This opinion will
be unpublished and
may not be cited
except as provided by
Minn. Stat. §
480A.08, subd. 3 (2006).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF
APPEALS
A07-1311
Walnut Towers,
Respondent,
vs.
Lori A. Schwan,
Appellant.
Filed September 16, 2008
Reversed
Hudson, Judge
Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-CV-07-1183
Walnut Towers, 105 East Walnut Street, Mankato, Minnesota 56001 (respondent)
Tashi Lhewa, Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, Inc., 12 Civic Center Plaza, Suite 3000, Mankato, Minnesota 56002-3304; and
Michael Hagedorn, 166 East Fourth Street, Suite 200, St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-1448 (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Kalitowski, Presiding Judge; Hudson, Judge; and Collins, Judge.*
HUDSON, Judge
On
appeal in this eviction matter, appellant-tenant argues that the district court
erred in (a) permitting respondent-corporation to appear in district court
without the representation of a licensed attorney; (b) entering judgment in
favor of respondent-corporation on the basis that appellant’s request for
reasonable accommodation would impose an undue financial and administrative
burden on respondent-corporation; and (c) granting the request to evict
appellant when appellant was not provided with the opportunity to meet with
management before filing of the eviction action. Because the district court erred in allowing
respondent-corporation to appear in district court without the representation
of legal counsel, we reverse.
In July 2006, appellant Lori Schwan entered into
a lease agreement to rent a federally subsidized apartment from respondent
Walnut Towers. In the following months,
appellant was issued several “Notice of Lease/Rule Violations” for conduct that
was allegedly in violation of her lease agreement. Finally, in March 2007, after a confrontation
with her landlord, appellant was advised that her lease was terminated.
After an eviction action was filed against
appellant in April 2007, appellant filed, in district court, a memorandum in
support of reasonable accommodation.
Appellant claimed to be disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 3602 (h)
(2003), and requested that Walnut Towers provide her with a reasonable
accommodation. At the eviction hearing,
Mary Dundas, the manager at Walnut Towers, appeared on behalf of Lasson
Management, the corporation that manages Walnut Towers. Appellant objected to Dundas appearing on
behalf of the corporation because she is not a licensed attorney. The court overruled appellant’s objection, stating
that
it is “the long standing tradition in Blue Earth County of not requiring
incorporated landlords to be represented during eviction hearings.” The district court then concluded that
appellant “may have a disability as defined under 42 U.S.C. § 3602 (h),”
but the “accommodation requested by [appellant] is unreasonable as it will
impose undue hardships and/or undue financial and administrative burdens upon
[Walnut Towers].” Thus, the district
court entered judgment in favor of Walnut Towers. Appellant’s eviction was stayed pending
determination of this appeal.
Appellant
argues that the district court erred in permitting Walnut Towers, a
corporation, to be represented by a non-attorney agent during eviction
proceedings in district court. Questions
concerning rules are questions of law, and we need not defer to the conclusions
of law drawn by the district court from undisputed facts. See Reichel v. Hefner, 472 N.W.2d 346, 347 (Minn. App.
1991). Consequently, we review this
issue de novo. See Frost-Benco Elec. Ass’n v. Minn. Pub.
Utils. Comm’n, 358 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn. 1984) (stating
that appellate courts review legal issues de novo).
We initially note that appellant
phrases the issue as one of jurisdiction, and that while appellant does not
specify whether her argument refers to personal jurisdiction, subject-matter
jurisdiction, in rem jurisdiction, or some other type of jurisdiction, the
substance of her argument suggests that she is arguing that the district court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The
issue presented, however, is not one of jurisdiction. In the past, this court has been presented
with similar issues and has loosely used the term “jurisdiction” to conclude
that a corporation may not appear in district court without the representation
of a licensed attorney. See, e.g., World
Championship Fighting, Inc. v. Janos, 609 N.W.2d 263, 265 (Minn. App. 2000)
(holding that because a corporation could not appear in district court without
an attorney, the district court was correct to conclude that it lacked
jurisdiction to hear the case). More
recently, the United States Supreme Court has cautioned against the misuse of
the term “jurisdiction.” Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454–55,
124 S. Ct. 906, 915 (2004) (noting that “[c]ourts, including this Court . . .
have more than occasionally [mis]used the term ‘jurisdictional’”). In an effort to add clarity to the issue,
this court recently stated that “[b]ecause the common law rule
requiring that a corporation be represented by counsel in legal proceedings
does not describe the classes of cases or persons within the district court’s
adjudicatory authority, the rule is not ‘jurisdictional.’” Save
Our Creeks v. City of Brooklyn Park, 682 N.W.2d 639, 643 (Minn. App. 2004),
aff’d, 699 N.W.2d 307 (Minn.
2005). The Minnesota Supreme Court, on
review, found this reasoning to be “persuasive” and adopted it. Save
Our Creeks v. City of Brooklyn Park, 699 N.W.2d 307, 310 (Minn. 2005). Therefore, we reiterate that the issue of
corporations appearing in district court without counsel does not involve the
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case.
We
now turn to the district court’s decision to allow Walnut Towers, a
corporation, to proceed in the eviction action without the representation of
legal counsel. In reaching this conclusion,
the
district court stated that:
[Appellant’s]
counsel has raised the issue of [Walnut Towers] appearing in District Court
without the assistance of an attorney.
The Court has addressed this issue with [appellant’s] counsel and
reiterated the long standing tradition in Blue Earth County of not requiring
incorporated landlords to be represented during eviction hearings. This policy is akin to the policy in other
informal proceedings such as conciliation court. Ultimately, whether [Walnut Towers] is
represented in Court by counsel would not change the facts or outcome of this
case.
Appellant argues that under
Minnesota law, the district court’s conclusion is erroneous. We agree. In Minnesota, a corporation must be represented by an attorney in legal
proceedings. Nicollet Restoration, Inc. v. Turnham, 486 N.W.2d 753, 754 (Minn.
1992). “The purpose behind attorney
licensing requirements ‘is the protection of the public and the courts from the
consequences of ignorance or venality.’”
Id. (quoting Strong Delivery
Ministry Ass’n v. Bd. of Appeals of Cook County, 543 F.2d 32, 33 (7th Cir. 1976)).[1]
In Nicollet Restoration, the supreme court rejected the argument that
Minn. Stat. § 481.02, subd. 2 (1990), authorized a corporation to appear
by or through a non-attorney agent. 486
N.W.2d at 755. The court stated that
under the common law, a corporation still must be represented by a licensed
attorney when appearing in district court because “a careful reading of Minn.
Stat. § 481.02, subd. 2,” does not permit an officer, employee, or agent
appearing on behalf of a corporation in district court to be a
non-attorney. Id. The court further noted
that “[e]ven assuming that Minn. Stat. § 481.02, subd. 2, could be construed to
permit a corporation to appear by or through a non-attorney agent, such a
construction would raise serious constitutional problems.” Id. The court then stated that under Article III,
section I, of the Minnesota Constitution, the power to decide who may properly
practice law before the courts of this state is vested solely in the
judiciary. Id. Thus, the court held
that “legislative enactments which purport to authorize certain classes to
practice law in the courts of this state are not controlling upon the
judiciary. As such, we reaffirm our
conviction that a corporation must be represented by a licensed attorney when
appearing in district court.” Id. at 756.
Here, despite the
district court’s attempt to carve out an exception for incorporated landlords
to appear in eviction hearings without representation by legal counsel, we
conclude that on this record, Nicollet
Restoration controls, and there is no legal support for such an
exception. See Save Our Creeks, 699 N.W.2d at 309 (stating that under
Minnesota common law, a corporation must be represented by an attorney in legal
proceedings); see also Nicollet
Restoration, 486 N.W.2d at 756 (holding that “a corporation must be
represented by a licensed attorney when appearing in district court”); Janos, 609 N.W.2d at 265 (stating that
the legislature did not intend that some corporations be allowed to institute
district-court actions without the aid of counsel while others would not). We fully acknowledge that the conciliation
court rules permit a corporation to appear by a non-attorney in conciliation-court
proceedings. See Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 512(c).
We also recognize the supreme court’s adoption of the rules for the
“housing courts” in Hennepin and Ramsey counties, which permit incorporated
landlords to appear without counsel, if their agents have the required “Power
of Authority.” See Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 603 (stating that “[n]o person other than
a principal or a duly licensed attorney shall be allowed to appear in Housing
Court unless the Power of Authority is attached to the complaint at the time of
filing”).[2] But those rules do not apply to eviction
proceedings heard in district court.
When appearing before this court, our supreme court, or in district
court, the law in Minnesota requires that a corporation must be represented by
a licensed attorney. Therefore, given
our role as an error-correcting court, we conclude that the district court
erred in permitting the non-attorney agent of Walnut Towers to appear on behalf
of the corporation in the eviction proceedings.
Next,
we address the appropriate remedy to be applied. In Save
our Creeks, the issue before the supreme court was “whether a
complaint filed and signed on behalf of a corporate entity by a non-lawyer is a
legal nullity.” 699 N.W.2d at 309. The court held that it was not a legal
nullity, but it presented a curable defect.
Id. at 310. The court then explained that
an amendment to add an attorney’s signature to a corporation’s
complaint should be permitted when the following four elements are met: (1) the
corporation acts without knowledge that its action was improper; (2) upon
notice, the corporation diligently corrects its mistake by obtaining counsel,
but in no event may it appear in court without an attorney; (3) the
nonattorney’s participation in the action is minimal; and (4) the nonattorney’s
participation results in no prejudice to the opposing party.
Id. at 311.
Under
Save Our Creeks, the mere fact that
an attorney did not sign the eviction complaint on behalf of Walnut Towers does
not render the complaint void. See id.
But in this case, unlike in Save
Our Creeks, there was never any attempt to remedy the defect and Walnut
Towers still has not retained counsel to represent it in this matter. Because the defect caused by the non-attorney
appearance on behalf of Walnut Towers was not cured, the district court should
have dismissed the eviction action, rather than proceeding to trial. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment in favor
of Walnut Towers. In light of our
decision, the additional issues raised by appellant are moot and, therefore, we
decline to address them.
Reversed.
* Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
[1] In addition, Minn. Stat. § 481.02, subd. 3(12) (2006), provides that “any authorized management agent of an owner of rental property used for residential purposes, whether the management agent is a natural person, corporation, partnership, limited partnership, or any other business entity,” is not authorized to “appear before a district court or the court of appeals or supreme court pursuant to an appeal” if the agent it not a licensed attorney. We think the language of this statute comports with Nicollet Restoration, but we recognize that there could be alternative readings of this statute. Nonetheless, because the statutory construction of Minn. Stat. § 481.02, subd. 3(12), was not briefed in this appeal, we decline to address it. See Balder v. Haley, 399 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn. 1987) (stating that, generally, appellate courts will not consider issues not argued in the parties’ briefs).
[2] We express no opinion at this time as to whether Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 603 is inconsistent with Minn. Stat. § 481.02, subd. 3. See Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 601 (stating that the rules pertaining to housing court “shall apply to housing court practice except where they are in conflict with applicable statutes”).