Court of Appeals Digest: July 3, 2023

Civil Nonprecedential

Civil Commitment

SPP; Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellant argued that the District Court erred by determining that (1) he met the statutory criteria as a sexual psychopathic personality (SPP) and a sexually dangerous person (SDP) when the only examiner who testified and filed a report stated that he satisfied neither definition and (2) he failed to present clear and convincing evidence of the availability of a less-restrictive placement. Noting that appellant had engaged in a habitual course of sexual assault, and that the record supported that appellant showed an utter lack of power to control sexual impulses, the Court of Appeals concluded that ample evidence in the record supported the District Court’s determination that appellant met the criteria for SPP and SDP. Affirmed.

A23-0032 In re Civ. Commitment of Kapol (Stearns County)

Domestic Relations

Child Custody; Caretaking History

In this appeal of an initial child-custody determination, appellant-mother challenged the District Court’s order granting respondent-father sole physical custody of their child. Mother argued that the District Court abused its discretion by (1) failing to properly consider her history of caretaking, (2) improperly considering the conduct of mother and mother’s spouse when that conduct did not adversely affect mother’s relationship with the child, and (3) making best-interests determinations and conclusions of law that were not supported by factual findings. The Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court properly considered the history and nature of each parent’s participation and did not abuse its discretion by considering mother’s and her spouse’s conduct in determining custody, and that award of sole physical custody to father was warranted by the record. Affirmed.

A22-1134 Hystead v. Boggs (In re Custody of R.J.H.) (Douglas County)

Domestic Relations

Child Protection; Custody Transfer

This transfer-of-custody appeal arose from a parent-child relationship in which a mother’s three minor children feared being alone with her. The county successfully petitioned the juvenile court for the permanent transfer of sole custody to the father after two years of providing services designed to repair the strained mother-child relationships. Pro se mother appealed the transfer order, contending that the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the custody dispute and that it erroneously concluded that a statutory basis supported transfer. The Court of Appeals concluded that the juvenile court had subject-matter jurisdiction to determine custody and did not abuse its discretion by permanently transferring custody to the children’s father. Affirmed.

A22-1800 In re Welfare of Children of N.J.E. (Sherburne County)

Breach of Contract

Statute of Limitations

Appellant sought review of a judgment after a jury trial that resolved appellant’s claims deriving from many years of complicated financial dealings, including two loans. The first was appellant’s 2008 loan to respondent-borrowers. The second loan was appellant’s 2009 loan with a promissory note from respondent bank. The 2009 promissory note was secured by mortgages on appellant’s three lake properties, on which bank foreclosed in 2010 after appellant defaulted. Relying on the terms of the mortgage agreement, bank sold appellant’s construction equipment and other personal property from two of the three lake properties. Appellant asserted claims relating to both loans and also including separate conduct by two bank employees. On appeal, appellant challenged several pretrial and trial decisions, arguing that the District Court erred by (1) dismissing appellant’s claims against borrowers as untimely under the applicable statutes of limitations; (2) granting summary judgment against appellant on all claims against bank employees; (3) granting summary judgment against appellant on three of appellant’s claims against bank; (4) granting judgment as a matter of law against appellant on his claims against bank for breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and tortious interference; and (5) denying appellant’s posttrial motion on damages. The Court of Appeals found no error, noting that all the claims against bank were untimely even if the oral amendments were valid. Affirmed.

A22-1199 Lang v. Flagship Bank Minn. (Hennepin County)

Landlord & Tenant

Eviction

In this eviction action based on nonpayment of rent, appellant-landlord challenged the District Court’s order (1) granting respondent-tenant’s motion to vacate the default judgment against her and (2) determining that tenant had substantially complied with redemption requirements and allowing her an additional week to pay a remaining balance of $88.20. The Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by vacating the default judgment, but the District Court erred by setting the redemption amount without receiving evidence of what tenant owed. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

A22-1388 2913 29th Ave. S. LLC v. Martin (Hennepin County)

Municipalities

Misfeasance

A boy crossing a county road by bicycle on his way to school was struck and killed by a car. The boy’s family settled any claims against the driver and sued the county, city, and school district for having negligently failed to reduce the speed limit or post warning signs on the road. The defendants each unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals concluded that appellant did not identify any city or school district action that constituted misfeasance and that the city had no duty to the boy, and thus the city was entitled to summary judgment. Furthermore, the discretionary nature of the county decision shielded the county in official immunity. Reversed.

A22-1536 Vitek v. City of Eagan (Dakota County)

Public Employment

Disability Discrimination

Appellant challenged the District Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of respondent-city. Appellant argued the District Court erred when it granted summary judgment on appellant’s disability-discrimination, retaliatory-discharge, and failure-to-offer-continued-employment claims relating to the termination of her position as a part-time meter reader. Noting that an HR representative’s email corroborated the city’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for defendant’s termination, and that utility operators were not similarly situated to appellant, the Court of Appeals concluded that appellant failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the city’s stated non-discriminatory reason for discharging appellant was pretextual. Affirmed.

A22-1184 Rhoades v. City of Bloomington (Hennepin County)

Sanctions

Attorney Fees

This appeal from an attorney-fees sanction arose after a three-year defamation litigation regarding a family real-estate dispute over land in Guatemala. Appellant appealed from the District Court’s decision to grant an attorney-fees sanction against him pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 549.211, subd. 3 and Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03. The Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court awarded this sanction after appellant’s claims survived summary judgment, and thus erred. Reversed.

A22-1847 Mazariegos v. Mazariegos (Nobles County)

Civil Order Opinions

Real Property

Quiet Title

In this appeal the dismissal of appellant’s quiet-title action regarding real property that was forfeited to the state in 2017, the Court of Appeals concluded that the action was untimely under Minn. Stat. § 284.28, and appellant forfeited the arguments made on appeal. Affirmed.

A22-1784 ROA, Inc. v. St. Louis County (St. Louis County)

Criminal Nonprecedential

Assault

Self-Defense

In this direct appeal from a conviction of second-degree assault, defendant argued, inter alia, that the District Court abused its discretion by denying his request to instruct the jury on self-defense and defense-of-dwelling. Noting that the cellphone recording captured defendant’s words of provocation when he yelled “come in the f—ing door mother—ker,” and that defendant continued to claim that he was going to “f—king kill” the victim, the Court of Appeals concluded that defendant could not establish an absence of aggression or provocation, and thus was not entitled to an instruction on self-defense. Affirmed.

A22-1149 State v. Young (Otter Tail County)

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Deficient Performance

Petitioner challenged the District Court’s denial of postconviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to adequately assess whether a competency evaluation should be requested before allowing petitioner to enter guilty pleas. Noting that defense counsel’s testimony demonstrated that, at least at the time of the plea colloquies in the two cases, petitioner could answer questions rationally, had some understanding of the proceedings, and could provide a summary of his memory of the offenses, the Court of Appeals concluded that counsel’s representation of petitioner was not constitutionally deficient. Affirmed.

A22-1037 Wachter v. State (Big Stone County)

Plea Withdrawal

Adequate Factual Basis

Defendant entered an Alford plea to attempted first-degree felony murder. Defendant appealed arguing that his lacked a strong factual basis. Noting that defendant’s intent to kill either victim could be reasonably inferred from the evidence recited by the prosecutor at the plea hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that the plea was valid because it was supported by a strong factual basis. Affirmed.

A22-0836 State v. Lacek (Anoka County)

Probation Revocation

Need for Confinement

Defendant challenged the revocation of his probation, arguing that the District Court made insufficient findings to revoke probation and abused its discretion by determining that the need for confinement outweighed the polices favoring probation. Noting that defendant violated probation by absconding from treatment, the Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion. Affirmed.

A22-1777 State v. Briggs (Chisago County)

Prosecutorial Misconduct

Closing Argument

Defendant challenged his criminal-sexual-conduct conviction following a jury trial, arguing that the prosecutor committed misconduct in closing argument. Noting that the evidence supported the characterization that defendant was victim blaming or shaming, the Court of Appeals concluded that this characterization did not inflame the jury such that it was misconduct. Affirmed.

A22-1167 State v. Skylark (Ramsey County)

Prosecutorial Misconduct

Prejudice

Defendant challenged his convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm and unlawful possession of ammunition following a jury trial, arguing that the prosecutor committed misconduct by misstating the burden of proof and interjecting his personal opinion during opening statement and closing argument, and that the District Court erred by convicting him of both offenses. The Court of Appeals concluded that, even if the prosecutor’s reference to an “open-and-shut” case crossed the line, no prejudice resulted, as the District Court instructed the jury multiple times on the state’s burden of proof. However, the offenses arose from the same behavioral incident. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

A22-1183 State v. Brown (Ramsey County)

Right to Speedy Trial

Prejudice

In this appeal from the final judgment of conviction for two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, defendant argued that the District Court erred by finding that good cause existed to hold his trial outside the six-month timeline permitted by the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act. Defendant argued that the District Court abused its discretion in its good-cause finding because the District Court assumed, without asking, that newly-appointed defense counsel could not be prepared for trial before the six-month period passed. Noting that defendant did not point to any prejudice, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that good cause existed to hold defendant’s trial outside the six-month timeline. Affirmed.

A22-0570 State v. Letourneau (Ramsey County)

Seizure

Free to Leave

In this appeal from final judgments of conviction of fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance, defendant challenged the District Court’s pretrial order denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized during a warrantless search of his vehicle. Defendant argued that the District Court erred by determining that (1) his seizure was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity and (2) the warrantless search of his vehicle was valid under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Noting that the officer did not activate his emergency lights and that the position of the parked squad car would not have prevented defendant from leaving, the Court of Appeals concluded that defendant was not seized when the officer parked his squad car some distance behind defendant’s truck and approached the passenger-side window. Furthermore, the search of defendant’s vehicle was lawful based on the observation of the smell of marijuana emanating from the vehicle. Affirmed.

A22-1296 State v. Lindekugel (Hennepin County)

Sentencing

Condition Violations

Defendant challenged his sentence for first-degree aggravated robbery, arguing that the District Court violated his due-process rights by determining that he violated the conditions of release without holding an evidentiary hearing on the issue. The Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court’s judicial notice of the conditional-release violation report was sufficient to support its finding that defendant failed to comply with the electronic-home-monitoring rules. Affirmed.

A22-1762 State v. Wade (Hennepin County)

Threats

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellant-child challenged the District Court’s order finding him guilty of making a threat of violence when he was 11 years old. The Court of Appeals concluded that, although context of appellant’s statement that he was going to shoot up the school—including his claim that he had a gun in his backpack and his physical gesture emphasizing that claim—was sufficient to create a reasonable apprehension that appellant would follow through with or act on his threat, the fact that appellant said he was “just kidding” and did not know that there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his words and acts would cause extreme fear supported a reasonable hypothesis other than guilt. Reversed.

A22-1780 In re Welfare of E.E.M. (Carver County)

Traffic Stops

Expansion of Scope

In this appeal from a conviction for first-degree possession of a controlled substance, defendant challenged the District Court’s pretrial order denying his motion to suppress. Defendant argued the District Court erred when it determined a trooper had reasonable articulable suspicion to expand the scope of a traffic stop. The Court of Appeals concluded that, absent the odor of marijuana, solely observing multiple air fresheners and an unlit cigarette, coupled with the trooper’s perception of nervousness, did not give the trooper reasonable articulable suspicion to expand the stop into a narcotics investigation. Reversed.

A22-1438 State v. Thomas (Winona County)