts establishing either deficient performance or prejudice. The court concluded that defendant’s claim that counsel convinced her to withdraw her guilty plea was contradicted by the existing record and supported only by conclusory assertions. The court further held that, even assuming counsel performed deficiently at sentencing, defendant failed to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome because she identified no facts demonstrating that her conduct was significantly less serious than a typical second-degree intentional murder, and offender-related considerations such as remorse did not justify the requested durational departure on the facts alleged. Affirmed.

A25-0088 State v. Nelson (Stearns County)

Juveniles

Certification as Adults

Juvenile appealed the order certifying him for adult prosecution on a first-degree controlled-substance offense, arguing that the juvenile court improperly weighed the statutory public-safety factors, disregarded recommendations favoring extended juvenile jurisdiction (EJJ), and that counsel rendered ineffective assistance at the certification hearing. The Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the proceeding for adult prosecution. The court concluded that the juvenile court carefully considered the certification study and psychological evaluation, was not bound by their recommendations, and reasonably determined that juvenile failed to rebut the statutory presumption favoring certification. The court further held that the juvenile court’s findings on the six public-safety factors were supported by the record, including the seriousness and sophistication of the offense, juvenile’s escalating delinquency history, his unwillingness to participate in available programming, and the absence of evidence showing that EJJ programming would better protect public safety than adult certification. Finally, the court held that juvenile failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel because the challenged decisions regarding witnesses, evidence, and presentation of the certification reports were matters of trial strategy, counsel’s performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, and juvenile failed to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome. Affirmed.

A26-0045 In re Welfare of T.L.L. (Morrison County)

Probation Revocation

Evidence

Defendant appealed the revocation of his probation for third-degree burglary, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion by relying on hearsay testimony and admitting surveillance video that had been suppressed in a separate criminal prosecution. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court properly admitted hearsay testimony at the probation-revocation hearing because defendant had a full opportunity to challenge the evidence, the lead investigator was available for cross-examination, and the District Court adequately explained the necessity for presenting the evidence through that witness in light of defendant’s speedy-hearing demand and the limited witness availability. The court further held that the District Court properly considered surveillance video previously suppressed in the related criminal case because the exclusionary rule generally does not bar such evidence in probation-revocation proceedings when its deterrent value is outweighed by the costs of excluding relevant evidence. The court concluded that the search-warrant defect resulted from an inadvertent omission rather than significant police misconduct and that the evidence had already been excluded from the related criminal prosecution, substantially serving the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule. Affirmed.

A25-2132 State v. Harris (Hennepin County)

Probation Revocation

Sufficient Findings

Defendant appealed the revocation of his probation for fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct following his admission that he violated a probation condition and challenged the imposition of a lifetime conditional-release term. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court abused its discretion by revoking probation without making the fact-specific findings required under Austin and Modtland. The court concluded that, although the District Court identified the probation violation and found it intentional and inexcusable, it failed to explain why the need for confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation, instead relying on generalized statements and merely restating that defendant had committed a new offense while on probation. The court further held that the lifetime conditional-release term was unauthorized by law because the governing statutes do not authorize conditional release for defendant’s offense, even when enhanced by a prior qualifying conviction. Reversed and remanded.

A25-2148 State v. Hartmann (Anoka County)

Probation Revocation

Violations

Defendant appealed the revocation of his probation following remand from a prior appeal, arguing that the District Court exceeded the scope of the remand by considering a probation violation previously withdrawn, violated his due-process right to a speedy probation-revocation hearing, and inadequately analyzed the third Austin factor. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court properly considered all three alleged probation violations because the prior remand for a new probation-revocation hearing before a different judge was a general remand that vacated the earlier revocation proceeding and authorized reconsideration of all alleged violations. The court further held that defendant forfeited his due-process challenge to the timing of the revocation hearing by failing to assert that claim or object to the delay in the District Court. Finally, the court concluded that the District Court made adequate findings under the third Austin factor by specifically finding that defendant repeatedly violated probation through positive, missed, and tampered-with drug tests and committed a new offense shortly after being placed on probation, thereby demonstrating that confinement was necessary to protect the public and that continued probation would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violations. Affirmed.

A26-0104 State v. Burton (Anoka County)

Public Benefits Fraud

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant appealed his conviction for food-stamp fraud, arguing that the state failed to present sufficient evidence that he willfully misrepresented his eligibility for SNAP benefits. The Court of Appeals held that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to prove the willfulness element because defendant falsely answered “No” when asked on his Minnesota SNAP application whether he had ever received SNAP benefits, despite previously receiving benefits in California, and later used both states’ benefit cards during the same period. The court further held that defendant’s alternative explanation—that he believed the application referred only to prior Minnesota benefits—was not a rational hypothesis inconsistent with guilt because the application expressly warned applicants against receiving benefits from multiple states for the same period and did not limit its questions to Minnesota benefits. Affirmed.

A25-1261 State v. Lindquist (Dakota County)

Relationship Evidence

Harmless Error

Defendant appealed his conviction for threats of violence, arguing that the District Court improperly admitted relationship evidence concerning his prior abusive conduct toward his former romantic partner during a prosecution involving threats against her current boyfriend. The Court of Appeals declined to decide whether the evidence was admissible under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 because any error was harmless. The court held that the challenged testimony was narrowly limited, the District Court twice instructed the jury on the permissible use of the evidence, and the prosecutor made only a brief reference to it during closing argument. The court further concluded that the state’s evidence of guilt was overwhelming, including doorbell-camera video and audio capturing defendant’s threatening statements and conduct, testimony that the victim feared defendant would carry out the threat, evidence that the victim purchased a shotgun for protection the following day, and testimony regarding defendant’s aggressive conduct toward responding law enforcement. Affirmed.

A25-1464 State v. Donson (Douglas County)

Sentencing

Downward Departures

Defendant appealed his 72-month sentence following his guilty plea to third-degree criminal sexual conduct, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a downward dispositional departure based on his claimed particular amenability to probation. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court carefully considered the sentencing record before exercising its discretion to impose a presumptive guidelines sentence. The court further held that the District Court’s findings were supported by the record, including defendant’s extensive recent criminal history, repeated noncompliance with court-ordered release conditions, lack of genuine remorse, and failure to demonstrate meaningful cooperation despite family support. Affirmed.

A25-1739 State v. Albertson (Stearns County)

Sentencing

Downward Departures

The state appealed the District Court’s downward durational departure from the presumptive guidelines sentences imposed after defendant pleaded guilty to multiple counts of dissemination and possession of child sexual abuse material, arguing that the departure was based solely on disagreement with the cumulative effect of the method of calculating criminal-history scores. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court abused its discretion by departing downward without finding that defendant’s conduct underlying the affected offenses was significantly less serious than the typical commission of those offenses, the only proper basis for a downward durational departure. The court concluded that the District Court improperly based the departure on its view that applying the sentencing guidelines unfairly exaggerated the cumulative punishment for the later counts, a rationale that was not an offense-related ground for departure. The court further independently reviewed the record and determined that defendant’s conduct was not less serious than the typical dissemination and possession offenses, leaving no alternative basis to sustain the departure. Reversed and remanded.

A26-0241 State v. Porter (Carver County)

Sentencing

Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Defendant appealed the sentence imposed on remand after a prior appellate decision, arguing that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to resentence him before entry of the appellate judgment and that the new sentence remained excessive. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to conduct the resentencing because it acted before the Court of Appeals’ judgment became final. The court explained that, absent a stipulation for immediate entry of judgment, a District Court lacks authority to act while the period for seeking Supreme Court review remains open, including any potential extension of time to file a petition for review in a criminal case. Because the resentencing occurred before the appellate judgment was entered and while the parties still could have sought Supreme Court review, the resulting sentence was void. Reversed and remanded.

A25-2057 State v. Doan-Hanson (Isanti County)

Sentencing

Upward Departures

Defendant appealed his sentence following his guilty plea to first-degree criminal sexual conduct, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion by denying a downward dispositional departure based on his claimed amenability to probation and by imposing an upward durational departure based on the victim’s zone of privacy. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court properly exercised its discretion in denying a dispositional departure after reasonably concluding that defendant’s lack of genuine remorse and continuing pattern of deflection outweighed other mitigating considerations. The court further held that the District Court properly imposed an upward durational departure because the offense occurred in the victim’s bedroom, a location where she had an expectation of privacy. Affirmed.

A25-1553 State v. Hernandez (Dakota County)

Traffic Offenses

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant appealed his convictions for driving after revocation and violating Minnesota’s hands-free law, arguing that the traffic stop lacked probable cause, the evidence was insufficient, the District Court improperly denied a challenge for cause to a prospective juror, the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument, and the sentencing court relied on an inaccurate factual statement. The Court of Appeals held that the trooper had probable cause to stop defendant after personally observing him driving while holding a cell phone and that the statutory emergency exception to the hands-free law is an affirmative defense that need not be disproved to establish probable cause. The court further held that sufficient direct evidence supported both convictions because the trooper testified that he observed defendant driving while holding a cell phone and records established that defendant’s license had been revoked and that notice of revocation had been mailed to his last known address. The court also concluded that defendant was not entitled to relief based on the denial of his challenge for cause because he removed the prospective juror with a peremptory strike and failed to show that any biased juror actually served. Finally, the court held that the prosecutor’s incomplete reference during closing argument to a voir dire credibility hypothetical, although improper, did not affect defendant’s substantial rights, and that the District Court’s corrected factual misstatement at sentencing did not influence the sentence imposed. Affirmed.

A25-1594 State v. Ebeling (Isanti County)

Criminal Order Opinions

Plea Withdrawal

Adequate Factual Basis

Defendant appealed the denial of plea withdrawal after pleading guilty to gross-misdemeanor obstructing legal process, arguing that the factual basis failed to establish the statutory element requiring force, violence, or the threat thereof. The Court of Appeals held that defendant’s guilty plea was inaccurate because the admitted facts established only that he resisted arrest by taking a stance indicating he would not accompany the officers and would physically obstruct them, not that his conduct was accompanied by force, violence, or threats as required for the gross-misdemeanor offense. The court concluded that the officers’ use of a Taser during the arrest did not permit a reasonable inference that defendant himself used or threatened force because the plea record contained no facts explaining the circumstances surrounding the officers’ use of force. Because the plea established, at most, the elements of misdemeanor obstruction, the plea was invalid, creating a manifest injustice requiring withdrawal. Reversed and remanded.

A25-2039 State v. Monack (St. Louis County)