Minnesota Lawyer//September 7, 2023
§1983
Failure to Provide Medical Aid; Qualified Immunity
Defendants appealed the denial of their motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Plaintiff’s son died in a vehicle accident that occurred while he fled from defendants. Plaintiff alleged that defendants failed to provide medical aid in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. The district court denied defendants’ request for qualified immunity, arguing that there were genuine issues of material fact that precluded granting summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
Where there was testimonial evidence indicating that defendants performed a PIT maneuver that caused the accident, which was not contradicted by the pursuit video footage, and where a reasonable officer would know that a person had a clearly established right to medical aid after a motor vehicle accident, the district court correctly concluded that there were factual disputes precluding the entry of summary judgment.
Stras, J., dissenting: “As the court recognizes, the Constitution only creates a duty to aid once officers “take[] a person into . . . custody and hold[] him there against his will.” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199–200 (emphasis added). But I could not locate a single case, much less a “robust consensus” of them, that extends it to someone they have seized by force but have not taken into custody… We can debate whether we should extend it to cover this situation, but no officer would be “on notice” that the Constitution does. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). Qualified immunity applies in just these circumstances.”
Judgment is affirmed.
Religious Freedom
RLUIPA; Res Judicata
Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of its complaint on res judicata grounds. Defendant gave plaintiff and another group permits to install monuments in a public park designated as a limited public forum. When citizens objected to the installation of plaintiff’s monument, defendant cancelled both permits. Plaintiff filed suit, arguing that defendant violated its constitutional rights to freedom of religion. The district court dismissed the constitutional claims but permitted plaintiff to proceed on its promissory estoppel claim. When the magistrate judge denied plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend, plaintiff instead filed a second complaint reasserting its dismissed constitutional claims. The district court dismissed the action, granting defendant summary judgment on the estoppel claim and ruling that the reasserted claims were barred by res judicata.
Where plaintiff failed to plausibly argue that closing the park as a limited public forum was unreasonable or discriminatory, its promissory estoppel claim failed, and the district court correctly concluded that res judicata barred the reasserted claims.
Judgment is affirmed.
Conspiracy to Commit Witness Tampering
Motion to Sever; Sufficiency of Evidence
Defendants appealed their convictions for conspiracy to commit witness tampering resulting in death and for drug and weapons offenses. Defendants were cousins engaged in drug distribution who identified a buyer as a confidential informant and killed her during a drug deal. On appeal, defendants challenged the denial of their motion to sever their trials and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions.
Where the rule presumed joint trials of co-conspirators, there was no error in refusing to sever trial where the district court properly limited testimony applicable to only one defendant. The possibility of the CI’s participation in a future drug trafficking prosecution also supported defendant’s convictions for witness tampering.
Judgment is affirmed.
Civil Commitment
Motion for Discharge; Pro Se Petition
Defendant appealed the denial of his pro se motion for discharge. Defendant was civilly committed due to a mental disease or defect that rendered him a public risk. After several conditional releases and revocation and while represented by counsel, defendant moved pro se for a discharge. The district court denied the motion on grounds that a motion for discharge could not be filed by a pro se petitioner. On appeal, defendant argued that prohibiting him from seeking a discharge pro se violated his due process rights.
Where defendant was represented by counsel during his civil commitment proceedings and defendant had no claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant was not prejudiced by the statutory prohibition on a civilly committed person filing a motion for discharge pro se.
Judgment is affirmed.
Drug and Firearms Offenses
Below Guidelines Sentence; Career Offender Predicate Offenses
Defendant appealed the below-Guidelines sentence imposed following his guilty plea to drug and firearms offenses, arguing that his prior state drug and assault convictions did not qualify as predicate offenses.
Where prior cases had ruled that defendant’s assault conviction qualified as a crime of violence, and his prior drug conviction qualified as a controlled substance offense, defendant’s challenges to his career offender designation were foreclosed by circuit precedent.
Judgment is affirmed.
Drug Crimes
Money Laundering; Conspiracy Instructions
Defendant appealed his conviction for drug and money laundering offenses. Defendant worked with others for about a decade to ship cocaine and fentanyl. Defendant refused to plead guilty, although other members of the conspiracy accepted plea deals to testify against him. On appeal, defendant argued that the redaction of his co-defendants’ names from the indictment made the conspiracy counts too vague. Defendant also challenged the denial of his request for a multiple-conspiracies instruction and to preclude the jury from hearing about his prior conspiracy to distribute conviction.
Where the indictment provided an approximate timeframe for the drug conspiracy, listed the locations where drug trafficking occurred, identified the trafficked drugs, removing the names of co-conspirators did not render defendant’s indictment improperly vague, and there was no error in the jury instructions where the government had alleged a single conspiracy that moved from city to city and defendant’s prior convictions were relevant to knowledge and intent.
Judgment is affirmed.
Sentencing
Prior Convictions; Special Conditions
Where a defendant challenged his sentence including the determination that he was an armed career criminal, the district court did not err in finding that the prior convictions occurred on different occasions for the determination, and an upward variance was substantively reasonable, but the court did not orally impose the 13 standard conditions of supervised release and a third special condition, so the matter is vacated and remanded for a resentencing limited to these issues.
Vacated; remanded for resentencing.
Sex Trafficking
Exclusion Of Video; Expert Testimony
Where a defendant, who was convicted of charges that included sex trafficking, facilitating prostitution and distributing a controlled substance to a person under 21 years old, challenged the exclusion of a video of an initial sexual encounter with the victim, the district court properly excluded the video because her initial sexual encounter with the victim did not establish her consent to later engage in commercial sex acts with others, and the court did not err in admitting expert testimony on sex trafficking.
Judgment is affirmed.
Supervised Release
Revocation; Reasonableness of Sentence
Defendant appealed the reasonableness of the below-Guidelines sentence imposed following the revocation of his supervised release.
Where the district court properly reviewed the statutory sentencing factors, the below-Guidelines sentence was presumptively reasonable.
Judgment is affirmed.
Vacated Conviction
Resentencing; Substantive Reasonableness of Sentence
Defendant appealed the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed following the vacatur of one count of conviction and resentencing by the district court.
Where there was no abuse of discretion in imposing a below-Guidelines sentence, the court affirmed defendant’s sentence.
Judgment is affirmed.
Cancellation of Removal
Unusual Hardship; Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Petitioner sought cancellation of removal. The BIA denied the request, finding that petitioner had failed to prove extremely unusual hardship to his children, who were U.S. citizens. Thereafter, petitioner found evidence of ineffective assistance from his attorney and moved to reopen the cancellation proceedings. Petitioner also sought to submit additional evidence that his children suffered from emotional and mental health issues that could not be addressed in Mexico. The BIA denied the request, noting that petitioner was represented by different counsel before the BIA and thus could not show prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel before the Immigration Judge. The BIA further rejected the sufficiency of petitioner’s new evidence of hardship.
Where the evidence supported the BIA’s determinations, there was no abuse of discretion in declining to reopen the cancellation proceedings.
Colloton, J., concurring: “Neither Llanas-Trejo nor the opinion in this case explains satisfactorily how a decision denying a motion to reopen a proceeding in which an alien seeks a grant of cancellation of removal is not a judgment regarding the granting of cancellation of removal.”
Petition is denied.
Health Insurance
Breach of Contract; Fraud
Plaintiff appealed the grant of summary judgment for defendants. A patient sought care from plaintiff after suffering a stroke. The patient was covered by insurance issued and managed by defendants. However, the patient later applied for and received retroactive Medicaid coverage. Medicaid reimbursed plaintiff for $300,000, far less than it was expecting from defendants’ insurance coverage. Plaintiff asserted breach of contract and fraud claims against defendants. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, ruling that plaintiff’s acceptance of Medicaid coverage barred its claims.
Where Medicaid regulations stipulated that a provider who accepted reimbursement from the program was deemed to have been paid in full, the provider was barred from seeking further payment from the patient or the patient’s health insurance.
Judgment is affirmed.
Mineral Interests
Unconstitutional Taking; Federal Preemption
Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their lawsuit. Plaintiffs purported to own mineral rights subject to the federal government’s acquisition of land under the Flood Control Act to create the reservoir for the Garrison Dam. However, North Dakota also gained title to the bed of the Missouri River up to the river’s ordinary high water mark. Based on surveys of the water mark, the state leased oil and gas interests allegedly within plaintiffs’ warranty deed with the federal government. Plaintiffs sued, arguing that North Dakota was preempted by the Flood Control Act and had taken their property without just compensation in violation of the Takings Clause. The district court rejected plaintiffs’ arguments and dismissed the case.
Where the Flood Control Act did not grant plaintiffs the right to be free from the application of state property law as to their retained mineral interests, the district court correctly concluded that North Dakota’s legal actions were not preempted by federal law.
Judgment is affirmed.