Court of Appeals Digest: July 15

Published Civil Opinions

Domestic Relations – Paternity; Burden of Proof

Appellant challenged the District Court’s order granting summary judgment and adjudicating him father of a minor child, arguing that the District Court erred by applying the statutory clear and convincing standard as his burden of proof to rebut the presumption of paternity and by failing to consider evidence of other possible fathers not joined in the paternity action. The Court of Appeals held that, in determining whether a presumed father’s evidence is sufficient to withstand a summary judgment motion in a paternity action, the court shall consider such evidence in light of the clear and convincing evidentiary burden of proof set forth in Minn. Stat. § 257.62, subd. 5(b). Affirmed.

A12-2315 Limberg v. Mitchell (Hennepin County)

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Unemployment Benefits – Severance Pay

Relator challenged an unemployment-law judge’s application of severance-pay ineligibility to the period immediately following his last day of employment, resulting in a finding of an overpayment of unemployment benefits. The Court of Appeals held that when an applicant for unemployment benefits receives severance pay, it is error to apply severance-pay ineligibility to the period immediately following the applicant’s last day of employment if the applicant was not then receiving severance pay. Therefore, the unemployment-law judge erred by concluding that relator was ineligible to receive unemployment benefits during a time that he did not receive severance pay. Reversed and remanded.

A12-2194 Van de Werken v. Bell & Howell, LLC (Dep’t of Employment & Econ. Dev.)

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Unpublished Civil Opinions

Adverse Possession – Hostility

This case arose out of a boundary-line dispute between appellants and respondents, owners of adjacent lots.  Appellants acquired lots in 1972, along with an easement over the western edge of lot 7.  Respondents acquired lot 7 the following year through a foreclosure sale, which they claimed extinguished appellants’ easement.  A gravel road generally divides the property appellants were using from respondents’ property to the east.  In 2001, a survey revealed that the boundary line between the lots is not located on the gravel road but actually lies westerly of the road and runs at a northwest angle through the property appellants were using, resulting in a portion of appellants’ garage, driveway, and yard being on lot 7.  Appellants sued respondents, claiming title to the land between the real boundary line and the gravel road by adverse possession or boundary by practical location or, in the alternative, an easement over the disputed land.  The District Court granted summary judgment to respondents.  On appeal, appellants challenged the District Court’s determination that (1) their easement was extinguished by the 1973 foreclosure; (2) their boundary-by-practical-location claims failed as a matter of law; and (3) their claims of adverse possession and prescriptive easement failed because they had permission to use the disputed land.  The Court of Appeals held that there were genuine issues of material fact as to “hostility” in appellants’ use of the disputed land, and thus reversed the District Court’s dismissal of appellants’ adverse-possession and prescriptive-easement claims and remand for further proceedings.  It affirmed the remainder of the District Court’s decision. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

A12-2119 Watkins v. Patch (Stearns County)

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Attorneys’ Liens – Validity

Appellant attorney challenged two District Court orders declaring his attorney’s lien void ab initio, requiring him to disgorge proceeds from satisfaction of the lien, and awarding those funds to his client’s judgment creditor.  The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had jurisdiction over the challenge, the judgment creditor had standing to challenge the validity of the attorney’s lien, and, after the attorney’s lien was declared void, the judgment creditor’s interest in the subject funds had priority over the attorney’s interest.  Affirmed; motion granted.

A12-2277 Bridgewater Bank v. Raddahl (Hennepin County)

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Civil Commitment – SDP; 60.02 Motions

Appellant was civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person (SDP) in 2007.  In this appeal, appellant challenged the District Court’s denial of his motion for relief under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion by denying his request for an evidentiary hearing and that the court erred by denying his motion for appointment of counsel.  The Court of Appeals held that because appellant was seeking a discharge from his commitment based only on generalized complaints about the MSOP, and not based on any individualized treatment concerns, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying his rule 60.02(e) motion. Affirmed.

A13-0382 In re Civil Commitment of Guy (Becker County)

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Civil Commitment – SDP; Likeliness to Engage in Future Acts

Appellant, who was civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person (SDP), claimed that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that he is “highly likely” to engage in future acts of harmful sexual conduct and that there was a less restrictive alternative treatment program to his commitment.  The Court of Appeals held that the the record included clear and convincing evidence that appellant meets the standards for commitment as an SDP and that appellant failed to establish that there was a less restrictive program available that meets his needs and is consistent with the requirements of public safety. Affirmed.

A12-2249 In re Civil Commitment of Cook (Olmsted County)

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Civil Commitment – SPP; Power to Control

In this appeal from his indeterminate commitment as a sexual psychopathic personality and a sexually dangerous person, appellant argued that the evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that he utterly lacks the power to control his sexual impulses or that he is highly likely to engage in harmful sexual conduct. The Court of Appeals noted that appellant has only two convictions, but both were “brutal” offenses.  Since the first offense in 1992, appellant has been in custody or on supervised release; he has spent only 29 days in the community without supervision. The Court reviewed the facts, and held that the District Court’s conclusion that appellant met the standard of an utter lack of power to control his sexual impulses was not erroneous. Affirmed.

A13-0106 In re Civil Commitment of Padron (Ramsey County)

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DHS Licensing – Disqualification

Relator challenged respondent Commissioner of Health’s denial of relator’s request to set aside her disqualification from working in a position allowing direct contact or access to persons receiving services at state-licensed health-care facilities.  Relator argued that the commissioner erred because her position as a dietary aide involved no direct contact with the residents and she presents no substantial risk to vulnerable adults. Relator also argued that her position as a dietary aide provided “abundant limitations to access” and thus sufficiently limited any risk of harm.  The Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that the commissioner found that the clients relator served were “very vulnerable,” and this finding was supported by the record. Affirmed.

A12-1934 Pillatzki v. Comm’r of Health (Minn. Dep’t of Health)

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Domestic Relations – Child Support; Modification

Appellant-obligor challenged the District Court’s order affirming a child support magistrate’s modification of his child support obligation based on increased earnings.  He argued that the District Court erred by including in his income financial assistance received from family members and by relying upon deposits into his personal and business checking accounts in order to calculate his income. The Court of Appeals held that there was no merit to appellant’s contentions that the CSM erred by calculating his monthly income based upon his deposits into his personal and business checking accounts, which deposits included contributions from his family.  And, based upon this calculation of appellant’s income, the CSM correctly modified appellant’s child support obligation in accordance with the required statutory factors.  The District Court did not err in affirming the CSM’s order setting appellant’s income and child support. Affirmed.

A12-1498 Dedefo v. Gada (Hennepin County)

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Domestic Relations – Dissolution; Property Division

Appellant husband challenged the District Court’s division of property in this dissolution action, arguing that the District Court erred or abused its discretion by (1) finding that respondent wife adequately traced a nonmarital inheritance; (2) failing to consider the debt on the hobby farm a marital debt; (3) awarding property that husband claimed does not exist; and (4) failing to award him a larger share of martial property. The Court of Appeals held that although the District Court could have exercised its broad discretion in the equitable division of martial property in a different manner, it could not conclude that the division made constituted an abuse of that broad discretion. Affirmed.

A12-1371 Richie v. Richie (Wright County)

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Employment – Retaliation

Appellant challenged the District Court’s conclusion that respondent did not violate the Public Employment Labor Relations Act (PELRA) or the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (MGDPA) and that respondent was entitled to summary judgment on appellant’s claim of defamation. Appellant argued that respondent violated PELRA by retaliating against her after she filed a grievance.  The Court of Appeals held that because appellant failed to establish a decrease in her hours, the District Court did not err by concluding that there was no adverse employment action and that appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Affirmed.

A13-0241 Whelan v. Hennepin Healthcare Sys., Inc. (Hennepin County)

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Fraudulent Misrepresentation  – Damages

After a bench trial involving alleged fraudulent misrepresentation in the sale of a home, appellant-home-buyers challenged the District Court’s damages award of $100. Appellants argued that the court abused its discretion by disallowing appellant’s testimony about the fair market value of the property. The Court of Appeals agreed. Appellant testified about her ownership of the property; that, before purchasing the property, she personally inspected it and received a seller’s disclosure report about it; that she began searching for the property three to five months before she and her husband executed the purchase agreement; and that the property was one of eight properties that she and her husband considered purchasing. The Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court abused its discretion by excluding appellants’ testimony about the value of the home and denying appellants’ motion for a new trial. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

A12-1432 Alexander v. Raps (St. Louis County)

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Implied Consent – Experts

Appellant challenged the District Court order sustaining revocation of his driving privileges under the implied-consent law, arguing that the District Court committed reversible error by excluding medical records and the testimony of an expert witness who would have testified about the effects of gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD) on appellant’s Intoxilyzer 5000 test results. Appellant asserted that his testimony that he was experiencing symptoms of GERD at the time of testing provided a sufficient foundation for the expert’s opinion about his test.  But, the Court of Appeals noted, the District Court found appellant’s testimony that he was experiencing GERD at the time of testing not credible.  Without credible testimony that appellant was experiencing GERD at that time, there was no foundation for an expert opinion that GERD affected appellant’s test. Affirmed.

A12-1756 Murtha v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety (Hennepin County)

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Municipalities – Detachment

Appellant challenged the District Court’s affirmance of an administrative-law judge’s (ALJ) order granting respondent property owners’ petition for detachment. Respondents petitioned for detachment of their real property from appellant City of Lake Elmo to Stillwater Township under Minn. Stat. § 414.06. Appellant first argued that the ALJ’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence.  The ALJ found that the subject property is not served by municipal water, and that appellant has “no specific development plans” for the subject property because it is “not included in areas staged for growth in [the city’s] comprehensive plan.”  Appellant contended that the “ALJ’s finding regarding water service and development are arbitrary and capricious and not supported by substantial evidence in the record.” The Court of Appeals discerned no reversible error in the ALJ’s findings regarding an avenue or in her findings regarding water service and development plans. Affirmed.

A12-2008 City of Lake Elmo v. Nass (Washington County)

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Public Employment Labor – Unit Determinations

Relator City of Bloomington appealed from a unit-determination order issued by respondent Bureau of Mediation Services (BMS) pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 179A.09 (2012), arguing that BMS erred by (1) determining “an” appropriate unit instead of “the” appropriate unit and stating on reconsideration that BMS must first consider the union’s proposed bargaining unit and address alternative proposals only after determining the union’s proposed units to be inappropriate; and (2) failing to properly apply the standard of nonproliferation to recognize a wall-to-wall bargaining unit.  The Court of Appeals held that (1) the challenged BMS precedent was not contrary to the statute, and (2) the agency’s interpretation of the statute was not erroneous and substantial evidence supported the agency decision. Affirmed.

A12-1829, A12-2016 City of Bloomington v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees (Bureau of Mediation Servs.)

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Unemployment Benefits – Actively Seeking Employment

Relator challenged the decision of an unemployment law judge (ULJ) that he has not actively sought suitable employment.  Relator argued that the ULJ erroneously relied on his failure to accept an available position and his failure to seek employment outside of his previous occupation.  The Court of Appeals held that the ULJ based the underlying factual findings on substantial evidence and did not err in applying the law. Affirmed.

A12-1859 Ohlson v. Gen. Drivers Local No. 120 (Dep’t of Employment & Econ. Dev.)

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Unemployment Benefits – Employment Misconduct

This certiorari appeal is from an unemployment-law judge’s decision that relator is ineligible to receive unemployment benefits because he was discharged for aggravated employment misconduct. After completing a job, relator instructed homeowner to write the check to him, instead of to respondent company. Relator was subsequently charged with gross-misdemeanor theft. Relator argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the ULJ’s finding that he intended to keep the money from the job and to permanently deprive respondent of the money from the job. The Court of Appeals held that sufficient evidence supported the ULJ’s findings. Affirmed.

A12-2150 Hatleli v. Midwest Door Co. of Austin, MN, Inc. (Dep’t of Employment & Econ. Dev.)

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Unemployment Benefits – Employment Misconduct

A coworker reportedly witnessed pharmacist relator drinking unprescribed prescription cough medicine containing codeine while on the job at respondent employer. Relator appealed from an unemployment law judge’s determination that she is ineligible to receive unemployment benefits because she was discharged from her position for employment misconduct. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence substantially supported the unemployment law judge’s findings of fact. Affirmed.

A12-1921 Kolstad v. Regions Hosp. (Dep’t of Employment & Econ. Dev.)

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Unlicensed Motor-Vehicle-Repair  – Sufficiency of the Evidence

In this certiorari appeal from an administrative-citation hearing, relator challenged the administrative hearing officer’s decision to uphold fines for violating respondent-city’s ordinance that prohibits the operation of unlicensed motor-vehicle-repair garages.  Relator argued that his operation did not fall within the definition of a motor-vehicle-repair garage and that the findings and the evidence were insufficient to support the imposition of fines. Relator and the city disagreed on whether the operation was a business as contemplated in the ordinance. In light of the dictionary definitions and caselaw, the Court of Appeals held that the term “business” was not ambiguous.  It agreed with relator that a “business” for purposes of the licensing ordinance means a commercial enterprise with a profit-making motive. It disagreed with relator, however, to the extent that he asserted that the city must prove his profit-making motive by submitting evidence of his finances. Affirmed.

A12-1808 Eshmawy v. City of Minneapolis (City of Minneapolis Dep’t of Licensing & Consumer Servs.)

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Unpublished Criminal Opinions

DWI – Pre-test Counsel

Appellant challenged her conviction of gross-misdemeanor driving while impaired (DWI), arguing that the District Court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence of her alcohol concentration. Appellant argued that the record does not support the District Court’s finding that her medical condition made it impossible for her to consult with an attorney. The Court of Appeals noted that an officer testified that paramedics constantly attended to appellant at the crash scene, then airlifted her to the hospital for emergency medical care.  When the officer saw appellant at the hospital, she was lying on a CT board with her eyes swollen shut, intravenous tubes attached to her, and an oxygen mask on her face. The Court of Appeals concluded that the officer’s observations amply supported the District Court’s finding that appellant’s medical condition made it impossible for her to consult with an attorney. Affirmed.

A12-1853 State v. Wessing (Olmsted County)

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Escaping Vehicle-Registration Fee – Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellant challenged his conviction of intent to escape the vehicle-registration fee in violation of Minn. Stat. § 168.35, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to convict him. Appellant was stopped in a car with license plates from a different vehicle. Appellant told the officer that he had gotten the plates from a junked vehicle or from a vehicle at a wrecking yard and that he knew the plates did not belong to the Cadillac.  When the officer told appellant that he believed that appellant was avoiding the vehicle-registration tax, he testified that appellant’s response was “yes and no.”  Appellant explained that he intended to buy the tabs, but he did not have the money. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to convict appellant of the offense charged. Affirmed.

A12-1277 State v. Hansen (Becker County)

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Evidence – Harmless Error

Appellant, in a juvenile delinquency proceeding, challenged the District Court’s decision to admit a recorded statement which had been given to police by another juvenile.  The Court of Appeals held that, while there was sufficient evidence that the recording of the interview qualified as a memorandum or record and that the recording was “made or adopted” by the juvenile within the meaning of rule 803(5), the District Court, under the circumstances of this case, nonetheless erred in playing and admitting the entire recording at trial. However, when compared to the evidence as a whole, the recorded statement was a minor part of the state’s case, and any error in admitting the evidence was harmless. Affirmed.

A12-2285 In re Welfare of A.L.H. (Otter Tail County)

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Evidence – Probative Value

On appeal from his conviction of third-degree controlled-substance crime, appellant argued that the District Court abused its discretion by (1) admitting identification testimony from a drug- and gang-unit officer based upon “prior knowledge,” and (2) admitting evidence of appellant’s six prior felony convictions for impeachment purposes, should he testify.  The Court of Appeals noted that any prejudicial effect of the officer’s testimony was limited—the officer provided no details regarding the source of his prior knowledge.  It concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the officer’s testimony that he was able to identify appellant because of his prior knowledge. Furthermore, because at least four of the five Jones factors favored admission of appellant’s six prior felony-theft convictions, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of those convictions for impeachment purposes. Affirmed.

A12-1381 State v. Bobo (Benton County)

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Failure to Register – Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his two convictions of failure to register as a predatory offender, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 243.166. The Court of Appeals reviewed the record and held that the District Court could reasonably conclude that appellant knowingly violated the registration requirements, and is thus guilty of the charged offense. Affirmed.

A12-0905 State v. Livingston (Dakota County)

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Postconviction Relief – ‘Knaffla’ Bar

Appellant challenged the District Court’s denial of his postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737 (1976).  The Court of Appeals held that this issue was previously raised and considered on direct appeal, and thus barred by Knaffla. Affirmed.

A12-2115 Solorzano-O’Brien v. State (Hennepin County)

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Postconviction Relief – Timeliness

In these consolidated postconviction appeals, appellant challenged the postconviction court’s order summarily denying postconviction relief, arguing that the court erred by concluding that his petitions were untimely. The Court of Appeals held that because appellant did not seek postconviction relief until after the statute ran, his petitions did not fall within the interests-of-justice exception. Affirmed.

A12-2252, A12-2254 Maya v. State (Ramsey County)

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Probation – Continuation

Appellant State of Minnesota challenged the District Court’s sentencing order that continued respondent’s probation following a probation violation.  The state argued that (1) the District Court failed to make findings pursuant to State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246 (Minn. 1980), and (2) revocation was required because the evidence establishes the third Austin factor.  The Court of Appeals held that because the District Court was not required to make findings under Austin before revoking probation and because the District Court acted within its discretion by continuing respondent’s probation, reversal was not warranted. Affirmed.

A13-0133 State v. McGee (Hennepin County)

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Prosecutorial Misconduct – Burden Shifting

Appellant argued that he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by improperly shifting the burden of proof and misstating the law of defense of another. Appellant argued that the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof because the prosecutor’s closing argument repeatedly indicated that appellant was claiming that he acted in defense of another, thereby insinuating that the burden of proof was upon appellant, rather than the state. The Court of Appeals held that, when viewed as a whole, the prosecutor’s statements amount to a vigorous contention that the evidence did not support appellant’s defense that he was acting in defense of another. Affirmed.

A12-1198 State v. Zepeda (Dakota County)

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Right to Counsel – Waiver

The state charged appellant with third-degree criminal sexual conduct, and he fired his public defender and repeatedly insisted on representing himself at trial. He now appealed from his conviction, arguing that the District Court unconstitutionally failed to obtain a valid waiver of his right to counsel before allowing him to proceed pro se, that the prosecutor committed misconduct, and that the District Court departed from its neutral role. The Court of Appeals held that the record showed that the District Court adequately ensured that appellant’s decision to proceed to trial without legal counsel was informed and voluntary notwithstanding its failure to conduct a specific on-the-record colloquy, the prosecutor properly focused on the victim’s credibility in her closing argument and not on appellant’s exercise of his constitutional rights, and the District Court’s improper questioning of a witness did not affect appellant’s substantial rights. Affirmed.

A12-1456 State v. Prewitt (Hennepin County)

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Search Warrants – Sufficient Nexus

Appellant challenged the District Court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during a search of his residence, arguing that the warrant authorizing the search failed to establish a sufficient nexus between his residence and any suspected criminal activity.  The Court of Appeals noted that there was no information in the affidavit, other than the police officer’s conclusory statements, linking appellant’s property to the marijuana-growing operation.  Whereas police officers may rely on their experience in drawing inferences in search warrant applications, “mere suspicion does not equal probable cause.”  It held that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause to believe that evidence of the growing operation would be found at appellant’s property, and the fruits of the search must therefore be suppressed. Reversed and remanded.

A12-1730 State v. Johnson (Mille Lacs County)

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Sentencing – Downward Departure

After entering an ‘Alford’ plea for unintentional second-degree felony murder and receiving a sentence within the presumptive sentencing guidelines, appellant appealed, arguing that substantial and compelling circumstances supported a downward durational and dispositional departure from the presumptive sentence.  The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a presumptive sentence. Affirmed.

A12-2195 State v. VanHoutan (Anoka County)

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Stalking  – Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellant challenged his convictions of stalking and second-degree burglary, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his stalking conviction and, even if there is sufficient evidence to support the stalking conviction, that conviction cannot satisfy the independent-crime element of second-degree burglary. Appellant argued that because the evidence fails to establish that he knew or had reason to know that his conduct would cause the victim to feel frightened, it was insufficient to support his conviction of stalking. The Court of Appeals held that, given the victim’s direct evidence that she did feel frightened and the evidence demonstrating her intent to sever telephone contact and keep appellant out of her apartment, the only reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the circumstances proved establish that appellant had reason to know that breaking into the victim’s apartment and obtaining and using her new phone number would cause the victim to feel unsafe and frightened. Affirmed.

A12-1269 State v. Haberman (Rice County)

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Traffic Stops – Reasonable & Articulable Suspicion

Appellant challenged his convictions for driving while impaired, arguing that the District Court erred when it upheld the constitutionality of the stop of his vehicle. Appellant argued the deputy did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion to initiate the stop because he neither personally observed appellant commit any criminal activity nor suspected appellant of any criminal activity. An officer was dispatched to investigate a report of a suspicious vehicle, made by a citizen informant, who reported that he saw a “guy driving a pickup, running back and forth going into different people’s houses.” The Court of Appeals concluded that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer had a reasonable basis for stopping appellant’s vehicle. Affirmed.

A12-2022 State v. Price (Anoka County)

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