Civil
Attorney Discipline
Admonitions
In this discipline case, an attorney challenged the findings made by a panel of the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board and the discipline imposed. The Supreme Court held that (1) a panel of the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board did not clearly err by finding that appellant attorney solicited professional employment for pecuniary gain in person on two occasions over consecutive days and gave an individual advertising material without properly affixing the words “Advertising Material” to the outside of the envelope, thereby violating Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 7.3(a) and (c); and (2) in this case, an admonition is the appropriate discipline for an attorney who violated two solicitation rules, Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 7.3(a) and (c).
Admonition affirmed.
A22-0413 In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct in Panel File No. 43372 (Original Jurisdiction)
Employment
Hostile Work Environment
This case arose out of an age-based employment discrimination claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. Respondent/cross-appellant employee alleged that she suffered a hostile work environment and disparate treatment culminating in constructive discharge during her employment at appellant/cross-respondent school district. The District Court granted summary judgment for the school district on both claims, ruling in part that employee had “voluntarily resigned her position without taking advantage” of the school district’s anti-discrimination policies. The Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment on the disparate treatment claim but affirmed summary judgment on the hostile work environment claim.
The Supreme Court held that (1) the employee did not create a genuine issue of material fact on her claim of a hostile work environment based upon age under the Minnesota Human Rights Act when the conduct alleged was not sufficiently severe or pervasive for a reasonable person to find the work environment to be hostile or abusive; (2) to establish an adverse employment action in the form of constructive discharge as part of a discrimination claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, an employee is not necessarily required to prove the existence of a hostile work environment, but must demonstrate that the employer’s actions were intended to force the employee to quit—as the employee did here—either by demonstrating (a) that the employer deliberately created intolerable working conditions with intent to force the employee to quit, or (b) that resignation was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the employer’s discriminatory actions; and (3) the employee did not establish the adverse employment action element of a claim of age-based disparate treatment under the Minnesota Human Rights Act by relying on the cumulative effect of the employer’s actions. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
A21-0004 Henry v. Indep. School Dist. #625
Governors
Emergency Powers
This case arose from Governor Walz’s declaration of a peacetime emergency under the Emergency Management Act, and the executive order Governor Walz issued that required that Minnesotans wear face coverings. Appellants petitioned for a writ of quo warranto challenging Executive Order 20-81—the face-covering mandate. According to appellants, Governor Walz’s declaration of a peacetime emergency to combat a public health crisis overstepped his powers under the Emergency Management Act, and Executive Order 20-81 violated their constitutional rights in several ways. On these grounds, appellants asked the District Court to enjoin enforcement of Executive Order 20-81, along with “any other emergency executive order related to COVID-19” issued under the Emergency Management Act. Respondents—Governor Walz and Attorney General Ellison—moved to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The District Court granted respondents’ motion and dismissed the case. Appellants appealed, and while the appeal was pending the peacetime emergency and the mask mandate ended. The Court of Appeals then dismissed the appeal as moot. Review was granted on the mootness issue.
The Supreme Court held that (1) because the question of whether the Emergency Management Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 12.01–.61 (2022), allows the Governor to declare a peacetime emergency in response to a public health crisis is functionally justiciable and an issue of statewide importance that should be decided immediately, that question is justiciable under an exception to the mootness doctrine; (2) because appellants have not shown a reasonable expectation that they will be subjected to a statewide face-covering mandate in the future, their claims alleging that the mandate violates the constitution and conflicts with statute are moot and not justiciable under the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review doctrine; and (3) because respondents have met their burden to show that it is absolutely clear that Executive Order Number 20-81 (or a substantially similar order) is not reasonably expected to recur, appellants’ claims that Executive Order 20-81 violates the constitution and conflicts with statute are moot and not justiciable under the voluntary-cessation doctrine.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
A21-0626 Snell v. Walz (Court of Appeals)
Criminal
Right to Confrontation
Remote Testimony
The issue raised by this case was whether a criminal defendant’s right to confrontation under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions is violated when a District Court allows a witness to testify using live, two-way, remote video technology during a jury trial in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic. Appellant was charged with the third-degree sale of a controlled substance. During her jury trial, the District Court allowed one of the State’s five witnesses to testify via Zoom after the witness was exposed to COVID-19 and forced to quarantine. After the jury found appellant guilty, she challenged her conviction on appeal, arguing that her constitutional right to confrontation was violated when the District Court allowed the witness to testify via Zoom. In a precedential opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the District Court to allow the remote testimony.
The Supreme Court held that (1) the two-part test set forth in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), applies to determine whether a defendant’s right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 6, of the Minnesota Constitution has been violated when a witness testifies during trial by use of live, two-way, remote video technology; and (2) the defendant’s right to confrontation under the federal and state constitutions was not violated when the District Court permitted one witness to testify using live, two way, remote video technology during a jury trial because the remote testimony was necessary under the circumstances then presented by the COVID 19 pandemic, and the testimony was sufficiently reliable. Affirmed.
A21-0359 State v. Tate (Court of Appeals)