8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Digest: April 1, 2026

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Administrative

Power Transmission

Long-Term Rights; Allocation of Zero Rights

Plaintiff petitioned for review of FERC’s dismissal of plaintiff’s administrative complaint. Plaintiff supplied power to municipal electric utilities in several states. In October 2015, plaintiff joined Southwest Power Pool, a regional transmission organization that managed large parts of the interstate transmission grid. Southwest allocated long-term transmission rights, which could be used to protect against congestion charges on interstate transmission grids. Previously, FERC approved Southwest’s tariff, which established the procedure for awarding long-term transmission rights on an annual basis. Southwest began allocating rights months before plaintiff joined its market, and plaintiff had received no rights since. FERC dismissed plaintiff’s petition challenging the allocation of zero long-term rights as violating the Federal Power Act.

Where the act did not entitle plaintiff to long-term transmission rights because it could not force transmission organizations to provide rights that would be infeasible due to the previous awarding of rights, Southwest’s tariff was not arbitrary or capricious for rolling over awarded long-term rights as long as they were not surrendered.

Petition is denied.

Missouri River Energy Services v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (MLW No. 84536/Case No. 24-3161 & 25-1058 – 12 pages) (U.S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit, Colloton, J.) Petition for review of an order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

Civil Rights

1983

Parolees; Due Process Violations

Defendants appealed the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs, a group of detained Missouri parolees, filed suit under §1983, alleging that the Missouri DOC’s parole revocation procedures deprived them of due process. The district court initially ordered certain changes to the MDOC’s policies, but the court reversed in part. On remand, plaintiffs moved for attorneys’ fees based on their partial success. The district court granted plaintiffs’ request in part, rejecting defendants’ assertion that the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s cap applied to attorneys’ fees. The district court later awarded additional fees to cover compliance monitoring costs.

Where the certified class only included parolees who faced or would face revocation proceedings, all class members would necessarily be detained or incarcerated, making them prisoners subject to the PLRA and its fee cap.

Judgment is vacated and remanded for recalculation.

Gasca v. Precythe (MLW No. 84541/Case No. 25-1430 – 6 pages) (U.S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit, Kobes, J.) Appealed from U.S. District Court, Western District of Missouri, Bough, J.

Prison Inmate

Burden on Religious Exercise; Inadequate Pre/Post-Fast Meals

Plaintiff, a state prison inmate, appealed his complaint against the state DOC, arguing that prison officials substantially burdened his religious exercise. Plaintiff, a practicing Muslim, alleged that his correctional facility provided insufficient food and drink for the predawn and post-sunset meals served during Ramadan when he was obligated to fast from food and drink.

Where dieticians testified that the facility’s meal plan for fasting Muslims provided an adequate amount of calories for males, plaintiff’s voluntary decision to refuse some of the meals provided by the prison did not constitute a substantial burden on his religious practices, especially where he could supplement his nutrition through food obtained from the prison commissary.

Judgment is affirmed.

Holt v. Payne (MLW No. 84534/Case No. 25-1507 – 6 pages) (U.S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit, Erickson, J.) Appealed from U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Arkansas, Wilson, J.

Prison Inmate

Dismissal of Action; IFP Status

Plaintiff, a state prison inmate, appealed the dismissal of his action without prejudice based on his failure to comply with the district court’s order to pay an initial partial filing fee.

Where plaintiff’s failure to make a timely payment was due to a lack of funds in his inmate account, the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the action.

Judgment is vacated and remanded.

Patterson v. Centurion (MLW No. 84503/Case No. 25-3104 – 2 pages) (U.S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit, per curiam) Appealed from U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Missouri.

Criminal Law

2255 Motion

Career Offender Designation; Setting Aside Prior Conviction

Defendant appealed the dismissal of his §2255 motion to vacate and correct his sentence. After being convicted of multiple federal felonies, defendant was sentenced as a career offender due to his prior convictions, including a Missouri marijuana-related conviction. Defendant filed his motion after Missouri set aside his marijuana conviction, arguing that the conviction should not count toward his career offender designation.

Where defendant’s Missouri conviction had not been set aside due to innocence or error of law, the district court could continue to count the conviction for purposes of determining defendant’s career offender status.

Kelly, J., concurring: “The expungement of Lozano’s prior conviction may not have been related to innocence, error of law, exoneration based on later-discovered evidence, or federal constitutional invalidity. But it is difficult to characterize it as anything other than an ‘expunged conviction; If not for Townsend, I would conclude that it is.”

Judgment is affirmed.

Lozano v. U.S. (MLW No. 84533/Case No. 24-3517 – 14 pages) (U.S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit, Gruender, J.) Appealed from U.S. District Court, Western District of Missouri, Fenner, J.

Drug Conspiracy

Withdrawal of Plea; Sentence Length Challenge

Defendant appealed his conviction for drug conspiracy offenses, challenging the district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and the length of his sentence.

Where defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims were only cognizable in collateral proceedings, the court upheld the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea where the record demonstrated that defendant was competent and knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered his plea. The district court’s proper consideration of statutory sentencing factors also demonstrated that it entered a substantively reasonable sentence.

Judgment is affirmed.

U.S. v. Sims (MLW No. 84537/Case No. 25-1158 – 7 pages) (U.S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit, Kelly, J.) Appealed from U.S. District Court, Western District of Missouri, Harpool, J.

Drug Distribution

Suppression Motion; Basis for Traffic Stop

Defendant appealed his conviction for possession with intent to distribute, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because police lacked a basis to initiate a traffic stop based on an ambiguous database message regarding insurance coverage. An officer on patrol entered a vehicle’s license plate into the insurance verification system, which responded that coverage was unconfirmed. The officer accordingly initiated a traffic stop, during which the driver failed to provide proof of insurance. A warrant check on all the occupants revealed that defendant was on parole; a search uncovered drugs in his jacket pocket.

Where an ambiguous response to an inquiry regarding a vehicle’s insurance coverage was sufficient to justify a brief investigatory stop to confirm the driver’s coverage, the stop leading to defendant’s search and arrest was justified.

Kelly, J., concurring: “Nevertheless, I agree that the reliability of AOIVS is not properly before us. In its order, the district court noted that Mitchell did not argue that AOIVS was unreliable, and Mitchell did not contest that characterization, so we have no need to question it on appeal. For this reason, I concur in the judgment.”

Judgment is affirmed.

U.S. v. Mitchell (MLW No. 84540/Case No. 25-1261 – 5 pages) (U.S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit, Erickson, J.) Appealed from U.S. District Court, Western District of Arkansas, Hickey, J.

Felon in Possession of Firearm

Second Amendment Challenge; Prior Controlled Substance Offenses

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm, reiterating his Second Amendment challenge to the offense of conviction and arguing that the district court erred in calculating his offense level because his prior Arkansas convictions did not constitute controlled substance offenses.

Where defendant’s prior convictions fell within the definition of a controlled substance offense and where his constitutional argument was foreclosed by circuit precedent, the court upheld his sentence.

Judgment is affirmed.

U.S. v. Price (MLW No. 84526/Case No. 24-3344 – 2 pages) (U.S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit, per curiam) Appealed from U.S. District Court, Western District of Arkansas, Brooks, J.

Firearms Offenses

Motion to Dismiss; Sufficiency of Evidence

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for two firearm offenses, challenging the denial of his motion to dismiss which argued that the indictment failed to state the essential elements of each charge. Defendant also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.

Where the indictment closely tracked the statutory language, the court found the indictment sufficient even though it omitted the mens rea element as the allegations fairly informed defendant of the charges against him, and the evidence was sufficient to find that defendant knowingly possessed prohibited firearms.

Judgment is affirmed.

U.S. v. Opdahl (MLW No. 84530/Case No. 24-2713 – 7 pages) (U.S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit, Kelly, J.) Appealed from U.S. District Court, District of North Dakota, Welte, J.

Loan Fraud

Suppression of Evidence; Due Process

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for COVID-19 loan fraud, challenging the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and the validity of his waiver of counsel. Defendant also raised procedural due process claims, asserting that he was denied a fair trial. Finally, defendant challenged the district court’s imposition of a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice.

Where the totality of the circumstances supported finding that defendant was not in custody at the time of his police interview at home, the lack of a Miranda warning supported the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress his statements, and the record also did not support finding that defendant’s counsel was unprepared to try the case, meaning that defendant’s waiver of counsel did not constitute a “Hobson’s choice.”

Judgment is affirmed.

U.S. v. Kaeding (MLW No. 84532/Case No. 24-3462 – 21 pages) (U.S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit, Smith, J.) Appealed from U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota, Tostrud, J.

Sex Trafficking by Fraud

Objections to PSR;   Procedural and Substantive Reasonableness of Sentence

Defendant appealed the sentence imposed following his guilty plea to sex trafficking by fraud. As part of his plea agreement, defendant, a nurse practitioner, admitted that he enticed dozens of minors and young adults to engage in sexual acts with or in front of him under the guise that they were part of legitimate medical examinations or research. The PSR recommended a life sentence, finding that defendant had defrauded at least 200 individuals, impeded the government’s investigation and failed to accept responsibility for his action. The district court overruled defendant’s objections and denied his request for a downward variance, sentencing him to life imprisonment.

Where the undisputed part of the record supported the district court’s factual findings, there was no procedural error in sentencing, and the district court imposed a substantively reasonable sentence after weighing defendant’s mitigating factors against the seriousness of his offenses.

Judgment is affirmed.

U.S. v. Markley (MLW No. 84538/Case No. 25-1670 – 5 pages) (U.S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit, per curiam) Appealed from U.S. District Court, Southern District of Iowa, Rose, J.

Supervised Release

Revocation; Sentencing Factors

Defendant appealed the sentence imposed following the revocation of his supervised release, arguing that the district court plainly erred in its application of the statutory sentencing factors.

Where the record showed that the district court appropriately considered the statutory sentencing factors, the court found no plain error in the sentencing determination.

Judgment is affirmed.

U.S. v. Bell (MLW No. 84529/Case No. 25-2407 – 2 pages) (U.S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit, per curiam) Appealed from U.S. District Court, Western District of Missouri, Kays, J.

Elections

Voter Registration

‘Wet’ Signature; Civil Rights Act of 1964

Defendants appealed the district court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction against a rule issued by defendants, the Arkansas State Board of Election Commissioners. The rule required voter registration applications to have a handwritten or “wet” signature. Plaintiffs alleged that the rule violated a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that prohibited denying the right to vote because of an error or omission that was not material to determining the individual’s qualification to vote under state law. The district court determined that the rule likely violated federal law and issued a preliminary injunction.

Where plaintiffs alleged that the rule prohibited them from using their online voter registration tool, they sufficiently established an injury in fact to support standing, and where the record showed that signatures were not used by election officials to confirm an applicant’s existence or identity, the district court did not err in determining that the wet signature requirement violated the materiality provision of the Civil Rights Act.

Stras, J., dissenting: “Just because there are other ways to fight fraud does not mean that a method Arkansas chose, the wet-signature rule, is “[im]material.” Handwritten signatures help ensure that those registering to vote are who they claim to be and understand what they are doing. At the very least, the plaintiffs have not made a “clear showing” to the contrary, so I would let Arkansas continue to require them on voter-registration forms.”

Judgment is affirmed.

Get Loud Arkansas v. Jester (MLW No. 84539/Case No. 24-2810 – 26 pages) (U.S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit, Colloton, J.) Appealed from U.S. District Court, Western District of Arkansas, Brooks, J.

Employer-Employee

First Amendment Violation

Retaliation; FMLA

Defendant appealed the denial of his motion for judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff filed suit against her employer and defendant, one of the employer’s directors, alleging violations of the First Amendment and the Family and Medical Leave Act. Plaintiff claimed she suffered harassment and retaliation after reporting falsification of records in her department. Plaintiff later took intermittent FMLA leave for work-related stress. After a verbal altercation with a co-worker that almost became physical, plaintiff was terminated. The jury ultimately returned a verdict for plaintiff on her First Amendment retaliation claim against defendant, finding that plaintiff’s reports of misconduct were a motivating factor in defendant’s decision to terminate plaintiff.

Where the record could support finding that defendant’s stated reason for terminating plaintiff – the altercation with the co-worker – was pretextual given the co-worker receiving lesser discipline despite her arguably greater culpability in the altercation and prior disciplinary history, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.

Judgment is affirmed.

Woods v. City of St. Louis (MLW No. 84535/Case No. 24-2689 – 20 pages) (U.S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit, Erickson, J.) Appealed from U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Missouri, Perry, J.

Wrongful Termination

Motion to Dismiss; Conflict of Laws

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s grant of defendants’ motion to dismiss his wrongful termination complaint and denial of leave to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff alleged that he was terminated in retaliation for reporting the predecessor employer’s violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute; the employer asserted months later that plaintiff had committed disloyalty by aiding a competitor and engaged in disrespectful behavior. The district court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act because plaintiff did not work for his employer in Minnesota and ruled that his amended complaint under Hawaii’s whistleblower law was futile because his employment contract had a Minnesota choice of law clause.

Where plaintiff’s work in Minnesota was limited to attending trainings and he did not have an ongoing physical presence in the state, he failed to meet the statutory definition of an employee under the MWA, and there was no provision under Hawaii’s whistleblower law precluding contractual waiver of claims under the statute.

Judgment is affirmed.

Ghosh v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. (MLW No. 84528/Case No. 24-3317 – 13 pages) (U.S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit, Loken, J.) Appealed from U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota, Doty, J.

Immigration

Habeas Petition

Detention Without Bond; Removal Proceedings

The government appealed the district court’s judgment granting petitioner’s writ for habeas corpus. Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, was apprehended for lacking documents of legal entry to the U.S. He was detained without bond pending removal proceedings. However, the district court granted the petition for writ of habeas corpus, ruling that the statutory authorization for detention without bond did not apply because petitioner had lived in the U.S. for years without seeking lawful admission and thus was not subject to mandatory detention.

Where an alien remained an “applicant for admission” while present in the U.S. without being lawfully admitted and thus would also be seeking admission to the country, regardless of whether they were taking affirmative steps toward admission, and where immigration law did not confer any advantage or benefit on aliens who had entered the country without lawful admission versus aliens who presented themselves at the border or a port of entry for admission, statutory law did not entitle petitioner to a bond hearing for his detention pending removal proceedings.

Erickson, J., dissenting: “In doing so, the court does not rely on recent Congressional action or a change in the regulations governing detention but rather engages in a novel interpretation of “alien seeking admission” that eluded the courts and five previous presidential administrations. Because the court’s interpretation is not supported by the plain meaning of “seeking,” the context of the INA, or the history of the IIRIRA, I respectfully dissent.”

Judgment is reversed and remanded.

Avila v. Bondi (MLW No. 84527/Case No. 25-3248 – 16 pages) (U.S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit, Shepherd, J.) Appealed from U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota, Tunheim, J.

Insurance

Commercial Property Damage

Appraisal Award; Court’s Authority to Seek Clarification

Defendants appealed the district court’s decision to seek clarification from the parties’ appraisal panel. Defendants’ property sustained tornado damage, but the roof was already in poor condition from water damage. Plaintiff, defendants’ property insurer, filed a declaratory judgment action, arguing that it was only required to pay for damage caused by the tornado; defendants contended that plaintiff should cover the cost of a new roof. The parties’ appraisal panel largely ruled in plaintiff’s favor. However, when local authorities refused to issue a permit unless defendants replaced the roof, they sought to enforce the insurance policy’s “ordinance or law” provision. The district court, finding ambiguity in the appraisal award, sought clarification from the panel and ultimately entered judgment for plaintiff.

Where the loss amount could only be decided by the appraisers and applicable law precluded vacatur of the award, the district court reasonably sought clarification in accordance with state practice.

Judgment is affirmed.

Cincinnati Insurance Company v. Rymer Companies, LLC (MLW No. 84531/Case No. 24-3356 – 8 pages) (U.S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit, Stras, J.) Appealed from U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota, Tostrud, J.