Civil Precedential
Insurance
Notice of Claim
In this insurance-coverage appeal, appellant-insurer argued that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to respondent-insured when it concluded that a property loss notice generated by a third-party insurance agency was a “written notice of claim” for purposes of computing preaward interest under Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b). The Court of Appeals concluded that a property loss notice generated by a third-party insurance agent at the insured’s direction and on the insured’s behalf constitutes a “written notice of claim” sufficient to start the accrual of preaward interest. Affirmed.
A22-1264 Shardlow Townhomes Assoc. v. Midwest Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. (Olmsted County)
Civil Nonprecedential
Civil Commitment
SDP; Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant challenged the District Court’s findings that (1) there was clear and convincing evidence to support appellant’s civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person and a sexual psychopathic personality; and (2) there was not clear and convincing evidence that a less-restrictive treatment program was appropriate. The Court of Appeals concluded that the record supported the District Court’s determinations that appellant has a habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters, that appellant possesses all four statutory conditions which rendered him irresponsible in his personal conduct in sexual matters, that all three experts opined and credibly testified to appellant’s conditions, that appellant has an utter lack of control based on factors set forth in caselaw, and that the experts credibly opined and testified to that lack of control. Affirmed.
A22-1629 In re Civil Commitment of Morrow (Freeborn County)
Domestic Relations
Child Custody; Abuse
Appellant-mother challenged the District Court’s decisions (1) finding that father did not commit domestic abuse; (2) ordering the disclosure of her Safe-at-Home address; and (3) changing child’s surname. The Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in crediting father’s testimony over mother’s or in changing the child’s surname, but that the District Court erred by ordering mother to disclose her address to father without making threshold findings and determinations. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
A22-0961 S.A.A. v. S.D. (Hennepin County)
Domestic Relations
Child Custody; Modification
In this custody-modification dispute, appellant-mother argued that the District Court’s order resulted in a de facto modification of custody when it changed the children’s primary residence from mother’s home to father’s home and significantly increased father’s parenting time to include 80% of school nights during the school year. She argued that this de facto modification was erroneous because the District Court did not first find that father made a prima facie case of endangerment to modify custody; that her due-process rights were violated because the evidentiary hearing was noticed as a hearing to decide parenting time, not a modification of custody; and that the modification was not supported by the record because the basis for finding endangerment did not exist at the time of the evidentiary hearing and modification of custody was not in the children’s best interests. The Court of Appeals concluded that, although the District Court erred in making a de facto custody modification without first finding that father presented a prima facie case of endangerment, but because mother has not demonstrated prejudice, the error was harmless with no showing of prejudice. Affirmed.
A22-0536 Filose v. Christensen (Hennepin County)
Domestic Relations
Child Protection; Termination of Parental Rights
In this appeal, appellants mother and father challenged the District Court’s decision to terminate their parental rights to their child on the grounds that they failed to rebut the presumption that they were palpably unfit to parent. The parents argued that they presented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption and that the District Court applied an incorrect standard when it determined they failed to rebut the presumption. Noting that the District Court failed to discuss the easily rebuttable nature of the statutory presumption, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court applied an incorrect standard when analyzing whether the parents produced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption. Reversed and remanded.
A22-1594 In re Welfare of Child of D.L.P. (Chippewa County)
Domestic Relations
Dissolution; Child Support
In this appeal from a marital dissolution judgment and decree, appellant-father challenged the designation of respondent-mother’s residence in Illinois as that of the parties’ joint child. Father also challenged the parenting-time schedule set by the District Court. Additionally, he claimed that the District Court granted the parenting consultant authority beyond the scope of the parties’ general agreement to appoint a parenting consultant. Finally, father challenged his obligation to pay “back child support” and claimed that the District Court erroneously treated it as an arrearage when setting the payment schedule for it. The Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court erred in calculating child support as beginning to accrue before the child’s birth, and reconsideration of the payment schedule was required for any retroactive child support owed by father because a retroactive child-support obligation is not necessarily an “arrearage.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
A22-0195 Kemp v. Kemp (Washington County)
Domestic Relations
Dissolution; Marital Assets
In this marriage-dissolution dispute, husband argued that the District Court (1) abused its discretion by determining that the nonmarital tax liens on a marital home in Minnesota were paid and satisfied with marital assets; (2) erred in determining that husband did not have a nonmarital interest in a snowmobile; and (3) abused its discretion by determining spousal maintenance without making a finding on husband’s net income. The Court of Appeals found no error the District Court’s findings. Affirmed.
A22-1102 Meyer v. Meyer (Itasca County)
Insurance
Duty to Defend
In this insurance-coverage dispute, appellant-insurer argued that the District Court erred by granting summary judgment for respondent-insured based on the court’s conclusion that appellant had a duty to defend respondent in a separate action. Appellant also challenged the District Court’s award of attorney fees to respondent. By notice of related appeal, respondent argued that the District Court erred in declining to award certain attorney fees, as well as prejudgment interest. The Court of Appeals concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact that respondent’s public statements were made with knowledge of falsity and that, therefore, the knowledge-of-falsity exclusion clearly applied to the conduct at issue and thus, appellant had no duty to defend respondent. Reversed.
A22-1387 Minn. Sporting Clays Ass’n. v. Nat’l Cas. Co. (Hennepin County)
Licensure
Professional Engineers
Relator challenged the constitutionality of respondent professional board’s order disciplining him for inaccurately holding himself out to the public as a professional engineer and for failing to truthfully answer questions on two separate licensing applications. The Court of Appeals concluded that relator’s false information on his licensing applications to the board was not speech that the First Amendment protected. Affirmed.
Limited Liability Companies
Derivative Claims
This case arose out of a dispute between the two sole members of a limited liability corporation (LLC) in which respondent alleged that appellant misappropriated funds belonging to the LLC. Appellants challenged the District Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of respondent, arguing that respondent did not have standing and that the District Court erred when entering damages against appellants. The Court of Appeals concluded that appellants waived any objections to the pleadings, and respondent’s complaint, by fair and reasonable inference, stated a claim upon which relief could be granted to respondent as an LLC member.
A22-1164 Novak v. Miller (Hennepin County)
Orders for Protection
Reasonable Fear
Appellant-brother challenged the District Court’s extension of an order for protection (OFP), arguing that the District Court abused its discretion because the record did not support a finding that respondent-sister reasonably feared him. Noting that the finding was based on credibility determinations that it could not second guess, the Court of Appeals concluded that the record supported the District Court’s finding that sister reasonably feared brother would harm her. Affirmed.
A22-0975 Lewis v. Lewis (Fillmore County)
Real Property
Easements
In this appeal from a judgment following a court trial, appellant challenged the District Court’s judgment recognizing respondent’s right to unimpeded use of an implied easement that ran across a corner of appellant’s property and the District Court’s award of damages to respondent for appellant’s conduct. Noting that the plat map mentioned a wish for road to provide access to the property, that respondent recalled using the road as a child in 1975, and that appellant testified that when he purchased the property the contemporaneous residents were using the road, the Court of Appeals discerned no error the District Court’s determination that there was an implied easement by necessity. Affirmed.
A22-0739 Olson v. Jackson (Dakota County)
Unemployment Benefits
Employment Misconduct
Relator challenged the decision of an unemployment law judge (ULJ) that she was ineligible for unemployment benefits because she was discharged for the misconduct of violating respondent-employer’s COVID-19 vaccination policy and did not have a sincerely held religious belief precluding her from getting a vaccination. Relator asserted that she did not commit misconduct and that her refusal to be vaccinated was based on religious beliefs. Noting that relator failed to answer the questions about her religion on the application for a religious exemption and did not mention religion in the letter she submitted in lieu of the application indicated that her decision not to be vaccinated, the Court of Appeals concluded that the record supported the ULJ’s conclusion that relator’s decision was based on a personal, not a religious, view of the COVID-19 vaccination. Affirmed.
A22-1103 Dahle v. United Cmty. Action P’ship (Dep’t of Emp’t & Econ. Dev.)
Zoning
Conditional Use Permits
Relators challenged the denial of a conditional use permit (CUP) to operate a winery on their agriculturally zoned property. Noting that the county board failed to articulate any facts to explain why the CUP, with its 17 conditions which appeared to address the public concerns, was denied, the Court of Appeals concluded that the denial of the CUP lacked a reasonable basis. Reversed and remanded.
A22-0982 In re Application of Goodpaster (Chisago County Bd. of Comm’rs)
Criminal Precedential
Probation Revocation
Need for Confinement
Defendant challenged the District Court’s order revoking his probation, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion by concluding that the need for his confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation. Defendant emphasized that the parties and the probation department jointly recommended that he continue on probation. The Court of Appeals held that, when determining whether to revoke probation and order imprisonment, a District Court must independently determine whether revocation and imprisonment are appropriate under the applicable legal standards and is not bound by a joint recommendation of the parties and the probation department to continue the offender on probation. Affirmed.
A22-1459 State v. Fortner (Olmstead County)
Criminal Nonprecedential
Controlled Substance Crimes
Knowledge
In this direct appeal, defendant challenged his conviction of fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance. He argued that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. Alternatively, he argued that he was entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument and thereby prejudiced his right to a fair trial. Noting that none of the circumstances proved suggested that defendant believed the pipe contained anything other than methamphetamine, the Court of Appeals concluded that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. Affirmed.
A22-0712 State v. Armstrong (Cass County)
Evidence
Relevance
Two family members of defendant came forward and reported allegations of sexual assault by defendant for instances when they were children. Having been convicted of first-degree and second-degree criminal sexual conduct, defendant appealed on the grounds that the District Court erred when it allowed testimony from defendant’s supervised release agent regarding prejudicial pornographic search terms found on defendant’s cellphone and testimony by defendant’s biological niece regarding a prior instance of sexual assault by defendant when she was a child. The Court of Appeals concluded that the pornographic search terms were relevant because the nature of the searches—relating to father-daughter pornography—showed a sexual proclivity of defendant that was consistent with the charges against him and any prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value. Furthermore, the niece’s relationship evidence did not significantly affect the verdict. Affirmed.
A22-0618 State v. Abrams (Hennepin County)
Expert Witnesses
Domestic Abuse
Defendant challenged his convictions after a jury found him guilty of felony domestic assault and false imprisonment, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion by admitting expert witness testimony on typical behaviors of victims and abusers in relationships in which domestic violence is present. Defendant also challenged his sentence, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion by imposing (1) an upward dispositional sentencing departure based on the presence of a child as an aggravating factor for domestic assault—count one, (2) a consecutive sentence for count two—false imprisonment, and (3) sentences using a guidelines range for counts two and three—false imprisonment. Noting the expert’s testimony was offered to explain the victim’s behavior, and that expert’s corresponding descriptions of typical domestic abuser behaviors served that purpose, the Court of Appeals concluded that admitting the expert testimony was not an abuse of discretion, and any error was harmless. Furthermore, there was no error in the sentencing determinations on counts one and three. But the District Court erred by making the sentence for count two consecutive to the presumptively stayed sentence for count one. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
A21-1415 State v. Prevo (Meeker County)
Plea Withdrawal
Accuracy
Petitioner challenged the postconviction court’s denial of his request for plea withdrawal to one count of knowingly violating a registration requirement by failing to register. Noting that the plea colloquy showed that petitioner did not plead guilty to an offense greater than he could have been convicted of if he had gone to trial, the Court of Appeals concluded that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion. Affirmed.
A22-1482 Peterson v. State (Rice County)
Plea Withdrawal
Voluntary & Intelligent
Police found methamphetamine in a car where defendant was a passenger. Defendant admitted that the methamphetamine belonged to him and pleaded guilty to third-degree possession of a controlled substance. On appeal, defendant argued that his plea was neither voluntary nor intelligent, the District Court abused its discretion by denying his requests for downward departures, and his warrant of commitment listed the wrong offense. The Court of Appeals concluded that defendant understood his guilty plea when he agreed to it and the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied his requests for downward departures. But defendant’s warrant of commitment listed the wrong offense. Affirmed in part and remanded.
A22-1006 State v. Adams (Lake County)
Predatory Offender Registration
Dismissed Offenses
The state charged defendant with promoting prostitution, aiding and abetting racketeering, aiding and abetting concealing criminal proceeds, and sex trafficking of a minor. In exchange for the state’s agreement to dismiss the concealing-criminal-proceeds and sex-trafficking charges, defendant pleaded guilty to promoting prostitution and aiding and abetting racketeering. The District Court convicted him and, based on the dismissed sex-trafficking charge, informed defendant of his obligation to register as a predatory offender when he completed his prison sentence. Defendant petitioned for postconviction relief to challenge the registration requirement. The postconviction court denied his motion for relief. The Court of Appeals concluded that, because defendant’s dismissed sex-trafficking charge arose out of the same set of circumstances as his racketeering conviction, defendant had an obligation to register as a predatory offender. Affirmed.
A22-0971 Turner v. State (Washington County)
Probation Revocation
Condition Violations
Probationer-defendant left Minnesota for about eight years after the District Court authorized him to leave the state for only one week. The District Court found that probationer violated his probation. It therefore revoked his probation and executed his 86-month sentence for his underlying controlled-substance conviction. Probationer argued on appeal from that decision that the District Court erroneously revoked his probation when it found that he violated a condition never imposed and found that the need for his confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation. The Court of Appeals concluded that probationer’s unauthorized remaining absent from the state for a period longer than he was permitted violated the term of his probation requiring him not to leave without permission and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in its weighing of confinement against continued probation. Affirmed.
A22-1147 State v. Benitez-Rivero (Freeborn County)
Probation Revocation
Need for Confinement
Defendant challenged the District Court’s decision to revoke his probation and sentence him to 36 months in prison, followed by ten years of conditional release. He argued that the District Court abused its discretion by finding that the need for confinement outweighed the policies favoring continued probation, and by revoking his probation based on that finding. Noting that defendant failed to complete domestic-violence treatment, chemical-dependency treatment, and sex-offender treatment and intentionally violated the conditions of probation multiple times, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court’s decision to revoke defendant’s probation was not an abuse of its discretion. Affirmed.
A22-1153 State v. Bowers (Olmsted County)
Sentencing
Downward Departures
On appeal from his conviction of first-degree burglary, defendant argued that the District Court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a downward dispositional departure. Noting that the District Court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information before making its determination that it could not find defendant particularly amenable to treatment, the Court of Appeals discerned no abuse of discretion. Affirmed.
A22-0789 State v. Gaye (Ramsey County)
Sentencing
Downward Departures
In this direct appeal after conviction of conspiracy to commit second-degree possession of a controlled substance, defendant argued that the District Court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a downward durational sentencing departure. The Court of Appeals concluded that defendant did not show that this was one of those rare instances in which the District Court abused its sentencing discretion. Affirmed.
A22-0697 State v. Hunt (Steele County)
Threats
Intent
Defendant challenged his felony conviction for making threats of violence, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to terrorize the victim or acted in reckless disregard of that risk. Noting that, when his mother refused to let him take his children from her house, defendant responded with verbal and physical acts that occurred both inside and outside of the house and included express threats of bodily harm against three people, the Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence supported the finding of intent. Affirmed.
A22-0667 State v. Hassan (Hennepin County)
Traffic Stops
Traffic Violations
Following a traffic stop, defendant was convicted of gross-misdemeanor third degree driving while impaired (DWI). In this direct appeal, defendant argued that the District Court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the stop because the stop was not supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion of a traffic violation. Noting that video from the officer’s dashboard camera supported the District Court’s findings that defendant failed to yield to the officer, that the left-side tires of her car touched the road’s centerline, and that she passed another vehicle on the right at an intersection, the Court of Appeals concluded that the record showed an objective basis for the stop. Affirmed.
A22-0746 State v. Tayborn (Ramsey County)