Can a pandemic delay a speedy trial?

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Answering a question of first impression, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a trial delayed due to the pandemic did not violate a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. In State of Minnesota v. William Deshawn Paige, the court held that judicial orders issued in response to the pandemic did not weigh against the state and that Paige was brought to trial quickly enough so as to not violate his constitutional right.

While on intensive pretrial release, Paige verbally and physically threatened a maintenance worker with a knife. He was charged with one count of threats of violence in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.713, subd. 1 (2020). After completing a pretrial release evaluation, which yielded an extremely high score, the district court determined that Paige was not a good candidate for pretrial release or intensive pretrial release, setting his bail at $60,000.

Representing himself pro se, Paige asked for release pending trial and demanded a speedy trial. The court denied Paige’s request for release, but it scheduled a jury trial for March 31, 2020. A week later, Minnesota amended its complaint and added a second-degree assault charge. Paige moved to dismiss the charges against him—citing lack of probable cause—on March 3, 2020.

A week after Paige filed a motion to dismiss, the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a global pandemic. Two days later, on March 13, 2020, Gov. Tim Walz issued Emergency Executive Order No. 20-01, declaring a peacetime emergency due to the spread of COVID-19. On the same day, Chief Justice Lorie Gildea issued an Order that suspended trials, though it omitted cases subject a speedy trial demand from suspension. Then, Gildea ordered that no new jury trials begin before April 22, 2020, or by order of the court—with no exception for cases subject to speedy trial demands.

Paige reiterated his demand for a speedy trial on March 26, 2020, offering to waive the demand if he were released without monetary conditions. The court, however, rescheduled Paige’s trial for April 28, 2020, without modifying the release conditions. On April 9, 2020, Paige’s next pretrial hearing was held. Paige argued that his constitutional rights were violated by being denied a speedy trial and requested a reduction in bail. On April 27, the court denied Paige’s request for bail reduction as well as the speedy trial argument. It continued the jury trial to June 2, 2020.

The trial was held on June 2, 2020. Paige was found guilty of both charges and sentenced to 57 months for the second-degree assault conviction. Subsequently, Paige appealed, asserting that the trial delays caused by statewide orders should be weighed against the state. On August 23, 2020, the Minnesota Court of Appeals determined that Paige’s right to a speedy trial was not violated.

On appeal, the court considered the four Barker factors in ascertaining whether Paige’s right was violated.  Evaluating the first Barker factor—the length of delay—the court compared the 60 day statutory requirement to the 105 days that Paige waited. It determined that the delay was presumptively prejudicial, meaning it was required to consider the other Barker factors.

The second Barker factor—which party was responsible for the delay—required the most analysis. While the state argued that the delays due to COVID-19 were outside of the government’s control, Paige argued that the delays should weigh moderately against the state. Jenna Yaugh-Erickson, assistant state public defender, asserted, “The pandemic didn’t cause the delays. There is a step in between. It was this court’s orders that caused the continuances, that caused the delays.” Yaugh-Erickson pointed to other states that allowed certain trials to go on, despite the pandemic. “Different states and different parts of the country have weighed the significance of the COVID-19 pandemic differently,” Peter Magnuson, assistant attorney general, admitted. “The fact that other states weighed this differently doesn’t mean that Minnesota was wrong. I would argue that Minnesota’s was the correct one.”

The court made a distinction between external reasons for delays, finding that internal factors (such as court congestion) weighed moderately against the state. It determined that the COVID-19 pandemic was an external factor outside of the government’s control and did not weigh against the state. Citing decisions from courts considering similar crises that impacted courts—such as the eruption of Mount St. Helens and the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks—suspension of court was necessary. “In sum, the orders of the Chief Justice were not addressing systemic issues within the court system itself; the orders were responding to a deadly and virulent illness over which the court had no control,” the court wrote.

Regarding the third Barker factor—which was how forceful the request for the speedy trial was—the court found in Paige’s favor, due to the “frequency and force” of his demands. While the state attempted to cast suspicion on the motives behind Paige’s demand, the court declined to entertain the question. “The State has provided no justification as to why Paige’s reasons for wanting a speedy trial matter, nor has it delineated which reasons would be legitimate and which would not—if such a line can even be drawn.”

Finally, the court looked at the fourth Barker factor, which was what prejudice Paige suffered. Paige argued that he suffered many hardships due to the delay, from having visits restricted to potentially being infected. Yaugh-Erickson avowed, “Incarcerated people did not have the opportunity to social distance and could not just go out and buy a mask for themselves. Thus, the very dangers that prompted this court to prohibit trials are the same dangers Paige and other incarcerated people faced every day in jail, for periods that were lengthened due to this court’s orders.” However, the court declined to consider these as hardships, finding that they were not caused by the trial delay but due to restrictions put in place to mitigate COVID-19. The court found that the prejudice Paige suffered was being held an additional 45 days before his trial.

Balancing those factors, the court concluded that the state brought Paige to trial quickly enough so that his right to a speedy trial was not violated. It affirmed the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decision.