MSOP transfers must be timely

Patients in the Minnesota Sex Offender Program have a clearly established right to transfer to a reduction in custody in a reasonable amount of time following a transfer order, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held. On Feb. 1, the court maintained that the Minnesota Commitment Appeals panel exclusively orders transfers and that state officials must act on those transfer orders.

Ricky McDeid and Shane Garry are both patients in the Minnesota Sex Offender Program. McDeid was committed as a sexually dangerous person and sexual psychopathic personality by the Aitkin County District Court in 1999. Garry was committed as a sexually dangerous person in 2012.

When designated as a sexually dangerous person or sexual psychopathic personality, individuals are typically committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program for an indeterminate amount of time. As patients progress through their treatment phases, they move from more secure facilities to less secure facilities. One of the less secure facilities is Community Preparation Services.

The Minnesota Commitment Appeals Panel ordered the transfers of McDeid and Garry to the Community Preparation Services in 2017 and 2018, respectively. Neither of those orders was appealed by state officials; however, neither McDeid nor Garry was transferred.

In 2019, McDeid and Garry filed petitions for a writ of mandamus demanding the transfers. Additionally, they alleged violations of the 14th Amendment due process rights. Eventually, McDeid and Garry were transferred—but two years passed after the transfer orders before either was transferred.

“The statutes vest the CAP with the exclusive authority to order a transfers, provisional discharge, or discharge of those committed as a sexually dangerous person or a person with a sexual psychopathic personality,” the court wrote, pointing to Minnesota statute. State officials argued that the CAP transfer order was not binding on them, nevertheless, citing a statute that reads that a “civilly committed sex offender may be placed in [CPS] only upon an order of the [CAP].” They argued that “may” meant that the language was permissive and so CAP transfer orders simply provide authorization to transfer patients at their discretion.

However, the court determined that they misread the statute. “Nothing in the statute suggests that CAP transfer orders for reduction in custody are effective and operational only when the Commissioner concludes that the CAP got the decision right,” the court maintained.

Aaron Winter, assistant attorney general, argued, “The operative statutes don’t contain a deadline for transfer after a CAP order. Those statutes don’t authorize the CAP to determine the timing of transfer.” The court acceded that state officials are able to decide when that transfer occurs. Still, the court deemed the state to be conflating when a transfer should happen with whether one must happen within a reasonable time.

“Final CAP orders are mandatory. Government officials must fulfill a mandated act or duty within a reasonable time under Minnesota law,” the court said.

Andrew Pieper, Partner at Stoel Rives, represented appellants pro-bono. “The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision establishes a common-sense rule: There is a constitutionally protected and clearly established right to timely implementation of court orders that require state government action. In other words, when there is a court order mandating that the state take some action, the state must do so within a reasonable amount of time,” Pieper stated.

After reversing the Court of Appeals, the court remanded to determine whether obligation to transfer gives rise to a federal due process right and whether the state’s failure to transfer violated the patients’ federal constitutional rights, supporting a § 1983 claim.

“This decision, which we believe is an important step in eventual vindication of our clients’ constitutional claims, ultimately protects rights afforded to everybody. Simply put, states do not have the right to unreasonably delay implementation of a court mandate. As lawyers, we are sworn to support the Constitution of the United States; this case is in keeping with and advances that oath,” Pieper said.