Supreme Court Digest: May 6, 2026

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Civil

Torts

Vicarious Liability

A business owner died in a car crash caused by his 17-year-old employee losing control of a motor vehicle while driving. The business owner’s next of kin sued the employee and the employee’s parents, who owned the vehicle, alleging that the employee’s negligence caused the business owner’s death. On appeal the parties agreed that the employee was subject to the coemployee immunity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, which provides that a coemployee is not liable for negligent injury. Minn. Stat. § 176. 061, subd. 5(e). The issue before us is whether, notwithstanding the employee’s immunity from liability, the employee’s parents may be held vicariously liable for the employee’s negligence under the Safety Responsibility Act, which deems a permissive driver to be the owner’s agent in the event of an accident.1 Id. § 169.09, subd. 5a.

The Supreme Court held that (1) the Safety Responsibility Act, Minn. Stat. § 169.09, subd. 5a, imposes vicarious liability on a motor vehicle owner for the tortious conduct of a permissive driver even when the driver is personally immune from liability for that conduct; and (2) the coemployee immunity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, Minn. Stat. § 176.061, subd. 5(e), provides a personal immunity to a coemployee, rather than a release of liability, and therefore does not protect motor vehicle owners who would otherwise be vicariously liable for the coemployee’s conduct as the driver under the Safety Responsibility Act. Affirmed.

A24-0699 Nieburh v. Sieberg (Court of Appeals)

Criminal

Plea Withdrawal

Voluntariness

This case requires a decision on the validity of defendant’s guilty pleas made as part of a contingent plea agreement. Defendant, his wife, and their adult son were all charged with various controlled substance offenses after law enforcement discovered suspected bags of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in their residence. The State charged defendant with four felony counts. Defendant subsequently entered into a contingent plea agreement, agreeing to plead guilty to one count of first-degree sale of a controlled substance and one count of conspiracy to commit a first-degree controlled substance crime in exchange for the State dismissing the remaining two counts and promising leniency for defendant’s wife. At the plea hearing, the District Court did not ask defendant any questions concerning potential coercion but accepted defendant’s pleas. Defendant later moved to withdraw the pleas, but the District Court denied Torrez’s motion.

The Supreme Court held that, to ensure that a contingent plea is voluntary, a District Court must inquire into the nature of the contingency and conduct a heightened inquiry into any risk of coercion; the proper remedy for failing to do so is plea withdrawal. Reversed and remanded.

A24-0818 State v. Torrez (Court of Appeals)

Orders

Attorney Discipline

Public Reprimand

Jill I. Frieders was publicly reprimanded.

A25-0920 In re Frieders