admin//September 18, 2013//
Unpublished Civil Opinions
Civil Commitment – SDP; 60.02 Motions
Appellant, who was committed as a sexually dangerous person (SDP) and sexual psychopathic personality (SPP) in 2007, challenged the District Court’s summary denial of his request for appointment of counsel and motion for relief under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. The Court of Appeals noted that it recently held that a Rule 60.02 motion of an SDP/SPP asserting inadequate treatment without specifying the relief sought is also barred by the exclusive remedies of the Commitment Act and In re Civil Commitment of Lonergan, 811 N.W.2d 635 (Minn. 2012). It held that, because appellant was not entitled to relief under Rule 60.02, his request for appointment of counsel to represent him on such a motion was moot. Affirmed.
A13-0729 In re Civil Commitment of Foster (St. Louis County)
Official Immunity – Negligence
Appellants challenged the District Court’s grant of summary judgment, arguing that there were genuine issues of material fact in dispute and appellants’ claims of negligence, involving a “physical confrontation” between police officers and a misidentified domestic assault suspect, were not barred by official immunity and vicarious official immunity. The Court of Appeals noted that, although the parties disputed the extent of the physical contact between appellant and the police officers, it was undisputed that a “physical confrontation” occurred. It was equally undisputed that appellant failed to comply with various police commands, which included multiple demands that he show his hands. On appeal, appellants conceded that appellant’s noncompliance was the catalyst for the physical confrontation. In light of this concession, the Court of Appeals could not conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish a genuine factual issue as to whether the officers initiated physical contact with appellant to ensure their safety. Affirmed.
A13-0176 Hussein v. City of St. Paul (Ramsey County)
Probate – Joint Accounts
Appellant challenged the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of respondent that the funds held in decedent’s joint account belonged to the surviving accountholder under the Minnesota Multiparty Accounts Act (MPAA), claiming that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding decedent’s intent. The Court of Appeals held that appellant’s evidence failed to overcome the MPAA presumption that the sums left on deposit in the challenged accounts belong to the account’s joint owner. Affirmed.
A13-0162 In re Estate of Beito (St. Louis County)
Retaliation – Causal Link
After more than two years of complaining about a wide range of company policies, procedures, and business decisions, appellant was fired from his position as a procurement manager with respondent. He sued his employer, alleging that his discharge was retaliation for his reports of supposedly illegal activities—reports that, according to him, were protected under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act. Appellant appealed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in respondent’s favor, arguing that the District Court erred by refusing to consider his supplemental affidavit; that it abused its discretion by determining that his chosen expert witness was not qualified; and that it erred when it determined that appellant did not meet his burden of showing that he engaged in conduct protected by the act, that there was a causal connection between his reports and his termination, and that respondent’s stated reason for his termination was a pretext for retaliation. The Court of Appeals held that appellant failed to establish a causal link between any protected conduct and his termination, and he failed to show that respondent’s reason for discharging him was pretextual. Affirmed.
A12-2328 Chubboy v. Best Buy Co. (Hennepin County)
Return of Seized Property – Criminal Proceedings
Appellants challenged the summary-judgment dismissal of their claim for the return of property that they allege was wrongfully seized pursuant to a search warrant. Appellants also argued that the District Court erred by dismissing their civil-rights claim based on wrongful seizure and retention of their property. The city argued that the appeal should be dismissed because criminal charges related to the seized property have been filed and the District Court’s dismissal of appellants’ civil-rights claim is not appealable. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal because appellant had been federally indicted and the charges were directly related to the seized evidence. Appeal dismissed; motion granted.
A13-0243 LPOE, Inc. v. City of Duluth (St. Louis County)
Temporary Injunctions – Public Nuisance
Appellant challenged the District Court’s order granting respondent’s motion for a partial temporary injunction, claiming that the District Court abused its discretion by requiring appellant to pay for two police officers to be present at appellant’s place of business during its operating hours, including one hour before opening to one hour after closing. The District Court determined that the products sold by appellant created a public nuisance because appellant’s patrons created conditions that “unreasonably annoy[ed], injur[ed], or endanger[ed] the safety, health, morals, comfort, or repose of any considerable number of members of the public.” The Court of Appeals held that appellant’s contention that there was no proof of nuisance was unpersuasive. Affirmed.
A13-0027 City of Duluth v. 120 E. Superior St. (St. Louis County)
Unemployment Benefits – Wage Credits
Relator appealed from an unemployment-law judge’s (ULJ) decision that he was not entitled to wage credits for his part-time, year-round employment with respondent. The ULJ concluded that relator was not entitled to wage credits for his employment with respondent during the 2011 summer because the employment fell “between two successive academic years or terms.” The Court of Appeals held that, viewing the ULJ’s factual finding in a light most favorable to the decision, it would not disturb the finding because the evidence substantially sustained it. Affirmed.
A12-2314 Savard v. William Mitchell Coll. of Law (Dep’t of Employment & Econ. Dev.)
Published Criminal Opinions
Aggravated Forgery – Intent to Defraud
Appellant challenged her conviction for aggravated forgery on the basis that she did not act with “intent to defraud” within the meaning of Minn. Stat. sec. 609.625, subd. 1. Appellant claimed that by misidentifying herself and signing her sister’s name to a continuance for dismissal agreement and payment plan in order to resolve a speeding ticket, she did not intend to deprive or harm the property rights of another, but merely intended to avoid prosecution for the gross misdemeanor charge of driving with a license cancelled as inimical to public safety. The Court of Appeals held that a person may be found to have committed aggravated forgery and satisfy the “intent to defraud” requirement of Minn. Stat. sec. 609.625, subd. 1, when the person signs a document under an assumed name or the name of another and the document creates, terminates, transfers, or evidences genuine, legal rights, privileges, or obligations. Affirmed.
A12-1875 State v. Stahosky (Ramsey County)
Unpublished Criminal Opinions
Continuances – Obtaining Counsel
On appeal following his convictions of two counts of second-degree assault, appellant argued that the District Court abused its discretion by (1) denying his motion for a continuance to hire substitute counsel and (2) imposing the presumptive sentence without considering the factors outlined in State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28 (Minn. 1982). Appellant argued that a continuance was necessary for him to have the representation that he desired — an attorney to make a motion for a dispositional departure. The Court of Appeals noted that, fatal to his appeal, appellant failed to assert that he was materially prejudiced by not having a departure motion made on his behalf. He further failed to explain on what basis a departure motion would have been meritorious in light of the District Court’s warning that the possibility of a sentencing departure required appellant’s full compliance with his conditional release. Affirmed.
A12-2100 State v. Gerads (Stearns County)
Evidence – Testing
In his appeal from a conviction for second-degree intentional murder, appellant claimed that the District Court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence of spent bullet casings and by admitting the portion of his custodial interrogation in which he admitted to methamphetamine use. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that appellant failed to show any prejudice from the lack of DNA testing on the casings or as a result of the admission of the challenged portion of his interrogation, and did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress evidence from the casings. Affirmed.
A12-1049 State v. Jackson (Ramsey County)
Hearsay – Excited Utterances
Appellant challenged his convictions of assault, terroristic threats, and carrying a pistol while under the influence of alcohol. He argued that the District Court abused its discretion by admitting a recording of a 911 call as an excited utterance at his jury trial and that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing arguments. The Court of Appeals held that the record before it demonstrated that the District Court appropriately exercised its discretion. It carefully considered the relevant factors, and the Court of Appeals could discern no reversible error in its analysis. Affirmed.
A12-1601 State v. Porter (St. Louis County)
Right to Speedy Trial – ‘Barker’ Factors
Appellant challenged his convictions of third-degree assault and aiding and abetting theft from person, arguing that (1) the District Court deprived him of his right to a speedy trial; (2) the District Court’s omission of an accomplice jury instruction affected his substantial rights and requires reversal to ensure fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings; (3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction of third-degree assault; and (4) the District Court erred by sentencing him on both convictions that arose out of the same behavioral incident. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not violate appellant’s right to a speedy trial, the omission of the accomplice jury instruction did not affect his substantial rights, and the evidence was sufficient to support his third-degree-assault conviction. Because appellant’s convictions arose out of a single behavioral incident, it remanded to the District Court for vacation of one of the sentences. Affirmed and remanded.
A12-1603 State v. Murphy (Hennepin County)
Searches – Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
On appeal from his conviction of third-degree possession of a controlled substance, appellant argued inter alia that the search warrant authorizing a search of his home was unsupported by probable cause because the only evidence supporting it was recovered during an unconstitutional warrantless search of his garbage. Appellant argued that the search of his trash was illegal. The Court of Appeals noted that Minnesota courts have consistently held that garbage left on a curb or adjacent to an alley that is seized in a routine curbside pickup does not constitute an illegal search. Affirmed.
A12-2266 State v. McMurray (McLeod County)
Seizure – Reasonable Suspicion
Appellant state challenged a pretrial evidence-suppression order premised on a police officer’s seizure of respondent without reasonable suspicion. The state argued that a reasonable person in respondent’s circumstances would have felt free to leave. The Court of Appeals noted that the circumstances here included the officer, in the middle of the night, stopping his squad vehicle at an angle not quite blocking respondent’s vehicle but with its flashing red and blue emergency lights on and headlights shining into the vehicle. It concluded that a reasonable person in respondent’s circumstances would not have felt free to leave. Affirmed.
A13-0423 State v. Thibedeau (Hennepin County)
Sentencing – Conditional Release
Appellant challenged the District Court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief from a five-year conditional-release period following a period of commitment. Appellant argued that the five-year conditional-release period was not part of his sentence on the record, was without jurisdiction because it was imposed after the expiration of his period of commitment, and was not authorized for attempted first-degree driving while intoxicated. The Court of Appeals held that the five-year conditional-release period was orally imposed at the sentencing hearing, and appellant was convicted of a charge within the purview of the first-degree DWI statute. Affirmed.
A13-0549 Taylor v. State (Hennepin County)