Justices affirm workers’ comp claim for hybrid work injury

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In Brief:

• Minnesota Supreme Court affirms special-errand exception application.
• Cindy Ludwig’s injury compensable during return-to-office commute.
• WCCA reversed compensation judge’s initial denial of claim.
• Justice Anne McKeig’s concurrence emphasized need for clarification of exception due to modern hybrid-work world.

A Minnesota woman filed a claim for workers’ compensation after injuring herself on the day she was supposed to return to office following remote employment. Finding that the special errand exception applied to her work commute, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed that her injury was compensable.

Cindy Ludwig was hired by Dakota County for full-time clerical and customer service work at its Hastings office. In March 2020, the county issued a stay-at-home order in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This required Ludwig to work remotely full-time. Ludwig brought all of her necessary work equipment home.

During a 2021 conference call, Ludwig’s supervisors informed her that she would return to the office to begin a hybrid work schedule. The day before the return date, Ludwig placed all of her work equipment into a large plastic bin. On the day of her return, Ludwig left home earlier than usual to set up at the office before her shift began. When she was loading the bin into her van, she fell and injured her back.

Ludwig let the county know about her injury, and she sought medical treatment. When she returned to work a week later, she used a cane and a wheeled bag to carry her equipment. Subsequently, Ludwig filed a claim petition for medical expenses and wage loss benefits.

She argued that her injury was compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act because it fell under the special-hazard or special-errand exception. However, the compensation judge concluded that the special-errand exception did not apply. The special-errand exception allows an employee to receive workers’ compensation benefits for injuries sustained while performing a special errand or special mission for the employer. When this exception applies, the employee is considered within the scope of employment from the time they leave home until they return. The judge found that Ludwig’s act of returning equipment to the office was merely incidental to her regular commute.

On appeal to the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals, Ludwig argued that the compensation judge misapplied the special-errand holding in Thompson v. Minnesota Trial Courts—District 4. The WCCA distinguished Thompson, noting that, in that case, there was no directive to return equipment and backup equipment was available in that case. Conversely, Ludwig was returning office equipment at the employer’s request and there was no backup equipment was available at her office. The WCCA reversed, concluding the special-errand exception applied.

The county appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court. Before the court was contention about whether the special-errand exception applied. First, the court looked at whether the WCCA erred in finding that the county’s return-to-office directive included an implied requirement that Ludwig return her work equipment before her regular shift. The county argued that the WCCA improperly found that it implicitly required Ludwig to return her equipment before her shift, a finding the compensation judge never made.

The court investigated whether the WCCA’s findings conflict with the compensation judge’s. This only occurs when the WCCA substitutes its own findings for the judge’s express, implicit, or ultimate findings. Ultimately, the court concluded that there was no factual conflict.

The WCCA did make an express finding that the county required Ludwig to return her equipment before her shift, which the compensation judge did not make. However, any conflict would be with an implicit finding only if the judge had considered that issue. The judge addressed only the special-errand exception and did not consider whether the county issued such a directive, so no express or implicit finding exists on that question.

Finding no factual conflict, the court upheld the WCCA’s finding because it was not manifestly contrary to the evidence. It emphasized that Ludwig was required to return to in-person work with equipment she had been using at home, and that there was nothing in the record that contradicts the WCCA’s determination that this directive implicitly required her to bring the equipment back before she resumed working in the office.

The court also concluded that the WCAA did not err as a matter of law when it concluded that Ludwig’s injury was compensable under the special-errand exception. It found that there was an express or implied request that Ludwig perform the task before working hours because the county required her to return to the office and bring her equipment so she could begin work by 8 a.m. That trip included returning equipment that she needed to do her job. It was also a special errand because returning her equipment to the workplace was not a regular or recurring part of her normal workday.

While the county argued that Ludwig was merely directed to report to work at a specific place and chose on her own to bring her equipment, the court concluded that Ludwig was implicitly required to return her equipment and set it up before her shift began. This transformed the directive into a special errand outside normal work hours.

The court also distinguished this case from those generally working in a hybrid work environment. “We acknowledge that in a world of hybrid work, it is unlikely that every worker performs a compensable special errand by transporting equipment associated with their job on their regular commute,” wrote Justice Sarah Hennesy. “But this case does not concern an employee’s regular day-to-day commute pursuant to an established hybrid work schedule. Ludwig’s injury occurred while she was returning to her office with her equipment for the first time following a prolonged work-from-home order during the pandemic, to begin — for the first time — a new hybrid schedule at the county’s request.”

In her concurrence, Justice Anne McKeig contended that the court missed an opportunity to explain how the special-errand exception works in the modern hybrid workplace.

“I would instead clarify that when an employee regularly transports her work equipment to work as part of her hybrid schedule, the special-errand exception does not apply because the transportation of her work equipment is part of her regular commute,” wrote McKeig. “Commuting with a laptop and other work equipment, in such routine circumstances, is not an errand that is an integral part of the service performed any more than the requirement that the employee themself commute to and from the office.”

“If the employee transports additional work equipment that will stay at work, the special-errand exception applies if the employee proves it was necessary to bring the equipment back to work,” McKeig added.