Court of Appeals Digest: Nov. 24, 2025

Civil Precedential

Debt Collection

Collection Agencies

In this certiorari appeal, relator challenged a cease-and-desist order issued by the Minnesota Commissioner of Commerce, prohibiting relator from conducting business in Minnesota absent licensure as a “collection agency” under Minn. Stat. §§ 332.31-.44, Minnesota’s collection agency statutes. Relator asserted that it was not a “collection agency” within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 332.31, subd. 3, and it did not conduct business “in Minnesota” within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 332.33, subd. 1. Relator also asserted that Minnesota’s collection agency statutes were unconstitutionally vague as applied to relator.

The Court of Appeals concluded that (1) an entity that seeks to receive payment on any pecuniary obligation for others, including a rental-vehicle damage claim, is engaged in the collection of “any … other indebtedness” and thus is a “collection agency” under Minn. Stat. § 332.31, subd. 3, regardless of whether such indebtedness is liquidated; (2)  an entity that agrees to undertake efforts to collect a debt originally owned by another and remit to the original debtholder some or all amounts collected on that indebtedness is engaged in collection “for others” and thus is a “collection agency” within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 332.31, subd. 3; and (3) an entity that contracts with a Minnesota business to undertake efforts to collect a debt for the benefit of another or engages in debt collection originating from a transaction occurring in Minnesota is subject to regulation under Minnesota’s collection agency statutes. Affirmed.

A25-0375 In re Unlicensed Debt Collection Activity of PurCo Fleet Servs., Inc. (Dep’t of Com.)

Civil Nonprecedential

Breach of Contract

Fraudulent Representations

In this appeal following a court trial, pro se appellant argued that the District Court erred in determining that she was the owner of a vehicle sold to her by respondent and that there was no breach of the agreement between appellant and respondent related to the purchase of the vehicle. Noting that under the plain and unambiguous language of the bill of sale, appellant was the owner of the vehicle, and that the bill of sale was unambiguous and excluded the possibility of fraudulent inducement by including specific language, the Court of Appeals found no error by the District Court. Affirmed.

A25-0020 Williams v. Kienzle (Dakota County)

Drivers’ License Revocation

Alcohol Testing

Respondent Commissioner of Public Safety revoked appellant’s driver’s license based upon a finding that he refused to submit to a breath test after his arrest for driving while impaired. Appellant petitioned the District Court to rescind the revocation of his license. The District Court denied the petition. Noting that the sergeant had to repeatedly restart his observation period due to appellant’s burping, that appellant refused to follow instructions and told the sergeant that he only had to blow into the instrument for eight seconds based upon his lawyer’s advice, and that appellant was continually arguing with the sergeant, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court did not clearly err in determining that, based upon the totality of the circumstances, appellant refused to submit to a breath test. Affirmed.

A25-0735 Mesenburg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety (Crow Wing County)

Fee Waivers

Findings

Appellant challenged the District Court’s denial of her fee-waiver application. Noting that the District Court did not provide an explanation for the denial and it could not identify a compelling and obvious reason, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court abused its discretion. Remanded.

A25-0335 Jemison v. Child Protective Serv. (Hennepin County)

Harassment Restraining Orders

Harassment

Pro se appellant demanded an evidentiary hearing to challenge a petition for a harassment restraining order (HRO) filed by respondent. The District Court granted the HRO, reasoning that appellant had violated active HROs by harassing respondent at least three times. Appellant sought to reverse the District Court’s decision granting the HRO request. The Court of Appeals concluded that the record supported the District Court’s finding that appellant engaged in following, monitoring, or pursuing respondent in violation of existing HROs, appellant’s due-process rights were vindicated, and the District Court acted within its discretion in fashioning the HRO. Affirmed.

A24-1727 Mitchell v. Black (Lyon County)

Intrusion Upon Seclusion

Intrusion

Pro se appellant lingered inside a convenience store’s retail area and its restroom for hours before store staff finally questioned whether he was using drugs and ordered him to leave. Appellant sued the store, alleging intrusion upon seclusion (a cleaning employee attempted to enter a restroom that appellant occupied), defamation per se, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and retaliation. The District Court dismissed all claims on summary judgment, concluding that the undisputed facts supported none of them. Noting that appellant’s forcefully shutting the door after it was opened only “an inch or so” prevented any invasion of his privacy, the Court of Appeals concluded that the undisputed facts established that no intrusion occurred. Appellant’s remaining claims fared no better. Affirmed.

A25-0656 Villanueva v. Circle K Stores Inc. (Hennepin County)

Landlord & Tenant

Parking

Pro se appellant-tenant argued that the District Court erred in continuing the parties’ summary-judgment hearing, granting respondent-apartment complex’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissing his claims against respondent towing company. Appellant brought this action after his car was towed twice form the parking lot of the complex. Noting that appellant did not properly serve the towing company with any of his complaints, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed appellant’s claims against the towing company for improper service. And the terms of the lease authorized the apartment complex to tow vehicles parked illegally or without authorization. Affirmed.

A25-0725 Alexander v. Tyson’s Towing & Transport LLC (Dakota County)

Criminal Precedential

Witnesses

Children

Appellant sought reversal of the District Court’s delinquency adjudication, arguing that the District Court committed reversible plain error by allowing a child-witness to testify at trial, outside the presence of appellant, without first making findings pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 4(c), that the defendant’s presence would psychologically traumatize the witness so as to render the witness unavailable to testify.

The Court of Appeals held that a District Court plainly errs by allowing a witness to testify at trial outside the presence of a defendant without holding a hearing and making findings pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 4(c), that the defendant’s presence “would psychologically traumatize the witness so as to render the witness unavailable to testify.” However, this error did not affect appellant’s substantial rights. Affirmed.

A25-0206, A25-0207 In re Welfare of E.J.C.L. (Nobles County)

Criminal Nonprecedential

Animal Mistreatment

Preemption

In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for animal mistreatment, defendant argued that (1) federal organic farming regulations preempted state law and precluded his prosecution; (2) the evidence was insufficient to prove that he knowingly deprived his animals of necessary food, water, or shelter; and (3) the animal mistreatment statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. The Court of Appeals concluded that the prosecution was not preempted, as a person can both provide an animal with necessary food, water, and shelter as required by Minn. Stat. § 343.21, subd. 2, and ensure the animal has access to “the outdoors, shade, shelter, exercise areas, fresh air, clean water for drinking, and direct sunlight” as required by 7 C.F.R. § 205.239(a)(1). Furthermore, the conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and the animal mistreatment statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied. Affirmed.

A24-1805 State v. Bourgeois (St. Louis County)

Criminal Sexual Conduct

Expert Testimony

On appeal from his convictions of one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and three counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, defendant argued that the District Court abused its discretion by allowing the state to introduce expert testimony on “grooming” behavior, and refusing to redact a statement made by the victim in a recorded interview that was played for the jury related to defendant’s attempt to kill the victim’s mother. Noting that evidence of guilt was strong, the Court of Appeals concluded that any error in admitting the challenged expert-witness testimony had no significant impact on the jury’s verdict. And the District Court’s abuse of its discretion in refusing to redact the challenged statement was harmless. However, the District Court erroneously entered a conviction on one of the four counts. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

A24-1912 State v. Peterson (Douglas County)

DWI

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In this direct appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of driving while impaired (DWI) and one count of test refusal, defendant argued that her convictions must be reversed for insufficient evidence. Defendant also argued that her test-refusal conviction must be vacated because it arose out of the same behavioral incident as the DWI conviction. Noting that defendant’s alternative hypothesis—that she was experiencing an anxiety attack and was not intoxicated—did not explain why she was swerving on the road, lost her balance, slurred her speech, and smelled strongly of alcohol, the Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support both convictions. However, the District Court erred in entering convictions on both offenses because they arose from the same statutory scheme and were committed as part of the same behavioral incident. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

A24-1613 State v. Libis (Hennepin County)

Juveniles

Certification as Adults

In this appeal from the District Court’s order certifying appellant for adult prosecution on six counts including first-degree burglary, appellant argued that the District Court abused its discretion in determining whether retaining the proceeding in juvenile court served public safety. Appellant specifically challenged the District Court’s consideration of the public-safety factors set forth in Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4. Noting that the District Court’s order reflected that its findings as to both of the challenged public-safety factors were supported by the record and that it gave greater weight to the seriousness of the offense as well as to the history of delinquency, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court properly acted within its discretion in ordering adult certification. Affirmed.

A25-0848 In re Welfare of M.E.G. (Blue Earth County)

Plea Withdrawal

Fair & Just

In this appeal from the District Court’s order denying her petition for postconviction relief, petitioner argued that the court abused its discretion in determining that it had acted within its discretion in its earlier denial of petitioner’s presentence motion to withdraw her Alford plea to the charge of third-degree burglary. Petitioner maintained that she advanced fair-and-just reasons for withdrawal and that the state asserted no prejudice. Noting that petitioner refused to identify the name of her purported exculpatory witness, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court acted within its discretion by determining that it had duly considered the bases petitioner claimed as fair-and-just reasons supporting her plea-withdrawal motion. Affirmed.

A25-0018 Englund v. State (Isanti County)

Pretrial Appeals

Permitted Orders

In this pretrial appeal, defendant challenged orders denying her motion to dismiss charges of felony deprivation of parental rights against her and partially denying her motion to eliminate or amend her conditions of release. The state contended the order denying the motion to dismiss was not appealable. Noting that an order denying a motion to dismiss is not appealable, notwithstanding that defendant had been found incompetent, the Court of Appeals dismissed this part of the appeal. And the District Court did not abuse its discretion by partially denying defendant’s most recent motion to eliminate or modify the terms of her conditional release. Affirmed in part, appeal dismissed in part.

A25-0109 State v. Konz (Hennepin County)

Right to Speedy Trial

Cause for Delay

Defendant demanded a speedy trial to contest a speeding citation that he received after a police officer ticketed him for driving 18 miles over the posted speed limit. Defendant appealed from his conviction, arguing first that the District Court violated his speedy-trial right, second that he was improperly refused discovery contingent on his paying an administrative fee, and third that the evidence was insufficient to support the speeding conviction because the District Court admitted the officer’s testimony about the LIDAR reading without sufficient foundation. Because the only delay attributable to the state was for good cause and defendant showed no prejudice, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court did not violate defendant’s right to a speedy trial, properly applied the discovery rules to require payment of the nominal administrative fee, and did not erroneously admit evidence of the LIDAR reading. Affirmed.

A25-0610 State v. Schillak (Hennepin County)