This opinion will
be unpublished and
may not be cited
except as provided by
Minn. Stat. �
480A.08, subd. 3 (2008).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF
APPEALS
A08-1734
Linda M. Cordes,
f/k/a Linda M. Joyce,
Appellant,
vs.
Holt and Anderson, Ltd., et al.,
Respondents.
Filed July 14, 2009
Affirmed
Shumaker, Judge
Dakota�County
District Court
File No. 19-C8-07-030092
James M. Kempainen,
8609 Lyndale Avenue South, Suite 214, Bloomington, MN 55420 (for appellant)
Bryon G. Ascheman,
Burke & Thomas, PLLP, 3900 Northwoods Drive, Suite 200, St. Paul, MN 55112
(for respondents)
����������� Considered and decided by Shumaker, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Crippen, Judge.*�
SHUMAKER, Judge
����������� Appellant challenges the district court�s grant of summary judgment to respondents, an attorney and law firm, on her claim for unjust enrichment.� Because the district court correctly concluded that appellant�s claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, we affirm.� �
FACTS
This appeal arises out of an
unjust-enrichment action by appellant Linda M. Cordes, f/k/a Linda M. Joyce,
against respondents, Michael J. Holt, and his law firm, Holt and Anderson,
Ltd.� Cordes retained Holt as counsel to
investigate a claim involving the estate of her long-time companion, Larry
Sohns.� Between July 2000 and February
2001, Holt billed Cordes for attorney fees incurred in defending and
prosecuting a series of claims against Sohns�s estate.� Cordes regularly received bills for attorney
fees, which she paid at the time without objection, even though she now claims
that the fees were unreasonable and excessive.�
In total, Cordes paid
$56,500 for Holt�s legal work.� Holt
claims Cordes�s last payment occurred on February 8, 2001, but Cordes claims she
made a final payment on March 24, 2001.�
Holt eventually withdrew as
Cordes�s counsel, though the parties dispute the date on which Holt�s
representation ended.� Holt claims that
he decided to withdraw from Cordes�s case on February 24, 2001, and gave Cordes
notice to that effect.� Cordes insists,
however, that Holt did not formally withdraw from representing her until May
15, 2001.� In support of her claim,
Cordes points to a notice of withdrawal of counsel from Holt dated May 15,
2001.�
Cordes commenced this
unjust-enrichment action against Holt and his law firm on May 14, 2007, seeking
repayment of some of the allegedly excessive attorney fees.� Holt asserted that Cordes�s unjust-enrichment
claim was clearly barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations, and
accordingly moved for summary judgment.�
The district court agreed and granted Holt�s motion for summary
judgment, concluding that Cordes�s unjust-enrichment claim was barred by the
six-year statute of limitations because Cordes�s last payment for legal
services was on February 8, 2001, and her complaint was served on May 14,
2007.� Cordes appeals.
D E C I S I O N
A motion for summary
judgment shall be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and
either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.� Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03.� On appeal from a district court�s grant of
summary judgment, the reviewing court asks �(1) whether there are any genuine
issues of material fact for trial; and (2) whether the trial court erred in its
application of the law.�� Hoyt Props., Inc. v. Prod. Res. Group,
L.L.C., 736 N.W.2d 313, 317 (Minn. 2007) (citation omitted).� No genuine issues of fact exist when �the
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
nonmoving party.�� DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 69 (Minn. 1997) (quotation
omitted).� �The construction and
application of a statute of limitations, including the law governing the
accrual of a cause of action, is a question of law and is reviewed de novo.�� MacRae
v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 753 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn. 2008).
Cordes commenced her
unjust-enrichment action on May 14, 2007.�
She concedes that her cause of action is governed by the six-year
statute of limitations set forth in Minn. Stat. � 541.05, subd. 1(1)
(2006).� Accordingly, if Cordes�s claim
accrued before May 14, 2001, it is barred by the statute of limitations.�
A court has �no power to
extend or modify statutory limitation periods.��
Johnson v. Winthrop Labs. Div. of
Sterling Drug, Inc., 291 Minn. 145, 151, 190 N.W.2d 77, 81 (1971).� The statute of limitations is a harsh but
strict mechanism designed to prevent one party who has a claim against another
from waiting an unreasonable amount of time to bring that claim.� Bachertz
v. Hayes-Lucas Lumber, Co., 201 Minn. 171, 176, 275 N.W. 694, 697 (1937); see also Bustad v. Bustad, 263 Minn.
238, 244, 116 N.W.2d 552, 556 (1962) (stating that the salutary purpose of the
statute of limitations is to discourage lawsuits based on stale claims).
�A cause of action accrues
and the statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action will
survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.� �Noske v. Friedberg, 670 N.W.2d 740, 742 (Minn. 2003); Bonhiver v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111,
116-17, 248 N.W.2d 291, 296 (1976).� �A
cause of action survives a motion to dismiss so long as �some� damage has
occurred . . . .�� Herrmann v. McMenomy & Severson, 590 N.W.2d 641,
643 (Minn. 1999); see also Bonhiver,
311 Minn. at 117, 248 N.W.2d at 296 (stating that the statute of limitations
begins to run when �damage is occasioned�).�
The running of the statute of limitations does not depend on the ability
to ascertain the exact amount of the damage and is not tolled, in the absence
of fraud, by ignorance of the cause of action.�
Hermann, 590 N.W.2d at 643.
The outcome of this case is
controlled by our decision in Block v.
Litchy, 428 N.W.2d 850 (Minn. App. 1988).�
In Block, we concluded that an
unjust-enrichment action based on an alleged overpayment accrued when the
overpayments were made.� 428 N.W.2d at
854.� Accordingly, we held that a claim
on overpayments made more than six years before the commencement of the action
was barred by the statute of limitation, but that a claim for overpayments made
within the six-year statute-of-limitations period was not barred.� Id.�
In light of Block, we conclude that Cordes�s cause
of action accrued when she made the alleged overpayments.� Although the parties dispute the date of the
last payment as being in either February 2001 or in March 2001, it is
undisputed that Cordes�s last alleged overpayment occurred before May 14, 2001,
more than six years before she commenced her unjust-enrichment action on May
14, 2007.� Thus, her unjust-enrichment
claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
Cordes argues that her cause
of action did not accrue until Holt withdrew from representation on May 15,
2001, explaining that she could not have known if Holt had earned all the fees
that he had charged until that date.� She
asserts that had she filed an unjust-enrichment claim before representation
ended, her claim would have been dismissed for failure to state a claim because
Holt would still have been working for her and earning fees.� But Cordes cites no caselaw or other
authority directly supporting the proposition that her cause of action accrued
when representation ended.� We held in Block that a cause of action for unjust
enrichment accrues at the time of overpayment.�
428 N.W.2d at 854. �Absent a claim
of fraud or deliberate misrepresentation, Cordes�s ignorance of her own cause
of action did not toll the statute of limitations.� Id.�� Additionally, Cordes�s argument that she
�did not know� if Holt had earned the fees until representation ended is
unavailing, as it, in effect, invites application of a discovery rule to
statute-of-limitation questions, which Minnesota courts have rejected.� See
Johnson, 291 Minn. at 150-51, 190 N.W.2d at 81 (rejecting the discovery
rule); see also Herrmann, 590 N.W.2d at
643-44 (rejecting the use of the
discovery rule in a legal malpractice claim and concluding that the cause of
action accrued when the attorneys failed to advise their client that an action
was prohibited).�
Because Cordes�s last
payment for legal services occurred more than six years before she commenced
her unjust-enrichment action, her claim is barred by the statute of
limitations. As a result, the district court did not err by granting summary
judgment against her unjust-enrichment claim.�
�
����������� Affirmed.
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, � 10.